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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“The key to formulating effective responsive strategies to cybercrime is to understand the 
different perspectives that the different actors in the field of cybercrime bring to the subject 
rather than see them in binary terms as either right or wrong... See, for example, the different, 
but real, experiences of the business community and the individual user. It is also crucial to 
hold realistic expectations of what the police can and cannot do.” 
David Wall, ‘Cybercrime, Media and Insecurity:  
The Shaping of Public Perceptions of Cybercrime’1 
 
 
If the warnings are to be believed, organised crime is rapidly taking over criminal 
activity on the Internet, cynically exploiting legitimate business models in the pursuit of 
huge profit. At the same time, some critics remain doubtful whether such statements 
can be taken to be authoritative or are merely ‘hype’. They highlight the issue that 
‘organised crime’ is an imprecise concept which is very susceptible to subjective 
interpretation. 
 
A substantial academic literature has developed over half a century to answer the 
question, ‘What is organised crime?’ and still the concept remains elusive, complicated 
by the recent emergence of the online criminal groups. These groups share many 
characteristics with their terrestrial counterparts yet they are also, due to their 
sophisticated exploitation of the benefits and vulnerabilities of the Internet, said to be 
evolving new characteristics whereby they are more educated, innovative and 
collaborative than the crime groups that came before them. 2 
 
For governments, law enforcement, Information Security (IS) professionals and others 
who are tasked with protecting the valuable assets accessible stored on the Internet, 
‘tried and trusted’ resources such as technical countermeasures and the international 
Information Security Standards, the 27000 series, have existed for some time to 
combat all types of online threat, including those from organised crime. In the last few 
years, professionals from all disciplines have recognised that they can no longer work 
in ‘silos’ and must collaborate to manage the problem. Considerable progress is being 
made in this area, for instance with the publication of national cybersecurity and 
organised crime strategies in the US and UK. 
 
However, if it is true that there is a close correlation between online organised crime 
and business, perhaps there is another resource available which remains largely 
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unrecognised and unexploited and which can perhaps be applied equally to legal and 
illegal ventures, namely the insights which a business perspective can bring to a 
situation. Is there potential for IS and business professionals (IS/business 
professionals) to contribute to the multi-disciplinary approach to combating organised 
crime by applying strategic management methods and their professional knowledge 
and expertise? Is there mileage in considering online organised crime ‘primarily as a 
business activity’ 3 or ‘as various forms of business activity which may or may not have 
attracted the label of criminality’? 4  
 
This paper explores these issues and related questions, with a view to maximising the 
resources of IS/ business professionals when risk-assessing technology-oriented 
organised crime, in particular online organised crime threats. 
 
1.1 Overall Purpose 
 
The overall intent of this paper is to raise awareness about the multi-disciplinary 
resources for combating online organised crime which already exist and to suggest 
approaches to assist IS/ business professionals in the strategic management of anti-
online organised crime strategies.  
 
It is intended that this purpose is achieved by building on the findings of Gilligan, 5 
Gottschalk 6 and others by extending their approach to the arena of online criminal 
activity. 
 
1.2 Specific Objectives 
 
The specific objectives of this project are to: 
• Present a basic overview of some of the different attitudes and perspectives 
which are associated with the concept of ‘organised crime’ 
• Raise awareness of the diverse range of existing resources for combating 
organised crime, including online organised crime, that can be utilised by any 
sector which adopts a multi-disciplinary approach 
• Separate the ‘facts from the fiction’ of organised crime, with specific focus on 
aspects which most concern IS/business professionals 
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• Compare and contrast key terrestrial and technology-oriented organised crime 
characteristics 
• Categorise some of the threats and vulnerabilities within modern information 
technology which online organised crime groups (OOCGs) can exploit 
• Briefly highlight the significance of legal/illegal online business models 
• Highlight existing theoretical and practical multi-disciplinary methods which IS/ 
business professionals can utilise when analysing online organised crime data 
within their specific roles. 
 
1.3 Scope 
 
This paper takes a high-level business management approach to IS and technology-
oriented organised crime, with a specific focus on online organised crime. In-depth 
social, economic and technical assessments of technology-oriented organised crime 
threats are outside scope as they have been addressed elsewhere and would 
constitute whole papers in themselves. Wherever possible, the reader is directed to 
sources of further reading for these and other subjects. 
Aside from contextual international references, the paper has an overall Western 
capitalist perspective towards organised crime.  
Due to word limit restrictions and the vast potential scope, the paper is unable to 
address every aspect of the subject. Consequently, it assumes that the reader is 
conversant with IS concepts such as ‘risk’, ‘threat’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘encryption’, ‘virus’ 
and ‘botnet’. 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The methods used in this paper consist of: 
• A literature review (books, journals, industry reports, Internet searches) across 
the disciplines of criminology, sociology, economics, law, commerce and IS. 
The literature review focuses primarily on post-2000 material and includes both 
UK and international sources such as government and private sector reports, 
academic books and papers and media coverage (eg from newspapers and the 
Internet). 
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• Tabulation of the key characteristics of terrestrial and technology-oriented 
organised crime 
• Comparison between theoretical online crime characteristics and real-life case 
studies 
• Application of Morphological Analysis within a hypothetical practical context.  
Note about Web Sources: This paper recognises that the use of web sources in 
academic projects continues to be problematic for a variety of reasons, some of 
which are discussed in relation to the portrayal of high-profile IS incidents.  
However, to ignore them completely within the context of current organised crime 
discussion would be to distort the cultural context of the situation. Also, although 
there are many unverifiable, transitory sources available on the Internet, it is also 
used as the primary medium for serious news media, academic and technical 
reference points, interviews and discussions which may not be published 
elsewhere. 
Accordingly, web sources are used within this paper and its references with some 
caution and predominantly within the following contexts: 
- Where the information is from a well-established recognised source (eg 
the BBC.co.uk or TimesOnline.co.uk  websites) 
- To provide links to copies of electronic academic journals  
- To provide examples of how the online media industry portrays 
organised crime 
- Where a web source indicates an innovative approach or piece of 
information which may not have been identified elsewhere. 
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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
“Amateurs study cryptography. Professionals study economics.” 
Shostack and Stewart, Ch 5, ‘The New School of Information Security’ (2008) 1 
 
“Looking to the future the equation is simple. Money is going electronic and where money goes 
so will organised crime.” 
Bob Packham, Deputy Director General, UK National Crime Squad (2001) 2 
 
 
This paper provides a high-level evaluation of organised crime and the threats arising 
from online organised crime, within a multi-disciplinary perspective. It draws on a range 
of academic, industry and other materials to distinguish the key characteristics of 
online organised crime and to identify some of the multi-disciplinary resources which 
are available to counter it.  Real-life case studies and other examples, together with the 
Tables in the Appendices, are used to demonstrate how contemporary online 
organised crime is profit-driven and has a strong commercial focus. 
 
The paper is accompanied by a series of Appendices and Glossaries and a 
comprehensive Reference list (provided within a separate document to facilitate cross-
referencing with this paper) that includes suggestions for further reading and research. 
 
Section Three begins by demonstrating how there are many possible approaches 
which can be taken towards organised crime, which may at first appear confusing, 
contradictory or overwhelming. It mentions that law enforcement is adopting a multi-
disciplinary approach and working in partnership with other sectors, including the 
business sector, to counter the problem. 
 
Next, the paper attempts to separate the ‘fact from the fiction’ of organised crime, 
highlighting the pitfalls of relying on any single source (for instance, media reports or 
statistics) when analysing the subject. It identifies reliable sources for information about 
organised crime (for instance, the United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crime and several established, academic sources) and aggregates some of 
the key organised crime characteristics from the sources within Tables 1 to 6 in 
Appendix A.  
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Having established that, despite initial impressions, it is possible to obtain a consensus 
view about theoretical organised crime characteristics within carefully-defined 
parameters, the project aligns the theoretical criteria against real-life online organised 
crime case studies. This establishes that, although there are many similarities between 
terrestrial and online organised crime groups (OOCGs), the online groups also display 
characteristics which are unique to them, for instance a high dependence on the use of 
the Internet and transnational strategies.  
 
With regard to online involvement by ‘traditional’ organised crime groups such as the 
Mafia, the paper highlights that, although there is some indication in both the 
theoretical literature and the case studies that traditional organised crime groups are 
targeting the Internet, the evidence in the case studies suggests that involvement of 
traditional organised crime groups is not a dominant feature at the moment. 
 
In Section Four, the paper assumes a non-technical IS perspective and describes 
some of the vulnerable elements within information technology, especially within the 
structures of the Internet and the Web, which all offenders, including OOCGs, are 
exploiting. It explains some of the reasons why these vulnerabilities exist and why they 
are attractive to offenders. In particular, it highlights the serious threat which 
crimeware, which is often sold and distributed by OOCGs, poses to the Web 
environment. 
 
In Section Five, the paper shifts to a business perspective, emphasising the 
importance of understanding online organised crime business models and mentioning 
the work of particular authors whose work in this field adopts a multi-disciplinary 
approach.  
 
The paper then uses Morphological Analysis (MA) to demonstrate how a multi-
disciplinary approach to strategic analysis can utilise the skills and experience of IS/ 
business professionals, as well as assisting them to manage the threat which OOCGs 
may pose to their business. 
 
The paper concludes with the observation from academic and industry sources that 
directly targeting the profit-making aspects of an online organised crime business may 
be one of the most effective responses to the problem. 
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3 OVERVIEW OF ORGANISED CRIME 
 
3.1 Different Perceptions about Organised Crime 
 
‘Much of the Mafia image revolves around symbols associated with mysticism …mystification 
….and styles of self-presentation….There is drama associated with Mafia identity and Mafia 
activity, even if much of the actual activity of the people involved in such groups is in fact quite 
unglamorous and dull.’ 
Eric Gordy, ‘Notes from the Iron Cage’ (February 2006) 1 
 
‘An instant gangster classic. This is in a league with the epics of Scorsese and Coppola.'   
Quotation from ‘Empire’ Magazine, cited on the film poster for 
  ‘Mesrine: Killer Instinct’ (Released in UK, August 2009) 
 
‘It’s about time law enforcement got as organised as organised crime.’ 
Rudy Giuliani, Former Mayor of New York (October 1984) 2 
‘Organised crime taking over spam – survey’ 
Global Secure Systems (July 2004) 3 
 
‘Organised crime’ is an emotive, confusing and controversial subject which can conjure 
many widely-divergent associations, as illustrated by the examples above. 4  Unlike 
many other forms of crime, associations with organised crime permeate the 
consciousness of people all over the world, in subtle ways.  
 
One objective this paper will attempt to demonstrate will be to show that, although it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reach a single consensus on the subject of 
‘organised crime’, multi-disciplinary professionals working in this field can use the 
varying perceptions to their advantage. 
 
3.1.1 The International Perspective  
 
At the international level, the history, popular image and perceptions of organised 
crime have a long tradition and deep cultural resonance within many countries across 
the world, as is the case in Italy, the United States and Japan. Crime organisations, in 
the sense of their most basic meaning of a group of people jointly engaged in activities 
contrary to their society’s designated norms, have existed for millennia 5.  
 
Societal attitudes towards organised crime vary depending on the values of the society 
in which the organised crime group operates, the robustness of the organised crime 
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group structure (for instance, whether it is based on an established ethnic or other 
dynasty), actual or perceived corruption within the State and the extent to which the 
activities of the organised crime group are perceived to be integrated within the norms 
of that society. 
 
3.1.2 The Public/ Media Perspectives 
 
To the layperson, ‘organised crime’ may evoke images of Mafia or other ‘gangster 
chic’.  As the first two quotations that head this section illustrate, organised crime 
retains a mystique due to its inherently clandestine nature and its ambivalent treatment 
in the media. This mystique, together with the dramatic potential of its ‘larger than life’  
aspects, for instance, escalated levels of violence and the potential for enormous 
profits, can be exaggerated for dramatic effect, evoking contradictory emotions such as 
fear and admiration.  
 
At the same time, according to the UK government, the public ‘recognises that serious 
organised crime is a significant problem’, with 84% of respondents believing ‘it was a 
very or fairly big problem in the UK, with one in three thinking it was a problem where 
they live.’ 6  A recent UK Home Office report states that the estimated annual cost of 
organised crime activity to the British economy is in the region of £30 billion and that 
‘there was a 250 per cent increase’ over the previous year ’in the use of malicious 
programmes’ by organised crime groups in 2008 alone. 7 
 
It is this capacity to superimpose both positive and negative associations without 
apparent contradiction which differentiates organised crime from other, supposedly 
more ‘mundane’ categories of crime 8 in the public perception. Real and mythical 
criminal gang leaders such as Ronald Biggs, Jonathan Wild, Robin Hood, Fagin, Al 
Capone, Bonnie and Clyde, the Kray Twins, Don Corleone and Tony Soprano have 
attained equal status as archetypes within the criminal folklore of the Western tradition.  
 
In many cases, for instance in the case of Jacques Mesrine (the subject of the film in 
the poster quotation), a factual character is able to achieve iconic status in their country 
of origin or across the world through their portrayal in the mass media of their age.9  
Literature, films and music available on the Internet and elsewhere may all present 
mixed messages where such characters are portrayed as anti-heroes, thus 
encouraging public empathy towards their situations. For instance, dilemmas arising 
from the ‘honour among thieves’ secret codes derived from certain crime groups, such 
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as the omerta (code of silence) of the original Sicilian Mafia, can be exaggerated to 
place the anti-hero within a sympathetic moral and ethical context. 
 
These quasi-romantic associations with organised crime clearly influenced the 
attitudes of some early hackers. In 2004, PCWorld 10  reported the example of one 
former Russian ‘hacker-turned-teacher’ who had written a message on 
GlobalSecurity.org which described how, during his childhood, he and a couple of 
friends hacked programmes and distributed them for free: 
 
‘It was like our donation to society …It was a form of honour. (We were) like Robin 
Hood bringing programmes to people.’   
 
Similarly, Michael Calce, the 15-year-old student from Canada who launched a series 
of attacks in 2000 against some of the leading commercial websites, including 
Amazon.com, Yahoo! and eBay, remains more commonly known by the alias he chose 
to represent his online identity, MafiaBoy. 
 
Furthermore, contemporary media treatment of real and fictitious criminal activity as 
entertainment, for instance the media portrayal of real and fictitious hacking activity, 
has often been exaggerated and ambiguous. This blurring of fact and fiction distorts 
the public perception of crime in favour of offenders and can create a false sense of 
familiarity with the subject. 11 
 
Recently, software and online games have created a new entertainment category 
which further blurs the distinctions between real and fictional organised crime, with 
Neoseeker.com listing over 50 software games whose titles have a ‘Mob/Organised 
Crime’ theme and that are inspired by both real and fictitious sources. 12  
 
3.1.3 The Government/ Law Enforcement Perspectives 
 
For governments and law enforcers in capitalist societies, modern organised crime is 
considered to be ‘one of the major threats we face’ 13, with an international reach that 
extends from terrestrial prostitution and narcotics networks through to electronic 
money-laundering and other forms of new and adapted Information Technology-
oriented ‘cybercrimes’. In its 2003 European Security Strategy, 14 the EU identifies 
‘organised crime’ as one of the 5 key security threats to its members and the 2009 
‘State of the Future’ report from the Millennium Project highlights the ‘enormity’ of the 
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threat of transnational organised crime, stating that: ‘Its global income is estimated to 
be about $3 trillion, which is twice all the military budgets of the world combined.’ 15 
 
In response, Western countries have been updating and creating new national and 
international laws and agreements. 16  Governments and law enforcement are also 
forging stronger ties with the private sector and are endeavouring to add to traditional 
law enforcement and detection techniques targeted at specific crimes by adopting a 
wider, strategic perspective that addresses the totality of the criminal environment and 
which seeks ‘to cement a collaborative approach and to embrace wide-ranging tactics.’ 17  
 
However, as is also the case with the academic and industry studies mentioned below, 
it is only recently that technology-oriented organised crime, including online organised 
crime, has begun to receive specific attention in government reports. 18 As combating 
organised crime is extremely resource-intensive, it remains to be seen if government 
resourcing and commitment will be sufficient to sustain their objectives. 19 
 
3.1.4 The Academic Perspective 
 
For academics, organised crime is ‘a slippery concept, notably resistant to precise 
definition due to its blurring of activities and structures’. 20  As Reuter observes: ‘For 
some, it is a set of relationships; for others, a particular set of activities.21  Klaus von 
Lampe 22, on his ‘Organised Crime’ reference website, cites over 100 different 
government and other references for sources which provide ‘organised crime’ 
definitions, including several from different government organisations.  
 
Although academic literature about the definition of ‘organised crime’ and its 
characteristics is extensive (encompassing, for instance, criminology, economic, 
sociology and legal contributions), relatively little serious academic research has been 
undertaken to date into researching the multi-disciplinary aspects of online organised 
crime. Consequently, the potential insights such an approach might bring remain 
largely untapped and fragmented across different disciplines. 23  
 
3.1.5 The Victim’s Perspective 
 
In the case of victims, their perceptions may vary widely. In some cases, they may be 
unaware that they are being affected by organised crime at all. 24  In other 
circumstances, for instance where victims live in societies with long-established 
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organised crime groups such as Sicily, or where the boundaries between legal and 
illegal activity are unclear and exploited, such as in Russia or Columbia, they may 
associate organised crime with fear, violence and repression. Conversely, victims’ 
attitudes may be that organised crime is a semi-mundane aspect of their daily 
existence or even a necessary evil which compensates for deficiencies of the state.25 
 
3.1.6 The Economic Perspective 
 
In the field of modern economics, Becker’s ground-breaking ‘rational crime’ theory, 26 
whereby individual crime decisions are calculated by weighing up the ‘pros and cons’ 
of the costs (eg the likelihood of punishment) and benefits (eg financial reward) of the 
situation, continues to be influential. One of Becker’s key concepts is the notion of 
‘psychic’ costs (ie non-monetary costs) such as thrill-seeking, which has translated well 
to the field of sociology, where it aligns with the socioeconomic concepts of ‘human’, 
‘social’ and ‘personal’ capital. 27 
 
With specific regard to organised criminal activity, there are two main schools of 
thought as to whether ‘organised crime’ is ‘market-based or occurs within the 
framework of an organisation.’ 28 Dick, writing in 1995, 29 proposes a ‘transaction cost-
based theory of organised crime’, based in part on the work of Schelling, who sees ‘the 
organised criminal firm as a formal governance structure that specialises in providing 
illegal goods and services to downstream buyers’.30 Dick concludes that transaction 
costs (ie any costs incurred from buying or selling assets),31 as opposed to monopoly 
power (Schelling’s theory), primarily determine the activities of organised crime firms. 32 
 
Citing Anderson’s transaction cost analysis study of the Sicilian Mafia, 33  Gottschalk 
extends Dick’s analysis, mentioning that, for offenders, ‘considerable transaction costs 
may arise to avoid profit seizure and loss of personal freedom’ when factors such as 
avoiding the consequences of monitoring by the police and informant activity are taken 
into account. 34 
 
3.1.7 The Corporate Perspective 
 
The corporate world, while taking on board the economic factors, will also view 
‘organised crime’ from a risk management perspective. For senior managers, 
‘organised crime’ is one among many potential risks on the list which is currently 
headed by the impacts of the current worldwide economic recession.  
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The ability to accurately balance the probable risk from all types of organised crime 
against other business elements is hampered by the fact that, in the past, businesses 
have been reluctant to formally disclose information about all types of serious online 
crimes, for reasons including: 
 
• fear of lost profits 
• reputational damage leading to reduced consumer confidence 
• losing control of the business (for instance due to potential business continuity 
issues due to system ‘down-time’ during formal incident investigation) 35 
• concerns that disclosing third party personal data on the borderline of 
confidentiality could lead to costly legal challenges (irrespective of whether 
those challenges had any merit) 
• concerns that revealing a serious security breach could expose vulnerabilities 
which could target further criminal attention towards them.  
 
This, in turn, limited the number of business-specific incidents recorded in industry and 
government statistics and case studies. Many US States, following the example of 
California’s SB 1386, have enacted legislation which mandates disclosure of loss of 
personal data. 36 The recent high-profile UK data loss incidents have prompted debate 
as to whether similar legislation should be enacted in the UK. 37 
 
This situation is reflected in a speech by former UK Home Secretary David Blunkett at 
the launch of the 3-year Business Crime Reduction Centre (BCRC) Project, part of the 
EU-sponsored European Crime Prevention Network, in which he declared that: 
 
‘Crime destroys businesses; from traditional industries to modern companies using 
advanced IT systems. Businesses across the board have generally had a blinkered 
attitude to organised crime. Now they face the next major challenge – high-tech crime 
and the sheer enormity of what can be done with the transfer of information.’ 38 
 
Blunkett’s statement captures the current mood of public statements issuing from both 
the corporate and IS industries in that, until recently, in the main, the threat from 
organised crime was considered to be a peripheral, non-typical issue for some, though 
not all, industry sectors. 39 
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3.1.8 The Information Security Perspective 
 
To some extent, the IS industry, working in concert with government and law 
enforcement agencies, has also been aware since at least the last century about the 
potential for organised crime to exploit online data and to threaten national security. In 
the late 1980s, the incidents described by Stoll in ‘The Cuckoo’s Egg’ revealed a far-
reaching pattern of transnational, organised online criminal activity and espionage 
driven by financial payments for technical expertise and information.40 Likewise, in 
2002 and 2006, CERT®  41 was highlighting the affinity between legal and illegal online 
business models.  
 
However, it was the arrest and conviction in 2004 of members of the international 
ShadowCrew organisation, together with the subsequent identified links between the 
Russian Business Network (RBN) and the technically-advanced ‘Storm’ (2006) and 
‘Conficker’ (2008) ‘botnets’, which captured the imagination of the media and which 
were instrumental in raising the profile of the scale and sophistication of the problem. 42 
Until that time, the predominant IS industry focus had been to combat specific known 
technical threats to information such as viruses and worms, which were being 
generated by disparate individuals or small groups with many different motivations 
including altruism, curiosity, arrogance and peer recognition. Although there were 
exceptions, many of the earliest hackers were not motivated by profit or found few 
opportunities to exploit the Internet financially.  
 
Gradually, however, the IS industry has identified significant changes in the 
membership structures and modes of operation of the perpetrators, which were 
reflected in the nature of the attacks. Whereas formerly, most attack vectors had been 
through ‘malware’, the industry has begun to see a greater number of co-ordinated 
technical and non-technical blended and multi-layered threats, such as those which are 
incorporated within crimeware ‘toolkits’.  
 
Many IS professionals will now be aware that widely-publicised recent industry reports 
and white papers 43  are sending a message that ‘individual hackers operating 
independently or groups of hackers with common goals’ 44  have been replaced by the 
underground, highly-complex, sophisticated, technically-advanced and predominantly 
profit-driven professional organisations such as the Russian Business Network (RBN).  
These industry reports warn that such organisations are threatening e-commerce and 
other business sectors at all levels by successfully undertaking the production and 
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distribution of crimeware such as malicious code on a mass scale, 45 by becoming 
more collaborative and mimicking or creating similar business models and strategies to 
those of legitimate markets. 46  
 
One noticeable trend among some accounts is a tendency to associate online 
organised crime business models with the hierarchical structures of terrestrial 
organised crime groups (TOCGs) such as the Mafia. 47 The change among online 
offenders to employing more strategic and aggressive large-scale tactics led to Keith 
Laslop of Prolexic Technologies (whose network protection company was targeted as 
part of the Distributed Denial of Service campaign which brought down The Blue 
Security Team) remarking: 
 
‘We used to call the Internet a sort of Wild West. Now it’s more like Chicago in the 
1920s with Al Capone.’ 48 
 
The idea that there are similarities between legitimate and illegal corporate activity is 
also not new.  For instance, in his 1905 essay concerning Marxist capitalism, Bonger 49 
quotes a proverb, ‘No commerce without trickery’ and observes that:  
 
 ‘… with the ancients, Mercury, the god of commerce, was also the god of thieves.’   
 
More contemporary authors have questioned what, if anything, differentiates ‘white 
collar’ crime from the activities of ‘traditional’ crime organisations. 50 Chambliss finds 
that:  ‘one of the reasons we fail to understand organised crime is because we put 
crime into a category that is separate from normal business. Much crime does not fit 
into a separate category. It is primarily a business activity’. 51 Specific associations 
between organised crime and commerce are made by Cressey, whose view is that the 
Cosa Nostra is ‘both a business organisation and a government.’ 52 
 
The concept that commerce and crime are closely linked is epitomised by the title of 
Misha Glenny’s book, ‘McMafia – Seriously Organised Crime’, 53 which plays on 
similarities between the organisational structures and strategies of the underworld and 
global corporations such as McDonald’s. Likewise, ‘Tony Soprano on Management’ by 
Anthony Schneider, 54 advertised as an ‘offbeat leadership guide’ to management 
techniques, uses the language and imagery of organised crime and applies it at 
operational level. The role of the ‘Mafia accountant’ 55 is extant in both fact and fiction 
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and the term ‘the firm’ itself, while meaning any corporate enterprise, has a more 
specific meaning that applies to a criminal organisation.56  
 
With regard to OOCGs, the Russian Business Network (RBN), as its name implies, 
identifies with the goals of the legitimate corporate world to the extent that it is a profit-
driven, multi-national organisation that is structured similarly to a legitimate business.  
The similarities between legal and illegal online organised crime activity have particular 
relevance within the context of IS, for instance because of: 
• the tactics which OOCGs employ to mimic legitimate business strategies and 
models for the purpose of committing online crimes 
• the difficulty which people find in distinguishing between real and fake web 
content, even when they are security-aware 57  
• the psychological propensity for people to trust Internet content more than its 
terrestrial equivalent  58 by taking the public content of the Internet at face 
value.  
These factors, together with poor authentication techniques and the ease with which e-
mails, URLs and other content can be ‘spoofed’ leave users vulnerable and 
demonstrate that the adage ‘On the Internet, no-one knows you’re a dog’ continues to 
apply. 59
 
3.1.9 The Challenge of Synthesising Divergent Views 
 
The above examples give a flavour of the wide diversity of mindsets and approaches 
which can legitimately be applied to this complex subject.  All of them have validity and 
will be recognised within their own fields. A pressing challenge which faces law 
enforcement and the public and private sector organisations which wish to engage with 
the ‘joint working’ approach to combating organised crime at the corporate level is how 
to understand and synthesise the most significant findings about organised crime from 
all these disciplines (and others) in order to create a new, relevant and comprehensive 
holistic frame of reference.  
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The current challenges for IS/ business professionals at corporate and operational 
level with regard to all types of organised crime, include: 
 
• Acquiring a clear understanding of the true nature of organised crime as it 
affects information 
• Understanding how to risk assess the extent to which organised crime may be 
a threat to their particular organisation so that they can implement adequate 
and appropriate countermeasures if there is a requirement to do so 
• Understanding the boundaries of their role and the point at which they may 
need to involve law enforcement. 
 
It is a premise of this paper that the current tendency for organised crime to use or 
mimic legitimate techniques provides an opportunity as well as a problem for law 
enforcement agencies and IS/business professionals by allowing them to apply new 
management skills and techniques in the risk analysis of criminal situations. As Gilligan 
states: 
 
‘Organised crime, with its multiple character and capacity for adaptivity, is perhaps best 
thought of as a type of organisational crime and part of a continuum between business 
and crime. The nature of much illegal enterprise means that many questions about its 
structures are analogous to those asked of legal enterprise (although of course there 
are other questions which cannot be asked of legal enterprise). Consequently, an anti-
organised crime strategy should prioritise issues of conventional strategic 
management.’ 60 
  
Choosing to use such an approach opens up a wealth of possibilities, including the use 
of conventional ‘tried and tested’ strategic management analysis tools and 
methodologies.  Furthermore, it creates an opportunity for IS/ business professionals to 
contribute their specific skills and expertise in IS and corporate management to the 
multi-disciplinary anti-organised crime agenda.  
 
3.1.10 The Multi-Disciplinary Perspective 
 
The multi-disciplinary work undertaken by Gilligan, Gottschalk and others has provided 
a distinct starting point for investigating these possibilities. Gottschalk takes ‘a neutral 
approach to understanding crime and criminals’  and attempts to contribute to ‘the 
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bridge between entrepreneurship and crime’.  61 He brings together the fields of law 
enforcement, criminology, economics, organisational theories, business management 
and entrepreneurship with the purpose of defining a contemporary business model of 
criminal activity ‘to a sophisticated level’.   
 
For both Gilligan and Gottschalk, their primary aim has been to analyse terrestrial 
organised crime business structures for the purpose of assisting law enforcement 
strategies. The fifth section of this paper explores the potential for their findings, and 
those of others who take a multi-disciplinary approach, to be applied within an online 
IS/ business management context. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Anna Cevidalli  RHUL MSc Project – September 2009 (Main Document) 
 18/103 
3.2 Dispelling the Myths 
‘Organised crime is both more and less than the average person understands it to be. It is more 
pervasive, more dangerous and more diverse...’ 
J O Finckenauer, ‘The Mafia and Organized Crime’ (2007) 1  
 
The following sub-sections attempt to extract the fact from the fiction of organised 
crime, in order  to clear the way for subsequent analysis to concentrate on the aspects 
of organised crime which are genuinely significant to IS/ business professionals. 
 
As suggested in Section 3.1, individual perceptions, in particular the extent to which 
organised crime is perceived to directly impact on everyday business or personal 
reality, influence the level of importance which different sectors of society in different 
countries ascribe to the subject of organised crime. An appreciation of these different 
perceptions is an important cultural consideration for law enforcement officials, IS 
practitioners and other professionals with an investment in crime prevention and 
detection, both in terms of stakeholder engagement (for instance, with their own staff, 
their colleagues from other disciplines or the public) and also to obtain a fuller 
appreciation of all the factors which may underpin organised crime activity.  
 
It is the joint responsibility of all professionals who encounter organised crime in their 
day-to-day role to ensure that their own understanding and representation of the 
subject remains as up-to-date, proportionate to their role, accurate, unbiased, inclusive 
and supported by evidence as possible, in particular that they avoid unnecessary 
imprecision, exaggeration and ‘hype’. This may appear to be stating the obvious. 
However, some of the factors which blur the distinctions about this subject can be quite 
subtle and pervasive, as demonstrated by the examples immediately below, so it is 
vital that they are explicitly identified and avoided or addressed where appropriate. 
 
3.2.1 The Limitations of Public Pronouncements and Statistics 
 
Public statements from government, law enforcement agencies, the media and the IS 
industry are always subject to scrutiny. For instance, in 1984, Reuter analysed the 
relationship between the New York press and law enforcement agencies and 
concluded that they were engaged in a vicious cycle which ensured the Mafia’s 
reputation was maintained. He found that the media, who treated organised crime 
largely as entertainment, would report law enforcement activities that featured the 
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crime groups that were familiar to the public (namely the Mafia) and that law 
enforcement, in turn, were encouraged to focus on the Mafia knowing that they 
received Press attention for their activities. 2  
 
In 2008, Wall 3 singled out the following statement from a House of Lords Science and 
Technology Select Committee Report: 
 
‘But the Internet is now increasingly the playground of criminals. Where a decade ago 
the public perception of the e-criminal was of a lonely hacker searching for attention, 
today’s ‘bad guys’ belong to organised crime groups, are highly skilful, specialised and 
focused on profit. They want to stay invisible, and so far they have largely succeeded. 
While the incidence and cost of e-crime are known to be huge, no accurate data exist. ’4 
As well as highlighting the lack of credibility arising from the contradictory statements 
that ‘no accurate data exist’ and that the ‘incidence and cost of e-crime are known to 
be huge’, Wall suggests that there are implied messages that the offenders in question 
are all-powerful and that the authorities are powerless against them.  
Elsewhere, Wall sounds a warning against ‘the danger of confusing the rhetoric with 
the reality’ of cybercrime 5, advising people to ‘take a critical view’ of the production of 
cybercrime data 6, due to a number of reasons including the lack of sufficient reliable 
data, the vested and sometimes contradictory interests of the different parties and the 
different interpretations which can be applied to statistical data. 7   
 
Although statistical information is quantifiable and is more credible than anecdotal 
evidence, in its raw form it can be meaningless or misleading. Wall highlights some of 
the problems associated with the accurate capture and interpretation of statistical 
information. He cites the example of the ‘Incidents reported’ item in the intrusion 
statistics which were formerly produced by the Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT®) at Carnegie Mellon University, among others. This item was discontinued 
because, as CERT® explained, the attacks were now ‘commonplace’ due to 
automation, with the statistics regarded as low-level and not representative of actual 
crimes.8   
Thus, citing mere numbers of incidents, for instance in a business case for more 
funding, although they demonstrate that incidents are taking place and may indicate 
trends, is very context-dependent and may not be of much value when assessing risk.  
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From a traditional law enforcement intelligence perspective, filtering the potential 
supply of statistical information is problematic because anecdotal information may 
have the potential to reveal insights. All information relevant to a case is deemed to be 
potentially significant on the basis that individual jigsaw pieces of information, when 
studied together, may reveal a clue which is not apparent when they are examined by 
themselves (the ‘mosaic effect’ 9).  
 
However, for the reasons indicated by the CERT® example above, such an approach 
encounters difficulties with regard to the analysis of large-scale and widely-dispersed 
online crimes (such as electronic security audit logs) because the amount of data 
available may simply be too overwhelming and complex to analyse quickly, inhibiting 
rapid identification of the salient factors. Some of it may also be stored on inaccessible 
servers in countries which may be hostile or unwilling to co-operate with particular law 
enforcement agencies outside their own jurisdiction. 
 
Another statistical distortion with particular significance for law enforcement is the 
under-recording of online crime.  In the case of all potential victims, they may lack 
awareness about what constitutes a technology-related offence or they may not have a 
clear point of contact for reporting incidents. They may also be embarrassed or 
consider the incident to be trivial, with minimal impact, hence not worth reporting. 10 In 
some cases, they may be fearful of the consequences of reporting because it will 
reveal they have made a mistake or because they may be implicated as a perpetrator 
during the investigation. 
 
For corporate organisations, it is only recently that they have begun to adopt formal 
Incident Management procedures on a wide scale, with the likelihood that, in the past, 
many incidents would have remained unidentified. Even where incidents are identified, 
they may not be formally recorded or escalated.  
 
Recently, two new reasons topped the annual Computer Security Institute ‘CSI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey’. Each year, CSI asks its respondents to record 
reasons why they have not disclosed incidents, using a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being ‘of 
no importance’ as a reason and 7 being ‘of great importance’. In 2008, the main reason 
cited for not reporting an incident was ‘Incidents Too Small To Bother Reporting’ (with 
an average response of 4.33 on the scale), followed by ‘Believed Law Enforcement 
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Couldn’t Help’ (4.07), which was cited by 47% of the respondents as opposed to 22% 
the previous year. ‘Negative Publicity’ was placed third (3.71). 11 
 
It is unknown whether the high response to ‘Believed Law Enforcement Couldn’t Help’ 
reflected the participants’ belief that law enforcement was powerless to help, whether 
they felt that some incidents were not criminal and so did not require the assistance of 
law enforcement, a combination of both or something else entirely. Including these 
categories in future CSI surveys might clarify the issue. 
 
Once again, for law enforcement, potentially valuable data which could contribute to a 
‘mosaic effect’ may be being discarded as having little significance. Capturing 
important information by encouraging businesses and the public to disclose incidents, 
while managing the large response that could result, is one of the reasons why 
governments and law enforcement are placing a heavy emphasis on collaborative 
working with the public and private sectors, including raising awareness about the 
benefits of instigating formal Incident Response procedures.  
 
As well as issues associated with the under-recording of incidents, there is the added 
difficulty that, in some cases, more data may exist than can be released into the public 
domain, for instance where law enforcement agencies are following leads from one 
organised crime group which has been apprehended and which is public knowledge, to 
another group which is still in operation. A related critical issue is that any serious, in-
depth study of organised crime is a risky undertaking, 12 which involves a high 
proportion of classified data that must be protected and only disclosed on a ‘need to 
know’ basis.  
Furthermore, serious organised crime, as the quotation at the opening of this section 
suggests, attracts some of the most dangerous individuals in the criminal fraternity, 
with most large groups retaining some members whose value is their capacity for 
resorting to violence.  If compromised, information about such groups could jeopardise 
a criminal investigation that may have been in place for several years or, worse, 
endanger the life of individuals. Aside from information which is known and 
undisclosed, since most organised crime activity is covert, there may be little 
conclusive evidence of a threat until an organisation is actually targeted by an attack.  
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In terms of threat types, a situation is developing whereby sample collection for new 
types of threats is becoming ‘almost impossible’, due to the sheer volume increase in 
the number of threat types which have combined to form blended, targeted attacks, 
further complicated by the proliferation of variations of type of threats. 13 For instance, 
aside from the ‘traditional’ polymorphic viruses and worms, there are at least 4 different 
variations of spam type alone. 14 At the same time, whereas many of the earliest IS 
attacks comprised a single attacker (or a small group) and a single target (from which 
further attacks could be launched), the current threat landscape often comprises 
multiple attackers targeting multiple targets simultaneously, as in the case of 
distributed Distributed Denial of Service attacks. 15 
 
Therefore, as with all types of statistics, the capture of online crime incident data is not 
an exact art and interpretations of the same information will vary, depending on the 
skills, experience and objectives of the people processing the information. Since 
governments and law enforcement agencies are obliged to rely on statistics to a 
certain extent as justification for their actions and the headline statistics will be picked 
up by the press, there is potential for bias and ‘hype’ in interpreting the data.  
 
Hence, although statistics remain an essential analytical tool (and are recognised as 
such within this paper), the amount of significance which is given to any individual set 
of statistics, as Wall highlights, in particular statistics which concern complex subjects 
such as organised crime, must take into consideration the different elements of the 
totality of the context in which the statistics are collected. Writing in 2007, it is his view 
that there is, as yet, insufficient data to support definitive statements about the current 
cybercrime threat landscape. There are also too many ‘unknowable unknowns’. 
Therefore, (in 2007) there can be no ‘experts’ and statistical results must be 
considered with caution. 16 
 
Unsubstantiated, abstract references to ‘organised crime’ as an indiscriminate danger 
to society may also distort a situation. They may place ‘organised crime’ in the same 
category as threats from ‘weapons of mass destruction’, a concept which is currently 
perceived  as ‘crying wolf’ due to repeated warnings which are to date unsubstantiated 
by empirical evidence. 17 
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Despite the issues surrounding high-profile security incident public statements, they do 
appear to have some impact. In this year’s ‘2009 e-Crime Survey’, 42% of respondents 
said that knowledge of high-profile incidents in other organisations had been the main 
driver for increased security investment last year. 18  As with other professions, the IS 
industry has capitalised on the reporting of ‘signal events’ such as ‘Conficker’ (signal 
events are perceived to be of particular significance and impact) by governments and 
the media, in order to raise awareness of its activities and concerns. This is a double-
edged sword in that, while it is true that media accounts are a fast and successful way 
to engage the attention of the public, media interests and values are not necessarily 
the same as those of the IS industry, which can lead to distortion between the source 
of the information and its media portrayal.  
 
In the case of the reporting of all technology-oriented crime, the potential for 
exaggeration or distortion is compounded by the inherently-dramatic associations with 
the entertainment industry which were described in Section 3.1.2.  
 
Although statements such as the following, from Baselinemag.com, and the examples 
provided in the References 19 are legitimate journalistic techniques to make articles 
more eye-catching and entertaining, they may create a side-effect which may detract 
from the seriousness of an event and reinforces the ‘glamorous’ stereotypes that are 
derived from the imagery applied to TOCGs: 
 
‘ShadowCrew is a Web mob, say law enforcement officials: a highly-organised group 
of criminals. Unlike the American Mafia or the Russian syndicates, however, these 
Web mobs work solely in the online world…. Members …. commit their crimes in the 
darkness of cyberspace.’ 20 
 
(The statement that these ‘Web mobs work solely in the online world’ and are not 
associated with terrestrial groups is not necessarily the case, as will be highlighted 
within Section Five of this paper.) 
 
Bearing in mind the above examples, it is important for IS professionals involved in 
media handling and IS awareness-raising to choose the way they express their 
statements about organised crime with care, to avoid sending mixed messages, 
reinforcing distorted organised crime group and ethnic stereotypes, infringing 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Anna Cevidalli  RHUL MSc Project – September 2009 (Main Document) 
 24/103 
intellectual property rights (for instance, those of films or television) and attracting 
accusations of trivialisation, exaggeration or sensationalism.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Anna Cevidalli  RHUL MSc Project – September 2009 (Main Document) 
 25/103 
3.3 Defining the Realities 
 
(The problems in defining organised crime are) ‘…not from the word “crime” but from the 
word “organised”… The fact that organised criminal activity is not necessarily organised 
complicates that definition process.’ 
US President’s Commission on Organised Crime (1986, P 25) 21 
 
The exact definition and nature of ‘organised crime’ (or even whether ‘organised crime’ 
can be defined at all) is a popular topic that has occupied the thoughts of academics 
for over fifty years. As there are many substantial, easily-accessible resources on the 
subject widely available elsewhere, with much of the pertinent literature pre-dating the 
age of the Internet, in-depth analysis and justification of generic organised crime 
characteristics is not undertaken in this paper.  
 
Nevertheless, as Kaspersky points out, organised crime must be understood before it 
is addressed. 22 Since there can be no single consensus, it is necessary for any paper 
about ‘organised crime’ to choose its terms and theories from among the many which 
are available, to clearly define and explain them and to demonstrate that the sources 
for these terms and theories are reliable, traceable and supported by fact. Failure to do 
so can lead to misunderstandings, confusion and flawed decision-making due to the 
plethora of possible interpretations. 
 
Additionally, in the context of this paper, the following questions require clarification 
before more specific consideration of possible countermeasures can be undertaken: 
 
• What is an organised crime group? 
• What is a technology-oriented organised crime group? How is it different to a 
terrestrial organised crime group? Are technology-oriented organised crime 
groups ‘new forms of criminal organisation’ as has been claimed?  23 
• How serious is the threat from technology-oriented organised crime groups to 
valuable information?  What tools do organised crime groups employ? 
• To what extent can the structure of technology-oriented organised crime groups 
be said to resemble those of their terrestrial equivalents? How significant is this 
observation to IS/ business professionals?  
These are important questions at a practical level for IS/ business professionals.  
Currently, there is a lack of clarity as to what exactly constitutes an OOCG, the 
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measures which are appropriate for IS/ business professionals to take to identify and 
respond to potential OOCG activity and, most importantly, whether this type of threat 
requires any specific precautions in addition to those which may already be in place for 
other types of online crime. 
 
3.3.1 Organised Crime Groups 
 
Although a single consensus among academics and other sources about the definition 
of organised crime is probably not achievable and may not be appropriate because of 
the huge scope of the subject, Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime  (UNTOC) definition 24  has achieved a certain 
measure of acceptance at international level.  
 
UNTOC recognises that global networks of organised criminals exist in both the 
terrestrial and the online communities. Their sphere of influence far exceeds that which 
applied to the ‘traditional’ organised crime groups that existed throughout most of the 
last century, with the United Nations 1999 Global Report on Crime and Justice stating 
that: ‘From the perspective of organised crime in the 1990s, Al Capone was a small-
time hoodlum with restricted horizons, limited ambitions and merely a local fiefdom.’ 25 
 
Articles 2(a) – 2(j)  (Use of Terms) of the Convention provide high-level definitions for a 
range of organised crime aspects, 26 with the negotiators of UNTOC opting for a broad 
definition in order to capture both the hierarchical and the less formally-structured 
organised crime groups. 27 As with all high-level definitions, those of UNTOC can only 
be a starting point and cannot address all eventualities. However, they do express 
some useful concepts, namely: 
 
Organised Criminal Group: 
• Defined minimum size of an organised crime group (‘three or more persons’) 
• Continuity (‘existing for a period of time’) 
• Collaboration (‘acting in concert’) 
• Criminal intent (‘with the aim of committing one or more offences’) 
• The use of direct or indirect methods (‘direct or indirect’) 
• Financial or other material goals (‘financial or other material benefit’). 
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Structured Criminal Group: 
• Formed for a planned purpose (‘not randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence’) 
• Fluid, changeable roles, membership and structure (‘does not need to have 
formally-defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a 
developed structure’). 
 
Article 5 (Criminalisation of the Participation in an Organised Crime Group) of the 
Convention adds further detail about the types of activities which are deemed to be 
criminal and within its scope, including: 
 
Article 5 (b): ‘ Organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the 
commission of serious crime involving an organised crime group’. 
 
Article 5 recognises that associated activities must be included within the crime, as well 
as the crime act itself.  
 
The Convention takes into consideration other important international organised crime 
factors such as corruption, money-laundering activities and extradition arrangements. 
However, by necessity, it does not incorporate all the characteristics which are usually 
associated with organised crime, particularly at ‘operational’ level, for instance the use 
of violence.  
 
In order to provide a slightly more practical and detailed picture, some of the most 
prevalent terrestrial/technology-oriented organised crime group characteristics 
identified by a representative sample of sources have been extracted and summarised, 
via a 6-stage reductive process, within Table 1 to Table 5 in Appendix A. These 
characteristics are then mapped against real-life OOCG criteria in Table 6. 
 
Tables 1 to 5 comprise the following: 
Table 1 – Raw data extracts which identify typical terrestrial/ technology-oriented 
organised crime group characteristics, from well-established sources 
Table 2 – Rationalised version of the raw data from Table 1, with sources cited 
Table 3 – Raw data extracts which specifically identify typical technology-oriented 
organised crime group characteristics, from a typical range of sources, with sources 
cited  
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Table 4 – Comparison between Table 2 data and rationalised version of the raw data 
from Table 3, with sources cited 
Table 5 – Comparison between typical terrestrial/technology-oriented and specific 
technology-oriented organised crime group characteristics in summarised form. 
 
Perhaps the most important point to make about the sources for the first 2 tables is that 
they do not strictly represent terrestrial crime group characteristics per se. It is perhaps 
more accurate to say that they represent characteristics which have been identified as 
definitely applying to TOCGs (for instance, in the case of the earlier sources) and 
which, for some of the sources (eg UNTOC), may also apply to technology-oriented 
groups as well.   
 
As is typical of ‘organised crime’ discussion, most of the items have been the subject of 
debate between different schools of thought (for instance, about the exact nature of 
‘organised crime’ structures), which are outside the scope of this paper. 
 
The intention of all the tables is to define some initial theoretical parameters for 
organised crime group criteria, by creating representational snapshots from attributed 
sources, for the purpose of using these parameters as a basis against which to map 
actual examples and case studies.  
 
The tables also demonstrate that, despite differences of opinion about detail, there is in 
fact some agreement among the different sources as to the nature of organised crime 
groups. In particular, they agree that terrestrial organised crimes have some sort of 
structure (although they may disagree as to the exact nature of that structure), that 
violence and corruption are significant organisational strategies and that TOCGs have 
a tendency towards continuity.  
 
For business professionals, Tables 5 and 6 can provide an initial indication of the true 
nature of ‘organised crime’ without unnecessary levels of detail. From a multi-
disciplinary perspective, the tables include items which may be of specific interest to 
different sectors. In particular, the under-representation of items within the 
‘Organisational Culture’ category may indicate that this is an area which requires 
further research, or where existing research and findings may need to be aligned more 
closely with other disciplines. 
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For IS professionals, use of Tables 5 and 6 may assist rapid identification of significant 
factors suggesting online organised crime involvement within an IS incident. (This idea 
is further explored within Section Five.) 
 
The items in each table have also been mapped against the following 6 categories:  
 
1.  Organisational Structures 
2.  Organisational Goals 
3.  Organisational Strategy/Tactics 
4.  Organisational Maturity 
5.  Organisational Culture 
6.  Organisational Environment.  
These 6 categories have been created to demonstrate that all the table characteristics 
can be mapped within a business organisational context. This, in turn, provides a 
context for simple analysis of each item from a business and IS perspective, in addition 
to the more usual criminological and sociological perspectives.  
This framework, together with the items within it, provides the basis for the analysis 
which takes place in subsequent sections of this paper. 
 
Considered collectively, the items in the tables include many characteristics which 
could equally be applied to legitimate businesses, such as ‘Having a commercial or 
business-like structure’ and ‘governed by explicit rules and regulations’. However, other 
items, such as ‘code of secrecy’ and ‘uses illegal violence or bribery’ are not typical of 
legitimate business structures and strategies and show that, fundamentally, the groups 
remain distinctive and dissimilar excepting in circumstances such as borderline ‘white 
collar’ crime, where there may be some overlap. 
 
From an IS/IT perspective, it is also interesting to note that, even for the more recent 
sources, distinguishing types of communications content and levels of technical/non-
technical ability or usage are not identified as significant factors for TOCGs. 
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3.3.2 Technology-oriented and Online Organised Crime Groups 
          (aka ‘Cybergangs’ 28) 
 
‘It is not clear, at this stage, whether there are ‘traditional’ organised crime groups operating 
within the technology-enabled crime environment, or whether there are simply criminal groups 
who happen to be organised,’ 
‘Future Directions in Technology-Enabled Crime: 2007 – 2009’ Report,  
Australian Institute of Criminology  29 
‘These aren’t geeks. These are serious and organised criminals.’ 
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (April 2008) 30 
 
Having established some parameters for terrestrial/technology-oriented organised 
crime characteristics, the next step is to identify some real-life case studies against 
which to test the items in Table 5, in order to begin to determine to what extent the 
characteristics of technology-oriented organised crime groups are distinct from those of 
terrestrial groups. As before, the purpose of this exercise is not to provide a conclusive 
set of items but to provide a baseline of potentially significant criteria as a starting point 
for further analysis in this paper or elsewhere.  
 
It is also important to mention that, in reality, the notion of clear demarcation lines 
between terrestrial and technology-oriented organised crime groups is somewhat 
artificial. As information technologies become more accessible and more countries and 
societies incorporate information technologies within their business structures, so that 
increasing volumes of valuable information and transactions take place electronically, 
some of the activities of many more TOCGs will inevitably become ‘technology-
oriented’. 
 
However, at the moment, by comparison with their terrestrial equivalents, the 
technology-oriented groups remain either in a transition state (where the groups are 
evolving from terrestrial sources to a more technology-oriented focus) or are still in an 
early stage of evolution (where the groups have been created specifically in response 
to advancements in technology). Both types have relevance within the context of this 
paper.  
 
The other contextual issue in relation to the tables which must be mentioned concerns 
the definition of ‘organised crime’ yet again, this time in relation to the definition of 
technology-oriented organised crime. Partly due to the comparative newness of the 
subject, there is a common tendency across the literature, including some of the IS 
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sources, to refer to technology-oriented organised crime in the abstract without 
attempting to explain what they mean by it (this is somewhat understandable given the 
general difficulties with pinning down the subject). 31  Thus, whereas the terrestrial 
characteristics for this paper were extracted from a wide potential pool of possibilities, 
there were fewer specific definitions of the technology-oriented organised crime group 
characteristics from which to choose. 32 
 
Another important point to highlight at this stage is the rapid evolutionary nature of the 
technology-oriented organised crime groups whereby, by comparison with the historic 
terrestrial groups, they can form and disperse very rapidly on a ‘virtual’ international 
basis with relative anonymity due to the information and communications benefits of 
the Internet, in many cases without any requirement to physically meet. Also, the risk 
and effort involved in committing their crimes, especially if directed specifically at 
information stored on the Internet, may be much less than undertaking a physical 
equivalent. Some of the factors which assist online organised crime groups to commit 
their crimes are discussed further in Section Four. 
 
Consequently, although comparisons can be made between the characteristics of 
terrestrial and technology-oriented groups, they do not start from a level playing field 
because of the huge advantages which the technology-oriented crime groups currently 
enjoy. This point has not been lost on the TOCGs and they are diversifying their 
activities to exploit these advantages, which again blurs the distinctions between the 
two types of groups. 
 
Up to this point, the paper as a whole has taken a very theoretical and high-level 
approach to both terrestrial and technology-oriented organised crime characteristics 
and activities. The next step is to begin to ascertain to what extent the items identified 
in the tables are supported by empirical evidence from real-life case studies. 
 
Although there will continue to be references to terrestrial organised crime where 
relevant, the focus from hereon in will be to consider specific threats which technology-
oriented organised crime activities can pose to the valuable information assets of 
businesses, the relevance of their business models and the possible countermeasures 
which IS/business professionals can take to counter them. 
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4 TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISED CRIME 
4.1 Online Organised Crime Groups and Information 
Technology 
 
‘Technology is increasingly becoming a facilitator for organised crime. New types of fraud such 
as data streaming of payment cards have emerged in recent years, and traditional forms of 
crime such as money laundering, drug sales, the dissemination of child  abuse material and 
prostitution have evolved as a result of technological developments. The internet has had an 
especially profound effect on crime.’ 
2006 Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 
(Quoted on Page 53, EU High Tech Crime Centre Report, 2007) 
‘There are ‘new crimes, new tools’ committed against computers and IT networks … and there 
are ‘old crimes, new tools’ … traditional crimes, supported by the use of the Internet and high 
technology …’ 
Len Hynds, UK National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (February 2006) 1 
 
Having examined some of the theoretical concepts of organised crime, this section will 
consider online organised crime from an IS perspective, within the context of key 
information technology developments in the real world, drawing on data from 
international reports and IS white papers. 2  
 
A range of representative, high-profile, real-life online organised crime scenarios to 
accompany this and subsequent sections is provided in Appendix B. This section 
further discusses Table 6 of Appendix A,  which provides data for analysis in both 
Sections Four and Five.  
 
Within Table 6, the 2 columns which represented the terrestrial/OOCG characteristics 
in Table 5 have been reconciled into one. The characteristics from the real-life 
scenarios have then been mapped against these consolidated theoretical equivalents. 
This process demonstrates that, between them, the real-life scenarios, although a 
small sample, embody most of the terrestrial/online organised crime characteristics 
which were identified in Table 5 and that many of the theoretical terrestrial items 
continue to be relevant within the online environment. At the same time, the OOCGs 
exhibit some additional distinctive characteristics, in particular their transnational nature 
and their reliance on using the Internet and the Web.  
 
At this stage of the paper, the case studies and Table 6 highlight 3 important points: 
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a) Although the sample group of case studies is small (12 cases), within each case 
study there are so many numerous individual types of crimes and actual incidents 
that the full extent of the activities will never be known. This supports the notion 
discussed in Section Three whereby measuring crimes by number of incident or 
crime type may not be a true reflection of the situation. 
b) Of the 12 cases, only 3 of the groups (The HangUp Team, The RBN and Rock 
Phish) are known to be still operating under the same identity. Members of the 
other groups have either been apprehended, or they dispersed when their forums 
and other enterprises were deactivated. Whilst it is true that disbanding OOCGs 
often has an immediate high impact (for instance, in the case of the dissolution of 
ShadowCrew), the membership of large groups may take years to investigate and 
arrest, during which time the group may continue to be extremely resilient by, for 
instance, going underground and re-emerging or regrouping under a different guise 
(as may have happened in the case of the RBN). 
c) The sources for five of the 12 examples cite associations with ‘traditional’ TOCGs 
such as the Mafia or the Triads (Item 2). However, although in one instance the 
activities of the group are formally Mafia-led, these online groups are all composed 
of a composite of international terrestrial and OOCG members (Item 22), creating 
organisations which, although they have many recognisable terrestrial organised 
crime group characteristics, are also distinct in themselves. 
 
Before undertaking further analysis of elements within Table 6 in Section Five, it is 
necessary to explain how such groups have evolved and why they choose the attack 
vectors that they do. For this, it is useful to trace their evolution alongside that of 
modern information technologies. 
 
4.1.1 Specific Threats Posed by Online Organised Crime Groups 
 
Just as the legitimate world has undergone a technological revolution since the late 
1970s, driven largely by the evolution of the micro-chip and the Internet, ‘so too has 
organised crime evolved, adapted and, in some cases, innovated.’ 3  The new 
information technologies, as with all innovations, have created opportunities and risks 
for both legitimate and illegal enterprises, some of which are categorised in Section 
4.1.2. 4 
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OOCGs pose specific threats to electronic information simply because they undertake 
activities of greater complexity and on a much larger scale than those of individual 
offenders. Working as a dedicated team or on a casual basis with other offenders, 
OOCGs can maximise their exploitation of the vulnerabilities within information 
technology (in particular the Internet), human behaviour and international legislative 
frameworks.  
 
As well as exploiting existing vulnerabilities, these groups are at the forefront of 
designing the current wave of crimeware and associated techniques, as exemplified by 
the RBN and Rock Phish groups in the case studies. It is the online environment, and 
websites in particular, which provide the most successful and lucrative targets for them. 5 
 
Although the types of information and technology attributes which can be exploited by 
all types of offenders is too extensive to list here, some of the more important items are 
provided in Appendix D.  The section below outlines some of these attributes which 
have been specifically targeted by OOCGs.  
 
4.1.2 Key Attributes of Information and Technology exploited by 
OOCGs 
 
4.1.2.1 Anonymity 
One reason why offenders can exploit anonymity is that, while strong authentication 
techniques such as RSA SecureID and SSL Certificates 6 are widely-available and 
popular within some environments such as e-commerce, they are sometimes not 
employed in order to save money, to speed up transactions or where information is 
deemed to be low-risk, hence not worth protecting. In the case of SSL, it is often 
deployed one-way, to verify the website and not the claimant. Thus, as with many 
vulnerabilities outlined here, mitigating security controls do exist but are often not 
implemented. 
 
Distributed technologies, as opposed to centralised, tightly-controlled systems, also 
contribute to the complexity of design which in turn facilitates anonymity. This 
complexity can be exploited to launch mass ‘swarming’ attacks against networks or 
websites from anonymous machines located across the world. Organised crime groups 
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have used the threat of DDoS attacks and ‘ransomware’ against online businesses to 
support their extortion demands. 7 
 
The automated mass production capabilities of ‘botnets’ (networks of compromised 
machines), when combined with the worldwide membership profile of OOCGs, greatly 
increases the anonymity and complexity of the potential attacks and reduces the 
likelihood of apprehension. Some of the most prolific ‘botherders’ are said to be part of 
OOCGs in Russia 8 and a large proportion of spam (currently estimated to comprise 97 
per cent of all business e-mail) 9  is said to be linked with them.  
 
As well as using ‘botnets’ directly in random or targeted attacks, OOCGs have been 
identified as orchestrating the ‘bot market’ trade, whereby ‘botnets’ are sold or hired for 
profit, in a structure that has been said to resemble that of the illegal drugs business. 10   
 
Along with terrorist organisations, these groups are also reported to be customers for 
the ‘bot market’ services. Recently, a joint report from an internet compliance company 
and an internet service provider reported that 90 per cent of the sponsored 
advertisements for online pharmacies generated by Microsoft’s ‘Bing’ search engine 
were probably associated with Eastern European and Russian organised crime and 
illicit drug networks. 11 
 
For all organised crime groups, anonymity is also a major factor in the success of 
electronic money-laundering. As demonstrated by the Triad Gang (Australia) case 
study example, the funds to be laundered are converted, often via an international trail 
of electronic transactions involving complicit and/or unsuspecting ‘mules’, into desirable 
currencies such as e-gold 12 and US dollars. 
 
4.1.2.2 Electronic Currencies, Payment Systems and Online Banking 
 
‘Virtual’ environments such as e-commerce, online casino and gaming sites can 
generate greater profit than their terrestrial equivalents, using far fewer resources. As 
mentioned above, because they deal in ‘e-currencies’ (aka ‘e-cash’), they can also be 
used to money-launder illicit funds.  
 
A report by Kaspersky Labs in 2007 13 described the problem of counterfeit versions of 
online games, which are used to generate real-world profits, as well as outlining how 
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virtual passwords and virtual property are ‘stolen’, through malware and other means, 
for resale to the original owner or elsewhere. Likewise, a CERT®  14 report warned in 
2007 that ‘protection rackets’ among online game players had been reported in South 
Korea, whereby vulnerable players were being targeted by organised crime group 
‘gamers’, who threatened them with adverse consequences unless they paid the group 
real or virtual currencies. 
 
Within the financial markets, ‘an increase in online transactions has been matched by 
an increase in fraud,’ facilitated by increased direct customer interaction with their 
online accounts, ‘the lack of contact between parties’ (exacerbated by the use, in some 
circumstances, of insecure authentication techniques), the automation of the process 
and the continuing reliance on the input of bank card numbers and other credit card 
credentials to verify transactions. 15   
 
Despite widespread security awareness campaigns about the issue, users continue to 
be easily tricked into revealing their online financial account details through social 
engineering techniques using spam and phishing attacks, trusting strangers’ website, 
e-mail and telephone communications without question. 2009 figures from APACS, the 
UK payments association, showed a 132 per cent increase in online banking fraud 
over the previous year, amounting to £52.5 million, with an increase in both phishing 
and malware incidents. 16 The success of phishing and malware is largely attributable 
to OOCGs, as demonstrated by the pioneering activities of the Rock Phish online crime 
group in the case studies. 
 
As with other types of scam, such as fake online dating and job scams, collaboration 
between offenders, for instance by asking a user to go through a series of processes 
whereby they are contacted by different people, greatly increases the chances that the 
user will believe that they are engaging with legitimate entities.  
 
As well as direct attacks on financial data, the capture of a single individual’s identity 
can lead to other types of crime, for instance the forgery of passport information using 
real credentials which can then be sold or used to commit further offences. 
 
4.1.2.3 Extraterritoriality    
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‘Extraterritoriality’ is ‘the notion that the Internet has no geographic boundaries’. 17 This 
concept formed part of the original model for the Internet, which was designed for open 
communication and not security.  
 
4.1.2.4 Globalisation 
 
Increased economic co-operation (for instance, with the increased membership of the 
European Union) and the dominance of multinational corporations increases the 
amount of information traversing the Internet, with the result that organisations are 
increasingly reliant on their international communications mechanisms. Commun-
ications and transactions flowing across the Internet are cheaper, faster, more efficient, 
simpler to execute and can be accessed easily by many more people than has ever 
been possible before.   
However, the awareness and implementation of security technologies has not matched 
the commercial development, creating vulnerable ‘hot spots’ where illegal activities can 
focus.  
 
As Gilligan 18 remarks, such ‘contemporary realities of globalisation’ have contributed 
‘to an increasing economic element in debates about organised crime’, with this trend 
being very noticeable in IS industry reports. Gilligan argues that it is ‘the increasing 
anonymity of market forces in a globalising economy’ which are facilitating ‘the 
assimilation of organised crime groups into … late-modern capitalism’, for instance 
within the financial services sector. 19 
 
4.1.2.5 Increased Commoditisation of Information 
 
The data-centric aspect of the Internet has encouraged the commoditisation of all 
types of information, including personal information (for instance, in the form of 
biometrics) and commercially-sensitive data which, together, comprise some of the 
most prized assets for offenders to target for intelligence-gathering, fraudulent use or 
resale.  
In addition to the overt data, the Internet has accumulated huge stores of discreet, 
ancillary background data, including cached data (data stored in a temporary location 
for later reuse) and metadata (information about the properties of data files), due in 
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part to variable housekeeping practices and the relatively inexpensive cost of online 
storage. 
As well as being vulnerable to social engineering attacks, such as those associated 
with phishing, many users still do not appreciate that their personal information has a 
monetary value, together with a non-financial value, and is vulnerable to exploitation. 
As an example, although the impact of ID theft, a popular attack vector for OOCGs, on 
victims can be very significant, far-reaching and complicated, there remains a disparity 
between the security awareness of different types of victims with regard to the value of 
their own personal information. 20 
Offenders, including organised crime groups, who understand the value of personal 
data very well since, in many instances, they are setting the prices, simply harvest 
personal information to sell via illegal online auction forums. Information stored on the 
Internet provides an entry point for access to a much larger pool of potential victims 
than was previously possible and, because the information is publicly-available to 
anyone, it can be extremely difficult to establish a trail of evidence between the original 
information compromise and any subsequent criminal activities. 
 
Targeted attacks bring the OOCGs into closer contact with their victims than may have 
been possible in the past. There is a possibility that, in situations where the attack has 
involved an element of personalisation, for instance where sensitive personal data 
which the victim believed to be confidential has been compromised, the emotional 
impact on victims may be greater than if they had been targeted randomly by an 
automated attack or by a single individual because they may feel powerless against a 
group, leaving them vulnerable to extortion or blackmail attempts. 
 
As well as creating new opportunities to generate profit entirely via the Internet, this 
commoditisation of information has also resulted in ‘profound’ changes in the traditional 
activities of serious organised crime communities, as mentioned in the OCTA report 
quote at the opening of this section. Paedophiles and other traders in illegal 
contraband have established complex international online communities where digital 
information, for instance in the form of sexually-explicit photographs, are viewed, 
shared and bartered. 21 
 
4.1.2.6 Interoperability and Interconnectivity 
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Modern interoperability and interconnectivity capabilities of hardware and software 
enable individuals and organisations to communicate across the world with 
interconnected networks, as well as to incorporate different applications within a single 
device.  
 
From a security perspective, complex interconnectivity erodes the concept of a 
traditional ‘security perimeter’, whereby individuals and systems are either within a 
distinct security perimeter or outside it. This creates difficulties for security analysts, for 
instance when deciding whether to strategically place firewalls within the security 
perimeter or within the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).  
 
As emerging hardware and software technologies such as Voice over IP (VoIP), 
Blackberries and iPhones become increasingly compatible and interconnected, 
successful unauthorised access at one source may lead to other information 
compromises within linked systems, for instance where levels of security design quality 
are variable across different applications.  
 
Across the Internet, Web 2.0 services provide greater control and media-rich options 
for users when interacting with web content than ever before, for instance when using 
social networking sites. Greater choice introduces greater complexity, for instance 
when choosing which security controls are appropriate. 22  Additionally, placing services 
on the Internet further complicates the capacity to define a distinct security perimeter. 
 
The blurring of security perimeters is reflected at the human level as well, whereby 
employees of an organisation and third parties will often share the same computer 
equipment. This factor, in addition to those outlined immediately above, can create 
legal corporate governance accountability issues if the information on that equipment is 
compromised. 
 
Perhaps most significantly, the potential for increased access across multiple systems 
poses a potential significant risk if any of the individuals using the equipment are 
working against the interests of their employer. Several of the case studies in 
Appendix B mention that the organised crime groups used the assistance of insiders 
to infiltrate the organisation’s systems, thereby completely bypassing any controls at 
the security perimeter.  
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Insider threats can arise at any level of the organisation, from senior management 
teams through to technical network systems administrators. In the latter case, these 
administrators may have permissions which formally allow them to access any 
information on the organisation’s network. In March 2009, CERT® published a report 
investigating the connection between malicious insiders and the Internet underground 
economy. 23  The report found that the threat from such insiders was ‘very real’, that 
they were often motivated by revenge and that it could be difficult to identify them. 24 
Additionally, a separate industry survey in June 2009 reported that 74 percent of 400 
senior IT UK and US professionals volunteered the information that they could 
circumvent their organisation’s security controls. 25 
 
Recent security reports have also highlighted the potential threat from the current 
economic climate, whereby many skilled Information Technology professionals in 
formerly prosperous economies are being made redundant.  There is a possibility that 
an increase in the number of disaffected ex-employees and low morale among the 
employees that remain in an organisation could lead to similar issues as those which 
apply in some countries of the former Eastern Bloc and elsewhere, 26  namely that, due 
to a lack of legitimate opportunities, these individuals will add their skills to the existing 
criminal ‘underground economies’. 27  
 
The above categories demonstrate how many modern information technologies 
continue to have inherent vulnerabilities which can easily be exploited by OOCGs. The 
next sub-sections focus more closely on 2 of the elements which OOCGs have 
combined to gain a competitive advantage over other offenders, namely crimeware 
and the Web. 
 
4.2 The Problem of Crimeware 
 
The total threat volume from malware is an increasing problem. Approximately 700,000 
new types of malware are being identified per month, with one in four US computers 
estimated to be infected. 28  Currently, offenders are eschewing the former pattern of 
high-impact, single event attacks 29 which can completely destroy the value of the 
assets, in favour of devising more long-term strategies which employ more complex, 
covert, technically-proficient, scalable (across different platforms), resilient and 
effective methods than ever before.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Anna Cevidalli  RHUL MSc Project – September 2009 (Main Document) 
 41/103 
In 2008, the OECD estimated that, over the previous 5 years, although there had been 
a decline in worm-related incidents by 25%, there had been a 30% increase in Trojan-
related incidents, with a 500% increase in malicious programmes. 30 This figure 
supports the trend highlighted by the UK Home Office (previously mentioned) which 
identified a 250% increase in ‘malicious programmes’ between 2007 and 2008 alone.  
Industry analysts have identified that malware is now often located on legitimate 
websites, including government and news websites, which act as unknowing ‘parasitic 
hosts’. 31 This is a trend away from relying on a user to access a malicious website (for 
instance, containing attractive illicit material) of their own accord. Together with ‘drive-
by downloads’, the use of legitimate websites makes it more difficult for the user to 
distinguish between innocuous and malicious websites because the fake websites 
appear ‘very convincing’. 32   
 
The emergence of ‘crimeware’ as a sub-set of malware has been a major milestone in 
the commercialisation of online organised crime attack vectors and is a significant 
factor behind the growing trend towards deploying blended attacks. This was identified 
early in the 21st Century, when ‘a marked shift occurred in the online threat landscape’, 
whereby offenders diversified from writing malicious code (‘malware’) to new and more 
concerted profit-driven criminal techniques (‘crimeware’), created with the specific 
intent of yielding large financial returns. 33  
 
A joint report sponsored by the US Dept of Homeland Security Science and 
Technology Directorate in 2006 observed that most crimeware attacks were being 
undertaken by organised criminals and that the growth of keylogger-specific crimeware 
and the sites distributing such crimeware reflected the ‘growing commoditisation of 
crimeware technology and the use of multiple hosts, such as botnets, for distribution 
and data collection’. They also found that the multiple web sites per attack increased 
the difficulty of ‘shutting down malicious web sites to stem the spread and impact of 
crimeware.’ 34 
 
These new types of crime groups form an industry of dedicated organised criminals 
who ‘treat their malicious activities as a full-time job rather than a hobby’, resulting in 
many different types of new and sophisticated products.  35 
 
Although it is difficult to assign exact figures to the crimes that are being committed, for 
the reasons discussed in Section Three, industry reports indicate that the problem 
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continues to increase and is a serious issue for businesses.  36 For instance, one 2009 
industry report has found that ’91 percent of all compromised records,’ obtained from a 
sample of 90 confirmed breaches comprising 285 million individual records, ‘were 
linked to organised crime groups.’  37  Although the IS industry is continually developing 
new strategies to combat the threats behind such statistics, due to the sheer number 
which are emerging and the mass industrialisation of the crimeware process, it remains 
impossible to address every single new variation on an individual basis.  
 
From the offender’s perspective, with so many new and ‘traditional’ malicious code 
options available, in many circumstances they do not even need to adapt or create a 
new product. Instead, they can simply ‘recycle’ old threats (for instance, in 2007/8, the 
Master Boot Record (MBR) rootkit was reconfigured to prevent detection) 38 or employ 
existing products that are considered legal such as adware, spyware and keyloggers, 
with malicious intent. 39 
 
For these reasons, malware and crimeware remain valuable and successful assets for 
offenders, who buy and sell different variations, often packaged together within simple 
to use crimeware ‘toolkits’ (thus creating a blended threat at the same time as 
increasing the potential customer base), through their illegal terrestrial and online 
markets. 40   
 
The latest crimeware is mainly distributed via the exploitation of human and technical 
vulnerabilities, for instance via dedicated social engineering (such as including a 
malicious attachment in a seemingly benign e-mail about a topical news item), 
exploitation of servers, browsers and workstations (for instance, via the propagation of 
viruses and worms) and by manual means, or through a combination of these 
schemes. 41  
 
Once installed on the equipment, the malware, in particular if it is part of a ‘package’ 
installed via a rootkit, can launch many overt and covert attacks against its host or 
another system, either on its own or as part of a botnet.  
 
Although it has been noted that statistics must be treated with caution, the evidence is 
overwhelming that the current malware distribution environment of choice for offenders 
is the Web, which is discussed in more detail overleaf. 
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4.3 The Internet and the Web as Attack Vectors 
 
The predominant tool and target for launching malicious attacks is now clearly the 
Web, 42 with 90% of all attacks arriving via Web threat vectors by the end of 2008 43 
and a new webpage infected every 4.5 seconds. 44  Between them, China, Russia and 
the US currently account for ‘almost three quarters’ of the websites spreading malware, 
with 85% of the pages affected residing on legitimate websites, as mentioned 
previously. 45 
 
Reasons why the Web is an attractive target include its popularity with users (with 93% 
of UK companies in the 2008 BERR  46 survey reporting that they had a corporate 
website), its continuing relative novelty as a technology, the variations in the level of 
security applied to publicly-accessible websites which hold valuable information, the 
amount of valuable information which is stored there and the improved security 
controls which are now routinely applied at e-mail gateway level, 47  thereby making 
them less vulnerable targets. 
 
The Internet provides both a target in itself and a new set of techniques  48  within the 
offenders’ criminal ‘toolbox’ for facilitating crimes within both the terrestrial and online 
environments. Traditional ‘tools’ adapted for the Internet include tools that support 
money-laundering, fraud and extortion. 49 These were already well-established and 
versatile and have translated easily to the online environment, which they can exploit 
for large rewards with minimum effort.  
 
The Internet has also provided many new tools for offenders, most of which are 
incorporated within the latest crimeware, as described previously. Because these new 
tools, such as web-hosted services, are not tried and tested, they include vulnerabilities 
which can be exploited. In the case of Web 2.0 services, although they offer many 
commercial advantages, for instance in terms of scalability and cost efficiencies, it may 
be extremely difficult to track exactly what is happening to the information. 50    
 
Increasingly, information on the Internet is being stored or transferred outside the core 
business. The technologies which support these strategies ‘are changing the entire 
nature of who has what information at what given time and who controls it’. 51 Where 
third parties who may be hosting the data, either on  the Web or on other network 
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infrastructures, are located abroad, it may also be difficult or expensive to audit their 
activities to the necessary level. 52 
 
Finally, offenders exploit the curiosity or fear of users and the immediacy of information 
provided by the Web and newsworthy events occurring in the physical world. 53 ‘Scare-
ware’ is estimated to have affected over one million users worldwide, 54  with the 
number of rogue anti-malware programs in circulation rising from 2,850 in July 2008 to 
9, 287 by December 2008, a three-fold increase in 6 months. 55 As well as causing 
serious problems to users, fake security applications can undermine trust in legitimate 
security products and adversely affect the reputation of the IS industry. 
 
Having considered some of the tools and techniques which OOCGs use to threaten 
individuals, legitimate businesses and information, the next section further addresses 
the types of crime which take place, from a business perspective. 
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5 THE BUSINESS OF ORGANISED CRIME 
5.1 The Importance of Online Organised Crime Business 
Models 
 
 
‘… Now it would be too difficult to conduct business … DarkMarket was our bridge to business 
and if that bridge is broken then that business is broken …’ 
‘Iceburg’ (sic), participant in the illegal DarkMarket online forum (September 2008) 1 
 
 
There are many approaches which can be taken when analysing the structures which 
underpin OOCG business models, some of which are based on academic terrestrial 
organised crime models applied to the online environment. 2 This section takes as its 
starting point Gottschalk’s ‘enterprise paradigm’ approach (based on the ideas of 
Symeonidou- Kastanidou 3), whereby an organisation has ‘entrepreneurial structure’ if it 
has the following 3 elements: 
a) Allocation of roles – Whereby the members of a group are ‘exclusively tasked 
with planning and preparation activities’ (ie each is allocated specific duties) 
b) Hierarchy – ‘When a predetermined superior-inferior relationship exists among 
members of the organisation.’ 
c) Concrete structure – ‘When a group possesses its own assets.’ 4 
 
With regard to business models as a concept, as with the organised crime group 
structures, although many different types have been identified, this section will restrict 
itself to discussing those which have been applied to the activities of OOCGs. In 
particular, it will explore the extent to which claims in industry reports that OOCG 
business models are similar to those of ‘traditional’, hierarchical organised crime 
groups such as the Mafia have validity and relevance for IS/ business professionals. 
Gottschalk’s overall approach is based in part on Albanese’s ‘consensus definition’ 
(2004 version) of organised crime group characteristics 5 which argues that the 
enterprise model of organised crime grew out of dissatisfaction with both the 
hierarchical and ethnic models that had previously dominated the criminology 
landscape, 6 a theory that focuses on economic considerations, as opposed to 
hierarchical, network or ethnic issues. 7 Gottschalk also mentions that this theory has 
been adopted by the FBI within their law enforcement strategy to combat transnational 
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organised crime and that it ‘assumes that legal and criminal organisations have 
similarities.’ 8  
The major characteristics of the illegal enterprise, as defined by Albanese and 
Gottschalk and accepted by this paper with specific reference to the online 
environment are that: 
• Organised crime and legitimate businesses both involve similar activities at 
‘different ends of a spectrum of legitimacy of business enterprise’ 
• Violence and ethnic exclusivity are not necessary in order to enhance profit 
• Violence and corruption are means to the end of profit and market share 
• The criminal organisation is ‘rarely centrally-organised due to the nature of the 
markets and activities involved.’ 
These characteristics are consistent with the findings in Table 6, where violence, 
corruption and ethnic exclusivity, although present in some of the case studies, are not 
defining characteristics for most or all of the groups. In particular, a strong tendency 
against ethnic exclusivity is indicated by Item 24 (‘Includes both national and foreign 
members’). 
One slight variation between Gottschalk’s approach and that of this paper arises 
because Gottschalk and Albanese’s analysis is predominantly about organised crime 
groups in general, as opposed to OOCGs in particular. The full range of criteria 
captured in Table 6 of Appendix A may be more representative of the diversity of 
OOCGs than any single set of criteria within it (for instance, Albanese’s), irrespective of 
how useful these single sets of characteristics may be in other contexts. Consequently, 
this paper will continue to use Table 6 in Appendix A (which includes Albanese’s 2008 
set of criteria) as representing a broad consensus definition of OOCG characteristics 
as they are currently formed, whilst recognising that this stage of their evolution may be 
temporary. 9 
Gottschalk also mentions the findings of Lyman and Potter who distinguish between 
‘criminal groups’, (reactive structures that respond to fluctuations in market supply and 
demand) and more long-term ‘criminal businesses’ which, although they have many 
similarities with legitimate businesses, are essentially criminal in nature and bound by 
the constraints that apply to all illegal enterprises. 10 
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Although it is possible to allocate the case studies in Appendix B between Lyman and 
Potter’s categories, thereby providing a snapshot as to the structure of those groups at 
that point in time, the fact that some of the groups were apprehended before their plans 
came to fruition renders the exercise inconclusive. This is because there is a possibility 
that, if the enterprises had been successful, some of these particular groups might 
have then evolved from ‘criminal groups’ to ‘criminal businesses’ which capitalised on 
their initial successes, whereas others might have chosen to dissolve. 
 
A closer approximation may be to apply Evans’ distinctions, also mentioned by 
Gottschalk, which differentiate between criminal  ‘enterprises’ (whereby ‘a group 
provides an illegal good or service on an ongoing basis’), criminal ‘networks’ (‘an 
enduring association of criminals’, possibly across different groups, which may utilise 
the skills of any or all of the members when committing any specific crime) and criminal 
‘ventures’ (a single ‘criminal episode usually engaged in for profit by a group’). 11  
Even so, several of the groups in Table 6 (for instance, ShadowCrew and the 
CardersMarket conglomerate), because of their organisational structures, whereby 
sub-groups may have their own identities within the main group, could qualify for both 
the ‘Criminal Enterprises’ and ‘Criminal Networks’ categories. Although a similar 
arrangement might also exist for some TOCGs, the OOCGs have an advantage in that 
they can exploit the benefits of the infrastructure of the Internet and Web 2.0 services, 
as mentioned in the previous section, which enables their own structures to be very 
flexible, depending on the demands of particular situations, inhibiting the capacity to 
define them precisely. 
 
The above observations continue the trend described in previous sections of the paper 
whereby different aspects of organised crime are too elusive to define within narrow 
boundaries.  However, at the same time, adopting a broader approach, based on 
established opinions and evidence, whereby it is accepted that there may be several 
different types of organised crime group, all of which may have some validity at this 
time, appears to be supported by the data in the tables and the case studies. 
 
Such an approach, although it remains evident that there are many areas of this 
subject which continue to require further analysis, enables IS/business professionals to 
move beyond a starting point where organised crime may appear to be an 
overwhelming and complex subject towards a position where aspects of the subject 
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may be quantifiable within the context of their own businesses, as long as they are 
defined within agreed parameters. 
 
The next step of the process is to consider some of the main business-related 
characteristics of OOCGs which are highlighted by the case studies and Table 6. 
 
5.1.1.1 Organisational Structures (Category 1) 
 
Within Category 1, the key factors which emerge are that all the examples demonstrate 
a formal structure, with a strong bias towards collaboration, division of labour and 
specialisation. From the evidence, links with established TOCGs (where these groups 
follow the structure of organisations such as the Mafia) are apparent, although they do 
not appear to be an essential component for online success. (However, this particular 
definition does not incorporate the transition economy structures of Eastern Bloc 
‘mafiya’ organisations, which are believed to have links with The RBN, among others.) 
Within the industry literature, some reports 12 directly associate the structure of OOCGs 
with those of the Mafia, often borrowing from R C Lindberg’s Structure of a Mafia Crime 
Family.  This was one of the first essays to highlight the similarity between modern 
Mafia structures and modern corporations and which places the ‘Capo’ at the top of an 
eight-stage, rigid, structured ‘chain of command’ hierarchy which includes ‘advisors’, 
‘financial advisors’ and ‘enforcers’. 13  
However, Finckenauer 14 refutes this approach as an interpretation of the methods of 
Russian organised crime, finding ‘no evidence of a complex hierarchy or set of 
hierarchies’ and, specifically, no evidence ‘of mafia-like structures or activities’. Instead, 
he states that they ‘often create flexible, project-oriented structures similar to some licit 
organisations.’ Furthermore, he warns that identification of Russian organised crime 
activity with that of the traditional Mafia ‘may actually create a self-fulfilling prophecy’, 
pointing out that:  
‘A criminal group gains stature when it is called ‘mafia’, which only heightens its power.’ 15 
The evidence in Table 6 supports Finckenauer’s findings by suggesting that 
hierarchical structures might apply in some specific situations (in particular, in the 
Banco di Sicilia incident which involved the Sicilian Mafia directly, as well as any 
money-laundering activity such as that conducted by the Triad Gang (Australia)) and 
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not in others. In the case of the RBN, their structure and activities, although originating 
in Russia, were more service-based and laterally-distributed across the world, with 
varying degrees of central control. 
The case studies demonstrate both hierarchical and network structures, with a strong 
tendency towards ‘swarming’ activities (for instance, where multiple attacks may come 
from all directions). The inclusion of network structures, together with the variation 
within the structures themselves, supports Gottschalk’s appraisal that: ‘Organised 
crime can best be understood in network terms’, with a key characteristic of large 
networks being that they may display strong ties at the centre, with weaker ties at the 
borders.  Gottschalk also mentions that trust, a characteristic that does not feature at 
all in the tables, is a fundamental characteristic of networks. 16 
This trend is supported by Symantec’s ‘Report on the Underground Economy’ 
characteristics, represented in Table 6, which identified that web-based forums tended 
to be loosely-structured. 17 
In addition, there is the issue, as discussed before, that legitimate and criminal  
organisational structures share many similarities. In this case, roles are assigned at 
different levels with the management roles at the summit and the least-status, less-
skilled roles at the base for both types of organisations, thus reducing the extent to 
which such structures can be said to be distinctively associated with groups such as 
the Mafia. Applying such roles to a situation may yield useful information in terms of 
how a criminal business operates. However, there is nothing about the placement of 
the roles themselves that suggests they are intrinsically ‘criminal’.  
 
5.1.1.2 Organisational Goals (Category 2) 
 
All the case studies were formed for a ‘planned purpose’ (as opposed to haphazardly) 
that included ‘financial or other material goals’ such as obtaining ‘valuable data.’ There 
is some evidence of monopolistic tendencies in 5 of the groups (cross-referenced with 
Category 6) although the defining characteristic of this category is ‘exploitation of the 
online market’. 
 
The evidence from industry reports is fairly conclusive that the activities of many 
OOCGs are currently focussed on ‘financial or other material goals’. 18  Although 
OOCGs may be involved in a wide variety of endeavours within both legitimate and 
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illegal markets (in particular where they participate in the ‘shadow economies’ that 
have arisen in countries which are in transitional economic states, 19 where their 
activities, although deemed officially illegal, may also be unofficially state-sanctioned), 
within the context of the Internet and the Web, most of their activities are currently 
targeted against the financial and service industries, for the reasons mentioned 
previously in Section Four.     
 
From a business perspective, this trend is evident from the types of business models 
with which OOCGs are currently associated, as demonstrated in industry reports 20 and 
the case studies, where employing collective, subscription and online auction business 
models have proven to be particularly successful strategies. Even at the basic level of 
representation within the case studies, it is evident that the structure of the groups 
which evolved was closely aligned with their business model choices, as opposed to 
being aligned with the ethnic or other cultural factors which played a significant role in 
the evolution of ‘traditional’ TOCGs. It also follows that the activities of these groups 
are (or were) strongly business-focussed as opposed to being, for instance, 
ideologically-focussed. 
 
As with legitimate organisations, the choice of an appropriate business model for 
contemporary OOCGs is a fundamental key to their success. It is evident from the 
choices they make that, in some circumstances, they are mimicking successful 
business models from the legitimate sector, for instance that of eBay. 
 
Each business model type identified, including the detailed information about specific 
tactics within them (as highlighted within the ‘Category 3’ section below), contains a 
wealth of potential clues for law enforcement and IS/business professionals to analyse. 
As demonstrated by the work already undertaken in some IS industry reports, for 
instance by Symantec, it is possible to create a baseline profile of specific OOCGs 
from the clues they leave in the information about them on the Internet and elsewhere. 
As mentioned in Section Four, digital information includes large amounts of cached 
data and metadata, the latter being a property which is not available within its terrestrial 
equivalent. Both cached data and metadata can potentially be monitored and analysed 
alongside the more overt information. 
 
Both legitimate and illegal enterprises must protect the information which ensures the 
integrity and viability of their business processes as well as their technical systems. 21 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Anna Cevidalli  RHUL MSc Project – September 2009 (Main Document) 
 51/103 
They both rely heavily on the Internet when conducting their activities. Currently, both 
are obliged to use some of the same infrastructure routes and types of applications to 
communicate, where they will both leave logical audit trails. Therefore, just as OOCGs 
scrutinise legitimate business structures, strategies, data and communication paths for 
signs of vulnerabilities, employing collaboration and  specialisation as tactics, so too 
can these same tactics be employed by groups of legitimate multi-disciplinary 
professionals, each sector specialising in the skills most appropriate to them.  
 
Furthermore, as expressed in the quotation at the beginning of this section, where the 
business model collapses, the whole criminal enterprise may collapse as well. This 
vulnerability is an additional feature which may be exploitable by multi-disciplinary 
teams. In particular, although they cannot employ the same illegal methods as 
offenders, business professionals can employ the same tactics that they use to 
evaluate business competition to identify potential vulnerabilities within criminal 
business structures. Similarly, IS professionals may be able to utilise their risk 
assessment skills to identify some of the potential risks to the information of criminal 
organisations, as part of the work of a multi-disciplinary team.  
 
The ability to interpret business models is an important analytical tool for multi-
disciplinary law enforcement and public/private sector teams. Within those teams, it is 
the business community which has the most skills and experience to theoretically 
analyse the business models of criminal organisations. Furthermore, it is IS 
professionals, among others, who may be able to provide an early detailed, risk 
analysis of a developing online organised crime threat, based on evidence from their 
knowledge of the risks to information, their roles as first-line contacts for Incident 
Management processes or the monitoring activities they undertake which can identify 
irregularities in security audit logs or other security processes.  
 
Additionally, as alluded to in the quotation from Wall at the beginning of the 
Introduction section, it is unrealistic (for instance, due to limited resources) for the 
police to take responsibility for addressing every aspect of a problem that is as large 
and complex as organised crime. Consequently, the most effective way to counter the 
problem is to distribute the tasks involved to the sectors that have the most relevant 
experience to assume them. 
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5.1.1.3 Organisational Strategy/Tactics (Category 3) 
 
This category is by far the largest, containing the most identified characteristics, with 
10 characteristics which are displayed by all the groups. Most of the groups comprise 
both national and international members, although the degree of influence which non-
national members may hold varies (for instance, in the Banco di Sicilia Incident 
example, the group was managed by the Mafia), depending on local culture or the 
purpose for which the group was formed (for instance, in the Triad Gang (Australia) 
example, Australian Triad members had links with individuals in Malaysia, as well as 
Russia, which facilitated money-laundering activities). 
 
OOCGs systematically mimic detailed features within legitimate business models in 
order to engender trust in their victims (for instance, when mimicking legitimate 
websites in phishing attacks), as well as to blur the distinction between their own 
activities and those of the legitimate sector (as demonstrated by the McColo example 
in the case studies, where the whole business was ostensibly legitimate yet which, on 
further inspection, proved to be a ‘front’ for illegal activities). The ShadowCrew and 
CardersMarket examples from the case studies, in particular, also demonstrate how 
mimicking a legitimate business model can foster a sense of legitimacy among the 
criminal community. 
 
Other examples of innovative tactics which OOCGs and other offenders have 
borrowed from the legitimate commercial sector include: 22 
 
• Establishing ‘rogue ISPs’  to co-ordinate the distribution of illegal content such 
as malware and hard-core pornography 
• Creating ‘misleading applications’, in particular the ‘scareware’ security 
applications, which may do the opposite of the stated purpose 
• Creating ‘instructional videos’ as part of a criminal product package 
• Applying ‘Copyright Notices’ to their malware (eg to Trojans) 
• Including ‘Terms and Conditions’ statements with their products which include 
reporting non-compliance to legitimate anti-virus companies. 
By comparison, bribery, corruption and violence, key criminal tactics of terrestrial 
groups, are less evident in the case studies for the online groups. This disparity may 
arise because OOCGs behave in a different way to terrestrial groups, although it may 
also be the case that further analysis needs to take place into these factors before a 
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clear trend can be deduced. Finckenauer’s 23 observation that violence is a typical 
tactic of Russian organised crime groups but that monopolisation and corruption are 
not, may also be indicative that this is an area where terrestrial and online organised 
crime tactics diverge. 
Any evidence of characteristics such as corruption, violence and extortion is significant 
within an online context because they mark the cross-over points between legitimate 
and illegal enterprises. 24  
 
5.1.1.4 Organisational Maturity (Category 4) 
 
The primary factors identified within Category 4 are continuity and innovation, together 
with professionalism and sophistication. There are strong elements of social 
engineering (for instance, through phishing attacks) and proficient concealment of 
money transfer activities. 
 
Gottschalk identifies 4 basic stages of growth for a criminal organisation, with each 
stage focused on either: 
 
Opportunity (Stage 1), Activity (Stage 2), Knowledge (Stage 3) or Strategy (Stage 4), 
with Stage 4 being future-oriented. 25   
 
One aspect of OOCGs, as demonstrated by the case studies, is that, because they are 
able to muster resources and skill sets very quickly from a wide range of sources, they 
are able to achieve Stage 4 of this maturity model much more quickly than their 
terrestrial counterparts. For instance, ShadowCrew was able to establish itself as a 
‘market leader’ within 2 years of its inception and all the case studies, irrespective of 
the length of time they existed, qualified as ‘professional and sophisticated’ (Item 54). 
 
5.1.1.5 Organisational Culture (Category 5) 
 
Although in theory ‘Organisational Culture’ could be a broad category containing many 
items, in practice the evidence in Table 6 suggests that it may be under-represented in 
academic literature at the moment with regard to online organised crime. There is 
some evidence that some online groups manipulate their characteristics (for instance, 
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in the case of The HangUp Crew who have a strong online identity) to create a strong 
brand image. 
 
5.1.1.6 Organisational Environment (Category 6) 
 
As with Category 5, there are relatively few criteria cited for ‘Organisational 
Environment’ by comparison with some of the other categories. However, there has 
been a strong tendency for the groups to take advantage of jurisdictional arbitrage, 
together with evidence that they are exploiting the web-based marketplace. 
 
There is also some evidence of monopolistic tendencies in 5 of the groups (cross-
referenced with Category 2) although the evidence appears to support the modern 
supposition that criminal markets are more likely to be based on competition than 
monopoly. 26 
Within the 6 categories of Table 6, the case studies tend to ‘cluster’ against specific 
items such as jurisdictional arbitrage and exploitation of the online market, whilst being 
much more thinly distributed or not represented at all against others (in particular, 
some items in Categories 3 and 5). This may suggest that there are some factors 
which are more favourable to the success of the groups than others or perhaps that 
additional research might be beneficial.  
Up to this point, this paper has considered different aspects of online organised crime, 
with a specific emphasis on the multi-disciplinary, academic, IS and business 
perspectives. The final part of this section proposes a model which can synthesise key 
characteristics from across the paper, in particular data extracted from Table 6, within 
an established strategic analysis problem-structuring methodology, for the purpose of 
leveraging the multi-disciplinary approach to organised crime. 
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5.2 Strategic Analysis and Online Organised Crime Groups 
 
As previously stated, the overall purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how practical 
methods drawn from the multi-disciplinary approach to organised crime can assist IS/ 
business professionals in identifying key factors within potential online organised crime 
situations which may be of relevance to their specific environments. This section offers 
one such tool, Morphological Analysis, as an example of this premise. 27 
 
Because the multi-disciplinary approach to organised crime is very much in its infancy 
and, at the moment, continues to be strongly influenced by a criminology ethos, there 
are as yet few widely-available tools and techniques available for use by multi-
disciplinary teams for the specific study of online organised crime. Although many 
crime analysis software applications currently exist, 28 some require specialist skills to 
use, which may not be appropriate for the commercial sector, or their use may be 
restricted to intelligence or law enforcement authorities. 
 
In circumstances where there is a possibility that online organised crime activity is 
involved and which requires further investigation, IS/ business professionals need 
access to simple-to-use, generic tools which can help them quickly identify the key 
elements of the situation, from which position they can undertake more in-depth risk 
analysis procedures as necessary. In particular, they require tried and tested tools 
which they can utilise immediately without ‘reinventing the wheel’. 
 
There are a number of business approaches and techniques which have been 
identified for use with law enforcement and which can easily be extended for use within 
multi-disciplinary environments. Most notably, Gottschalk 29 and Ratcliffe 30 
demonstrate how established strategic analysis techniques such as maturity models, 
trend analysis, morphological analysis (MA), process mapping and SWOT (Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis are relevant to the organised crime 
environment. All of these tools will already be familiar to many business professionals 
and, although they may have been devised for terrestrial environments,  can be 
applied equally to known factors within online legitimate and illegal business 
environments.  
 
Furthermore, Albanese 31 who has been a major influence within the field of organised 
crime, has proposed a risk analysis methodology for organised crime, within the 
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context of a ‘market and product-based model’. Albanese’s basic premise is that, 
rather than targeting organised crime individuals and groups (an approach which has 
limitations because of the diversity of crime group types and because the incentive for 
undertaking the crimes is not eliminated as new crime groups will always emerge to fill 
any gaps), a more productive contemporary approach may be to identify the highest-
risk specific products and markets, ‘knowing that these markets will attract the 
offenders that law enforcement seeks.’ 32 
 
One of the intentions of this paper is simply to raise awareness of the relevant literature 
about online organised crime which already exists, together with the commonly-
available established tools and techniques which can be used in multi-disciplinary anti-
online organised crime environments, such as those mentioned above. This section of 
the paper will conclude with a practical illustration of how one of these techniques, 
morphological analysis (MA) 33 can assist any sector within a multi-disciplinary anti-
organised crime team, either individually or working together, to undertake initial 
assessments of potential online organised crime incidents. 
 
The following section is a summary of the explanatory information which is provided in 
Appendix C. In addition, the Appendix applies the methodology within a theoretical 
scenario. 
 
5.2.1 Employing Morphological Analysis within a Multi-Disciplinary 
Context 
 
Morphological Analysis (MA) ‘is a qualitative method used to explore a range of 
different possible explanations for a number of issues’ by dividing the problem into 
different elements and displaying them in the form of a matrix that visually represents 
the 4 steps of the analytical process. 34 
 
As its purpose is to provide a holistic interpretation of a situation, MA requires multi-
disciplinary input to be truly effective. One of its key benefits is that the MA processes 
ensure that all input is managed and that input and decisions are trackable to their 
source. 
 
MA is intended to be used during the early stages of exploratory analysis, for instance 
within multi-disciplinary situations where, although some data is available, the quantity 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Anna Cevidalli  RHUL MSc Project – September 2009 (Main Document) 
 57/103 
may be insufficient to undertake meaningful quantitative analysis or, as often occurs 
when considering organised crime, there are a wide range of possible scenarios which 
need to be reduced to those which are most feasible for the given situation. 
 
The 4 steps of the MA process are: 
 
1. Break down the problem (identify the broad elements and categorise them) 
2. Create a morphological matrix  
3. Develop possible explanations or outcomes 
4. Grade the explanations (eg from most feasible to least feasible). 
 
The first step of the process is to identify the problem to be identified (for instance, how 
might online organised crime activity be affecting our business?).  
 
The categories within the matrix can be composed from any set of issues affecting the 
problem. Items within the categories are listed horizontally. Once the matrix is 
completed, it is read downwards and across to create pairs of associations. Where the 
pairs are not inherently consistent or may not be relevant to the situation they are 
discarded.  
 
Professional judgment is exercised in order to extract the most significant possibilities 
from within the matrix, with these items being further assessed against additional 
factors, such as feasibility. 
 
At the end of the process, a list of scenarios has been identified through a process of 
systematic analysis and elimination which, although brief, between them capture the 
key issues which need to be addressed. 
 
The value to multi-disciplinary professionals, in particular IS/ business professionals, is 
that this is a straightforward, simple method which enables them to pool their skills and 
expertise to solve a problem. The method is ‘tried and tested’ over several years and 
has been proven to work within a variety of diverse contexts, including scientific and 
business contexts.  
 
The particular benefit of applying this method to an online organised crime scenario is 
that it can utilise criteria from other sources (for instance, the items in Table 6 or any 
list of items which categorise organised crime characteristics) and it can also form the 
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foundation for subsequent work using other complementary methods, including risk 
and impact assessment tools. 
Therefore, morphological analysis is a useful tool for any environment and is well-
suited for the analysis of online organised crime information. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
‘There’s a war out there …A world war.  And it’s not about who’s got the most bullets.   It’s 
about who controls the information.  What we see and hear, how we work, what we think – it’s 
all about information. … The world isn’t run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It’s 
run by little ones and zeros, little bits of data. It’s all just electrons.’  
Cosmo, hacker character in the film ‘Sneakers’ (1992) 1 
 
This paper began by highlighting some of the issues, including widely diverse 
interpretations of the term ‘organised crime’ and distortions associated with media 
portrayals and statistical processing, which have inhibited the work of law enforcement 
and other anti-online organised crime professionals. It described some of the multi-
disciplinary initiatives which are being devised to counter the problem and 
demonstrated that it is possible to define a broad range of organised crime 
characteristics which are representative of online organised crime activity, based on 
traceable, established sources. 
 
The paper then explored some of the threats which online organised crime poses to 
the business community, from a non-technical IS perspective, before focusing on the 
business strategies and tactics which are used to commit the crimes. Within this 
process, the paper highlighted how OOCGs, in part because of the transnational 
nature and scale of their activities, as well as their ability to use advanced strategic and 
technical skills to successfully exploit the vulnerabilities within information technology, 
pose a genuine threat to the valuable assets of all types of business, as current 
industry reports indicate. 
 
The paper observed that, as with the legitimate sector, reliance on the Internet’s 
communication mechanisms, as well as sound business models, underpin the success 
of OOCG enterprises. It noted that, as well as providing a powerful tool, OOCGs’ 
reliance on well-known business strategies and public information travelling across the 
public Internet may create vulnerabilities which can be exploited by the legitimate 
sector. 
 
The paper concluded with a demonstration of a strategic analysis tool which can 
integrate with the other existing analytical and risk assessment tools used by the 
business, for the purpose of capitalising on the skills and experience of a multi-
disciplinary anti-organised crime professional team. 
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The paper highlighted the following key issues: 
1. There is a need for clarity of definition in all reports about ‘organised crime’. 
2. There is a need for IS/ business professionals to familiarise themselves with a 
basic understanding of organised crime, so that they are ready for any specific 
threats they may encounter, as well as to ensure that their countermeasures 
(including the publication of reports and security awareness materials) deliver 
the intended results as opposed to reinforcing inaccurate stereotypes. 
3. Statistics about the numbers of online organised crime incidents have limited 
value of themselves when applied to online organised crime activities. They 
must be evaluated within the total context of the incident or situation. For 
instance, a single identified online organised crime incident may comprise 
many thousands of individual data breaches. 
4. The real-life case studies corroborate the industry findings that online organised 
crime is distinctive from terrestrial organised crime. In particular, successful 
OOCGs are transnational, well-organised and can understand and exploit the 
properties inherent in all types of information and the continuing loopholes in 
legislation. They commoditise all types of information for profit and have 
capitalised on the benefits of modern technology such as Web 2.0 services to 
utilise the Internet and the Web as both an attack tool and an attack target. 
5. OOCGs are largely responsible for the increasing trend towards the 
commoditisation of malware, for instance in crimeware toolkits, as well as for 
fostering a commercial business approach among online organised criminals. 
6. There is a distinct though fragmented field of academic and industry research 
which analyses organised crime (and online organised crime to a lesser extent) 
from the perspective of its business strategies (as opposed to, for instance, 
employing a criminal law enforcement perspective). These research findings 
are corroborated by the evidence within the real-life case studies.  
7. Some of the elements of organised crime have received much more academic 
attention than others (for instance, the cultural aspects of online organised 
crime remain relatively unresearched). 
8. Morphological Analysis (MA) is a useful simple tool for helping multi-disciplinary 
anti-organised crime teams to quickly identify the key issues in a situation and 
to effectively share and update their skills and experience. 
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9. There is scope to integrate online organised crime business strategy analysis 
(such as MA and the other relevant approaches mentioned in this paper) within 
existing law enforcement and IS risk assessment strategies. 
10. A multi-disciplinary approach to countering online organised crime is the most 
effective and efficient method of capitalising limited resources. 
In conclusion, the paper ends with observations from some of the sources. Whereas in 
the past, intelligence and detection strategies have focussed on identifying individuals 
(for instance, organised crime leaders) and crime groups, as well as on ‘follow the 
money’ tactics, these often result in a temporary reduction in the problem. 2  Just as 
OOCGs use blended attack strategies for maximum impact, so it is necessary for 
countermeasure strategies to also incorporate a range of defensive and detective 
methods, including both technical and non-technical countermeasures, ideally 
identified by a multi-disciplinary team of professionals.  
 
One of the most effective countermeasure strategies may be to create an environment 
where the strategies which the OOCGs use are no longer effective or financially 
lucrative. For instance, IS/ business professionals can continue to work collaboratively 
with organisations such as ICANN to shut down offenders’ access to network and 
systems infrastructure. 3 The effect of this strategy is that it adds significantly to the 
transaction costs of the online organised crime businesses and adjusts ‘the risk/reward 
equation’ to a level whereby ‘these activities become less profitable and attractive’, 4 
concepts which are based on the theories of Becker and Dick, among others, which 
were mentioned in Section 3.1. Therefore, the vulnerabilities of the crime group’s 
business may be identifiable via the familiar legitimate business concept of economic 
analysis. 
 
Additionally, as has been observed by Emigh and Ramzan, 5 because OOCGs are 
mainly motivated by profit, ‘a successful countermeasure need not be bullet-proof, but 
merely good enough that it renders the attack unprofitable.’ Strategic analysis 
techniques such as Morphological Analysis, when used in conjunction with existing 
analytical tools and resources, can assist multi-disciplinary teams business teams to 
identify and target these vulnerable points, thereby maximising the effectiveness of the 
team’s resources and leveraging their multi-disciplinary approach to countering 
organised crime. 
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4. Abstract from the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee 5th Report of 
Session 2006-7, ‘Personal Internet Security’: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/165i.pdf 
5. D S Wall: Page 26, ‘Cybercrime, Media and Insecurity: The Shaping of Public Perceptions of 
Cybercrime’ (International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, Vol 22, Nos 1-2) 
(2008) 
6.  D S Wall: Page 13, ‘Cybercrime, Media and Insecurity: The Shaping of Public Perceptions 
of Cybercrime’ (International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, Vol 22, Nos 1-2) 
(2008) 
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7. D S Wall: Pages 13-29, ‘Cybercrime, Media and Insecurity: The Shaping of Public 
Perceptions of Cybercrime’ (International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, Vol 
22, Nos 1-2) (2008) 
8. D S Wall: Page 17, ‘Cybercrime, Media and Insecurity: The Shaping of Public Perceptions of 
Cybercrime’ (International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, Vol 22, Nos 1-2) 
(2008) 
Similarly, Newman and Clarke, writing about e-commerce crime, also warn against 
unreliable sources and potential bias from ‘both public and private’ vested interests.  
They observe that: ‘In the realm of cybercrime, however, there (are) but a handful of 
studies conducted that collect anything like first-hand information. The majority of articles 
on computer crimes are descriptive attempts …’ 
At the same time, they acknowledge the valid contribution made by reputable private sector 
organisations: 
G R Newman and R V Clarke: Pages 23-24, ‘Superhighway Robbery – Preventing e-
Commerce Crime’ (Willan Publishing) (2003) 
Newman and Clarke’s text is an in-depth evaluation of e-commerce crime from a situational 
crime prevention perspective. It includes a comparison of traditional commerce and e-
commerce factors, as well as a table (Table 3.1, Page 54) which estimates the cost and 
impacts of ‘crimes of the computing age’ on the e-commerce environment. 
9. Within formal forensic techniques, nothing is discarded without a specific reason and 
physical and electronic forensic techniques meticulously record every small clue from a 
situation. This information is particularly valuable in circumstances where overt 
information is difficult to acquire, for instance when combating organised criminal activity 
which is largely covert. 
For a simple explanation of the ‘mosaic effect’, see Computerworld Security – Jaikumar 
Vijayan, ‘Sidebar: The Mosaic Effect’ (March 2004): 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/91109/Sidebar_The_Mosaic_Effect 
10. D S Wall: Page 144, ‘Cybercrime’ (‘Crime and Society Series’, Polity) (2007) 
11. Page 23, 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey. 
 
The impact of reputational damage is difficult to quantify. Although the respondents in the 
CSI survey placed it in third place, it can have far-reaching effects. For instance, in the 
perception of the public, the name of the UK Government Department HMRC has become 
synonymous with its high-profile data loss of 25 million personal records such that the 
incident is simply referred to as ‘the HMRC incident’. 
12. J O Finckenauer and E Waring: Page 4, ‘Challenging the Russian Mafia Mystique’ 
(National Institute of Justice Journal) (April 2001) 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000247b.pdf 
13. Trend Micro: Page 4, ‘Trend Micro 2008 Annual Threat Roundup and 2009 Forecast’ 
http://us.trendmicro.com/imperia/md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/trend_micro_20
09_annual_threat_roundup.pdf 
14. Trend Micro: Pages 14-15, ‘Trend Micro 2007 Threat Report/ 2008 Threat and Technology 
Forecast’: 
http://us.trendmicro.com/imperia/md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/trend_micro_20
09_annual_threat_roundup.pdf 
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15. In her online essay for the Social Science Research Council, ‘Is Cyber Terror Next?’ 
(November 2001), written shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorism incidents, D E 
Denning mentions that the Code Red worm alone infected ‘about a million servers in July 
and August’ 2001, causing ‘$2.6 billion in damages’ from ‘a single incident’: 
http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm 
16. D S Wall: Pages 13-29, ‘Cybercrime’ (‘Crime and Society Series’, Polity) (2007) 
17. M E Beare: Pages 1-2, ‘Structures, Strategies and Tactics of Transnational Criminal 
Organisations: Critical Issues for Enforcement’ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute 
of Criminology, Australian Customs Service and Australian Federal Police Transnational 
Crime Conference, March 9-10, 2000; Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, 
Crime and Security) 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/nathanson/aust.html 
A recent study (July 2009), also by Carnegie Mellon University, found that users who 
encountered repeated pop-up warnings about SSL (an encryption protocol) in benign 
situations became desensitised to them and that additional techniques needed to be 
employed to ensure the message was assimilated.  
Carnegie Mellon CyLab: ‘CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Researchers Release Study 
on SSL Warning Effectiveness’ (no date provided): 
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/news_events/cylab_news/cups-study.html 
The significance of this study is already being extended to include discussion about the 
implications for warnings about national security threats, a category which is sometimes 
deemed to include both terrorism and ‘organised crime’:  
ABCNews.go.com: ‘Crying Wolf: Do Security Warnings Help?’ (July 2009): 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=8205775 
A specific example of the damage to trust which can occur when online crime data is 
perceived to be exaggerated or unverified occurred in April 2009, when the FBI’s Assistant 
Director of the Cyber Division described predictions about the possible impact of the 
‘Conficker’ botnet (suspected to have been created by an Eastern European online crime 
group *) as ‘hype’, saying that such statements could create a false sense of complacency 
and that the problem was being blown out of proportion.  
News.cnet.com: ‘Researchers say Conficker is all about the money’ (April 2009) 
http://news.cnet.com/researchers-say-conficker-is-all-about-the-money/ 
“… I think that focusing people on that particular aspect perhaps took their attention away 
from the overall threat, which is just as great or greater than Conficker itself.” 
ComputerWorld  - Security: ‘Conficker hype may have harmed security efforts, FBI cyber 
chief says’ (April 2009) 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9132089/Conficker_hype_may_have_harmed_sec
urity_efforts_FBI_cyber_chief_says 
In this particular instance, as with the warnings about the Millennium Bug, the IS industry 
found itself in a ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’ situation. Although the 
concerns raised by the security analysts were legitimate (for instance, because ‘Conficker’ 
was compromising millions of machines and was based on extremely sophisticated self-
evolving code. Also, that it was found to spread aggressively and had proven links with the 
online organised crime group behind the prolific ‘Waledac’ worm), the story was blown out 
of proportion by the press so the fact that there was no major impact on April 1st 2009 
meant that the analysts’ warnings were interpreted as being unfounded. 
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Gcn.com, (US) Government Computer News: ‘Mergers and acquisitions in the botnet 
world’ (May 2009) 
http://gcn.com/Articles/2009/05/11/Cybereye-cooperating-botnets.aspx?Page=1 
18. KPMG:  Page 30, ‘2009 e-crime survey’: 
http://www.e-crimecongress.org/ecrime2009/documents/e-
CrimeSurvey2009_AKJ_KPMG(1).pdf 
19. For example: 
Baselinemag.com: ‘Geekfathers: CyberCrime Mobs Revealed’ (March 2005) 
http://www.baselinemag.com/c/a/Projects-Security/Geekfathers-CyberCrime-Mobs-
Revealed/ 
NewsFactor.com: ‘The Real-Life Internet Sopranos’ (December 2005) 
http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=011000009BW2&full_skip=1 
eWeek.com: ‘Return of the Web Mob’ (April 2006) 
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Return-of-the-Web-Mob-%5B1%5D/ 
DarkReading.com: ‘Cybercrime, Cosa Nostra-Style’ (July 2008) 
http://www.darkreading.com/security/government/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=211201153 
British Computer Society (BCS): ‘Keeping it in da family’ (originally published in ‘ISNow’ 
journal, October 2008) 
http://www.bcs.org/server.php?show=ConWebDoc.22658 
Guardian.co.uk: ‘Al-Capone’ style plan to curb UK’s booming £30bn crime industry’ (July 
2009) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/13/organised-crime-fraud 
20. BaselineMag.com: ‘Shadowcrew: Web Mobs’(March 2007) 
http://www.baselinemag.com/c/a/Security/Shadowcrew-Web-Mobs/1/  
 
21. US President’s Commission - Quoted in: G P Gilligan, P 2, ‘Business, Risk and Organised 
Crime’ (Journal of Financial Crime, Volume 14, No 2) (2007) 
22. E Kaspersky, KasperskyUSA.com: ‘The Cybercrime Ecosystem’ White Paper (September 
2008)  
http://www.kasperskyusa.com/partners/pdf/The_Cybercrime_Ecosystem.pdf 
 
23. D S Wall: Page 40, ‘Cybercrime’ (‘Crime and Society Series’, Polity) (2007) 
24. ‘United Nations Convention On Transnational Organised Crime’ (2000) 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOC
ebook-e.pdf 
25. Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
Press Release: ‘Fighting Transnational Organised Crime’  (March 2000) 
http://www.un.org/events/10thcongress/2088f.htm 
26. Organised criminal group - Article 2(a) ‘... a structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
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serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.  
‘Structured group’ – Article 2(c) ‘… a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its 
members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure’ 
27. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Page 5, ‘Results of  a Pilot Survey of Forty 
Selected Organised Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries’ (September 2002) 
28. The terms ‘cyberspace’ and ‘cybergang’ retain resonances with science fiction and the 
image of the early hacking culture. Hence, the more neutral term ‘online organised crime 
group’ is used throughout. 
(See D S Wall, ‘Page 10, ‘Cybercrime’ and the Australian Government’s ‘Future 
Directions in Technology-Enabled Crime: 2007-09’, for the potential implications of using 
different crime and technology-oriented terms in different circumstances.) 
‘Future Directions in Technology-Enabled Crime: 2007-09’: 
K R Choo, R G Smith, R McCusker: Pages 2 and 7, ‘Research and Policy Series no.78 - 
Future Directions in Technology-Enabled Crime 2007-09’ (Australian Government, 
Australian Institute of Criminology) (September 2007) 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/61-80/rpp78.aspx 
29. ‘Future Directions in Technology-Enabled Crime: 2007-09’, Ibid, Page 64. 
30. BBC.co.uk: ‘Fraudsters’ Website Shut in Swoop’ (April 2008) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7675191.stm 
31. For instance, the recent UK Cabinet Office ‘Extending Our Reach: A Comprehensive 
Approach to tackling Serious Organised Crime’ report approaches ‘organised crime’ in 
very general terms. In many cases, where some attempt is made to define the nature of the 
problem, descriptions may be imprecise, implied or dependent on anecdotal as opposed to 
factual evidence.  
It is quite common for reports to jump between references to ‘organised crime’, technology-
oriented organised crime and technology-oriented crime in general, thus giving the 
impression that they are still speaking about the previous subject or that  the 2 subjects are 
synonymous, when in fact they are actually referring to something new which is quite 
different. This creates the potential risk that the audiences for these reports could become 
desensitised, as identified within Carnegie Mellon University study which was discussed 
previously. 
Although it would not be desirable or viable for the literature to detail every possible 
interpretation of ‘organised crime’, there is a great need for reports intended for large-scale 
audiences, including the IS/ business sectors, to define their scope and terms clearly and 
precisely as a matter of course, including the reasons behind the decisions why the terms 
have been chosen. Depending on the situation, it may simply be necessary to cite the 
sources for the decisions. This action might help to give some of the reports additional 
authority. 
Published security incident reports themselves, are part of an evolutionary process. For 
instance, in 2006, the focus of the Garlik ‘UK Cybercrime Report’ was typical of the genre 
until fairly recently, in that it focussed entirely on the types of threats without any 
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consideration at all about who might be committing them. Nowadays, equivalent reports 
will usually provide some broad analyses of the types of perpetrators, together with some 
information about the impact on businesses. However, as this paper discusses, the vast 
proportion of industry white papers, for instance, have until recently still tended to focus on 
detailed technical analysis of the threats, with little equivalent detailed analysis of the other 
elements which (for instance) comprise the International Standard, 27001.  
In fairness, it must be said that this lack of precision is not universal. For instance, the 
sources within the following tables were chosen because they either apply a certain level of 
intellectual rigour to their methods or have been influential or typical of their genre. An 
example of the new breed of security incident report is the 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the 
Underground Economy XII’, which provides a detailed analysis of several aspects of the 
‘underground economy’:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
32. There may be several reasons why this might be the case. The situation may reflect 
assumptions that there is no great need to differentiate between different types of organised 
crime. Alternatively, the difficulty of creating the definitions could be a deterrent so that the 
subject is avoided altogether. In some cases, there may be insufficient understanding of the 
issues to identify that definitions may be necessary.  
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38. Trend Micro: Page 15, ‘Trend Micro 2008 Annual Threat Roundup and 2009 Forecast’ 
http://us.trendmicro.com/imperia/md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/trend_micro_20
09_annual_threat_roundup.pdf 
39. Jakobsson and Z Ramzan: Pages 3 and19, ‘Crimeware – Understanding New Attacks and 
Defences’ (Addison Wesley) (2008) 
40. These kits come in many different flavours and include many advanced techniques. For 
instance, they can target victims with timed attacks that reduce the chances of detection:  
Symantec White Paper: Page 11, ‘Web-based Attacks – February 2009’ 
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-
whitepaper_web_based_attacks_03-2009.en-us.pdf 
The distribution method of the kits has been dubbed ‘crimeware-as-a-service’ (CaaS), in 
recognition that they closely mimic the ‘Software-as-a-Service’ (SaaS) model whereby 
software is hosted remotely on the Web and provided to subscribers ‘on demand’ for a fee:  
Blogs.ZDNet.com: ‘The Next Big Thing? Crimeware-as-a-Service’ (April 2008) 
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1012 
Having bought their kit, in many cases, offenders no longer need to employ much effort to 
launch high-impact attacks. Instead, they can place their tools strategically where they are 
likely to be found and accessed and leave the tool to do the rest.  
41. Jakobsson and Z Ramzan: Page 2, ‘Crimeware – Understanding New Attacks and 
Defences’ (Addison Wesley) (2008) 
42. Tim Berners-Lee, World Wide Web Consortium (W3C): 
     “Q: What is the difference between the Net and the Web? 
A: The Internet ('Net) is a network of networks. Basically it is made from computers and 
cables …. Lots of different sort of programs use the Internet: electronic mail, for example, 
was around long before the global hypertext system I invented and called the World Wide 
Web ('Web). Now, videoconferencing and streamed audio channels are among other 
things which, like the Web, encode information in different ways and use different 
languages between computers ("protocols") to provide a service. 
…. The Web is an abstract (imaginary) space of information. On the Net, you find 
computers -- on the Web, you find document, sounds, videos.... information. On the Net, 
the connections are cables between computers; on the Web, connections are hypertext 
links. The Web exists because of programs which communicate between computers on 
the Net. The Web could not be without the Net.” 
http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/FAQ.html 
43. BBC.co.uk: ‘ ”Boom year” for hi-tech criminals’ (December 2008) 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7797280.stm 
Some of the main web threat trends observed by Symantec  in 2008 were: 
      - ‘Drive-By Downloads’ from mainstream Web sites 
      - Heavily obfuscated (concealed) and dynamically-changing attacks  (Symantec     
      estimated that, whereas only a few attacks were obfuscated in 2006, by 2006 most  
      attacks were concealed in this manner.) 
      - Attacks targeting browser ‘plug-ins’ instead of only the browser itself  
     (ie attacks targeting the sources of the components which make up the browser, as  
     well as the browser itself) 
      - Misleading applications infecting users.  
44. Sophos: Page 1, ‘Security Threat Report: 2009’ 
http://www.sophos.com/sophos/docs/eng/marketing_material/sophos-security-threat-report-
jan-2009-na.pdf 
45. Sophos: Page 3, ‘Security Threat Report: 2009’ 
http://www.sophos.com/sophos/docs/eng/marketing_material/sophos-security-threat-report-
jan-2009-na.pdf 
46. UK Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR): Page 2, ‘2008 
Information Security Breaches Survey – Technical Report’: 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/berr_information_security_breaches_survey_2008.
html 
47. Sophos: Page 1, ‘Security Threat Report: 2009’ 
http://www.sophos.com/sophos/docs/eng/marketing_material/sophos-security-threat-report-
jan-2009-na.pdf 
48. Europol, High Tech Crime Centre:  Page 11, ‘High Tech Crimes Within the EU: Old 
Crimes New Tools, New Crimes New Tools’ – Threat Assessment 2007, Public Version 
(August 2007) 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/Workshop/cert_mit_cyb_att/threat_assess_high_tech_c
rimes_2007_open_ver.pdf 
For offenders in general, using the Internet as a tool follows in the tradition of exploiting 
other high-impact technologies, such as telephones, motor vehicles  and, more recently, 
electronic encryption devices: 
M D Goodman and S W Brenner, Page 1 in online version of ‘The Emerging Consensus on 
Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace’,  UCLA  Journal of Law and Technology (2002) 
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.php 
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Encryption devices can both fortify the protection of illicit information and be used as an 
extortion tool in ‘ransomware’, a re-emerging threat originally inspired by the ‘AIDS Info 
Disc/ PC Cyborg Trojan’ from 1989: 
‘AIDS Info Disc/ PC Cyborg Trojan’ – The ‘AIDS Info Disc’ was a virus transmitted via 
floppy disc which, when installed, encrypted the hard drive of the computer after 90 
reboots. The ‘company’ behind the virus then attempted to extort a fee in exchange for the 
decryption key. (D Denning: Page 262, ‘Information Warfare and Security’,  Addison 
Wesley, 1999). 
However, due to its impact on globalisation and the complexity of its design, the potential 
for damage through using the Internet is much greater than for terrestrial technologies such 
as motor vehicles:  
M D Goodman and S W Brenner, Pages 1 and 2,  in online version of ‘The Emerging 
Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace’,  UCLA  Journal of Law and Technology 
(2002) 
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.php 
For instance, modern organised crime groups can combine the benefits of the Internet with 
the diversity of sophisticated resources at their disposal, such as educated individuals 
located across the world and cutting-edge technical knowledge. 
49. Several authors have drawn comparisons between terrestrial and online versions of crimes. 
For instance, D S Wall, in ‘The Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity’ (Pages 77-98,  
Information Technology and the Criminal Justice System, A Pattavina (Ed), Sage 
Publications, Inc) (2005, 2007) includes a ‘matrix of cybercrimes’ (Table 4.1) which place 
terrestrial and digital crimes alongside each other, within categories which identify whether 
crime type situations create additional opportunities for traditional crimes, new 
opportunities for traditional crime or new opportunities for new types of crime. 
Albanese also creates a table (Table 4) in which he views most online crime as a variation 
of traditional crime. For instance,  internet gambling is viewed as an adaptation of terrestrial 
gambling. 
(J S Albanese: ‘Risk Assessment in Organised Crime: Developing a Market and Product-
Based Model to Determine Threat Levels’ (Pages 273 – 272, Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice, Volume 24, Number 3) (August 2008) 
http://jayalbanese.com/organized_crime ) 
50. For instance, it may be difficult to locate where it is backed up or by which route it is 
travelling. This is because web-based services rely heavily on the infrastructure of the 
Internet, whereby packets of data can travel across numerous different routes, depending on 
the data type and the configuration of the protocols:  
Securecomputing.net.au: ‘Experts urge caution on cloud computing’ (October 2008) 
http://www.securecomputing.net.au/News/125405,experts-urge-caution-on-cloud-
computing.aspx 
51. (Julie Allen: So give me a few examples.) 
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Tom Longstaff:  
‘So, for example, as we move from e-mail to web-based services, from web-based services 
to things like Ajax where you’re going to data models that are being pushed more and more 
outside of your corporation. These are technologies that are changing the entire nature of 
who has what information at what given time and who controls it…’ 
Interview between J Allen and Tom Longstaff:: ‘Evolving Business Models, Threats and 
Technologies: A Conversation with CERT’s Deputy Director for Technology’ ( CERT® 
‘podcast’ and transcript) (December 2006) 
http://www.cert.org/podcast/show/20061212longstaff.html 
52. The farther removed in terms of physical or virtual location a service is from the core 
business, the more likely that an organisation will settle for contractual assurances, for 
instance in the form of information-sharing agreements, which will often be insufficient in 
themselves to ensure the adequate protection of the assets for corporate governance and 
legal purposes.  In such circumstances, organised crime groups may be able to infiltrate the 
third party organisation, either physically (for instance by offering bribes or through 
extortion) or through the digital network, without challenge. 
53. For instance, the prolific ‘Storm’ worm was first propagated via malicious code embedded 
in e-mails which contained weather disaster content. Hoax security e-mails can encourage 
users to buy ‘scareware’, fake security software, usually promoted via security alert hoaxes, 
which often has aggressive installation techniques and which is designed to be very difficult 
to uninstall. 
54. The BBC.co.uk article ‘”Scareware” scams trick searchers’ (March 2009) summarises 
some of the main issues surrounding ‘scareware’: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7955358.stm 
55. BBC.co.uk: ‘US Shuts down ‘scareware’ sellers’ (December 2008) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7779223.stm 
The BBC article refers to a report from The Anti-Phishing Working Group:  
Page 9, ‘Phishing Activity Trends Report – 2nd Half 2008’ 
http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_report_H2_2008.pdf 
A recent innovation combines ‘scareware’ and ‘ransomware’ through the introduction of a 
fake anti-virus package that ‘holds files to ransom’ called FileFix Professional. This is 
accessible from the fake utility, Antivirus 2009 at a cost of $50.  
The Register: ‘Scareware Package Incorporates File Ransom Trickery’ (March 2009) 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/03/25/scareware_ransomware/ 
In December 2008, the US Federal Trade Commission issued injunctions against 2 major 
‘scareware’ vendors, who were trading on the borders of legality and advertising on 
legitimate, unknowing websites, to prevent them from making false claims and advertising 
their wares. 
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BBC.co.uk: ‘US shuts down ‘scareware’ sellers’ (December 2008) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7779223.stm 
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8 KEY TERMS 
 
8.1 Definitions of Key Terms As Used Within This Paper and 
its Appendices 
 
Business Model – A business model is a high-level, conceptual representation of a 
commercial organisation’s structure and key activities. It includes components such as 
the business process, customer identification and markets, as well as products and 
services. It is usual for businesses to amalgamate relevant features from different 
business models, according to the needs of their own organisation. 
Although there are many different types of business model, to date the literature about 
online organised crime has tended to focus on certain types, for instance:  
Subscription business models, collective business models (whereby resources are 
pooled between organisations), online auction business models and industrialisation of 
services business models. 
Business and Information Security Professionals – Within this paper, the term 
‘business and Information Security (IS) professionals’ refers to staff at management 
grade, in particular staff within Senior Management Teams. The term assumes that 
these staff will have the authority to make the corporate decisions which this paper 
discusses. 
Entrepreneur  – Within the context of this paper, an entrepreneur is ‘someone who 
creates value by offering a product or service in order to obtain certain profit.’ 
(P Gottschalk: Page 43, ‘Criminal Entrepreneurship’ (Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 
New York) (2008)) 
Jurisdictional Arbitrage  – A term to describe the exploitation of legal loopholes. 
Leveraging (Project Title) – ‘Military Dictionary: (US Department Of Defence) In 
information operations, the effective use of information, information systems and 
technology to increase the means and synergy in accomplishing information operations 
strategy.’ (Answers.com) 
Organised Crime – Generic term that may apply to all types of organised crime 
activity, whether terrestrial or technology-oriented 
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Online Organised Crime – Potential or actual criminal activity that primarily targets 
the Internet environment 
Terrestrial Organised Crime – Potential or actual criminal activity that primarily 
targets the physical environment, as opposed to the technology-oriented environment 
Technology-oriented Organised Crime – Potential or actual criminal activity that 
primarily targets any aspect of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT)  
environment, including the Internet 
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9 GLOSSARIES 
 
9.1 GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
 
Abbreviation/Acronym Meaning Additional Comments 
CAAS Crimeware-as-a-
Service 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
CARPO CARDS Regional 
Police Project 
An EU-sponsored initiative 
CERT Computer Emergency 
Response Team  
Based at Carnegie Mellon University in 
the United States 
CSI Computer Security 
Institute 
 
DoS Denial of Service 
attack 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
DDoS Distributed Denial of 
Service attack 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
DMZ Demilitarised Zone See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
DNA Deoxribonucleic acid A nucleic acid that contains the genetic 
instructions for all life forms 
FBI (US) Federal Bureau 
of Investigation 
 
ICANN Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names 
and Numbers 
ICANN is a non-profit international 
‘public benefit’ corporation which 
‘promotes competition and develops 
policy on the Internet’s unique 
identifiers.’ 
http://www.icann.org/en/about/  
IRC Internet Relay Chat See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
IS Information Security Within the context of this paper, the 
abbreviation ‘IS’ refers to ‘Information 
Security’ 
ISP Internet Service 
Provider 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
MA Morphological 
Analysis 
A quantifiable methodology to aid 
strategic thinking and problem-
structuring: 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
NCIA National Criminal 
Intelligence Agency 
(UK) 
Absorbed within SOCA in April 2006 
NCIS National Criminal 
Intelligence Service 
(UK) 
Absorbed within SOCA in April 2006 
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NCS National Crime 
Squad (UK) 
Absorbed within SOCA in April 2006 
NHTCU National Hi-Tech 
Crime Unit (UK) 
Absorbed within SOCA in April 2006 
OECD Organisation for 
Economic Co-
Operation and 
Development 
 
OOCG Online Organised 
Crime Group 
Within the context of this paper, the 
abbreviation ‘OOCG’ refers to online 
organised crime groups 
PDA Personal Digital 
Assistant 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
RICO Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt 
Organisations Act 
1970 
US legislation 
SAAS Software-as-a-
Service 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
SOCA Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (UK) 
Launched in 2005 and dubbed the 
‘British FBI’ by the media (Ref), SOCA 
incorporated the former NCS, the NCIS, 
the NCIA and the NHTCU within a 
single organisation 
T0C Transnational 
Organised Crime 
Formally defined by the UN in the 
‘United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime’ (2000) 
TOC was identified as the 10th threat in 
the United Nations list of identified 
serious world threats (December 2004): 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf 
 
TOCG Terrestrial Organised 
Crime Groups 
Within the context of this paper, the 
abbreviation ‘OOCG’ refers to terrestrial 
organised crime groups 
UNTOC United Nations 
Convention on 
Transnational 
Organised Crime 
 
VoIP Voice over Internet 
Protocol 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
VPN Virtual Private 
Network 
See Glossary of IS and Technical Terms 
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9.2 GLOSSARY OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND 
TECHNICAL TERMS USED WITHIN THIS PAPER 
AND THE APPENDICES 
 
IS/Technical 
Term 
Meaning 
Adware ‘Adware displays selected ads in pop-up windows or in the 
main browser window.’ 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger: Page 623, ‘Security in Computing – 4th Edition’ 
(Prentice Hall) (2007) 
Of itself, adware, as is also the case with keyloggers and 
spyware products, is not intrinsically illegal. In all three cases, it 
is the way in which the product is used which determines its 
legal status. 
Most adware is compiled using JavaScript, whose functions 
can be misused so that adware residing on an innocuous 
website, when accessed, can redirect the user to a malicious 
destination. 
Automatic/ 
Automated Teller 
Machine (ATM) 
A ‘machine where customers use a bank card or debit card to 
carry out banking operations such as withdrawals, deposits, 
transfers and bank payments.’ 
Merriam-Webster Visual Dictionary Online: 
http://visual.merriam-webster.com/society/economy-
finance/bank/automatic-teller-machine-(atm).php 
Biometrics A form of authentication based on a person’s physical 
characteristics, for instance their fingerprints. 
Cached data ‘Caching’ is the process of storing data in a temporary location 
for later reuse. 
Carding ‘Carding’ refers to illegal activities arising from the compromise 
of an individual’s credit or debit card (card fraud), for instance 
impersonation of their identity. 
Crimeware  ‘Crimeware is a subclass of the more broad category of 
malware, which refers generally to unwanted software that 
performs malicious actions on a user’s computer.’ (Page 3) 
‘Crimeware is software that performs illegal actions 
unanticipated by a user running the software; these actions are 
intended to yield financial benefits to the distributor of the 
software.’ (Page 2) 
M Jakobsson and Z Ramzan: ‘Crimeware – Understanding New 
Attacks and Defences’ (Addison Wesley) (2008) 
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Crimeware-as-a-
Service (CaaS) 
Technically, CaaS refers to viral code which resides ‘in the 
cloud’ *, as opposed to on a host, in a similar way to the SaaS 
model. ‘CaaS provides malware on demand to the infected 
host.’ 
Syscon.com: ‘Hidden Dangers: Crimeware-as-a-Service (Caas)’ 
http://www.sys-con.com/node/678589  
* As used here, ‘in the cloud’ refers to code which resides on 
the Internet. 
Demilitarised 
Zone (DMZ) 
A demilitarised zone is a designated ‘buffer’ area within a 
network which separates sensitive systems and data from 
direct access via the Internet. 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) 
A Denial of Service attack comprises any kind of attack on the 
availability of information. 
Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) 
These ‘command and control’ mass attacks use spam or other 
messages to overwhelm their target systems via a distributed 
system of ‘zombie’ machines, which are compromised 
corporate or domestic machines that have been infected with 
malicious code. ‘Zombies’ lie dormant until they receive a 
command from the ‘botherder These ‘command and control’ 
mass attacks use spam or other messages to overwhelm their 
target systems via a distributed system of ‘zombie’ machines, 
which are compromised corporate or domestic machines that 
have been infected with malicious code. ‘Zombies’ lie dormant 
until they receive a command from the ‘botherder’ (aka ‘zombie 
master’),  at which point they respond en masse.  Both the 
‘botherder’ and the ‘zombies’ can be located anywhere in the 
world and messages can pass through many routers, hubs and 
open proxy servers (which will mask the sending computer’s 
unique identifier, its IP address) on their way to their 
destination.  
A typical contemporary botnet scenario is outlined in:  
e-Week: ‘Pump-and-Dump Spam Surge Linked to Russian Bot 
Herders’ (November 2006): 
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/PumpandDump-Spam-Surge-
Linked-to-Russian-Bot-Herders/ 
See also: 
Terrence Berg, Computer Law: Pages 20 and 21, ‘The Changing Face 
of Cybercrime – New Internet Threats Create Challenges to Law 
Enforcement’ (Date not published, 2007?): 
http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article1163.pdf 
Drive-By 
Downloads 
A drive-by download is a type of attack whereby malicious 
software automatically infects the user’s machine covertly if 
they browse to a malicious website 
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e-Currencies ‘e-Currencies’ is a generic term which refers to currencies in 
digital form such as e-Gold. 
Encryption ‘Encryption is the process of encoding a message so that its 
meaning is not obvious.’ 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger: Page 38, ‘Security in Computing – 4th Edition’ 
(Prentice Hall) (2007) 
Fast-flux services ‘Fast-flux’ services aim to enable a fully-qualified domain name 
(eg www.example.com) … to have hundreds or even 
thousands of IP addresses assigned to it … with the addresses 
being ‘swapped out’ very quickly. The result is that website 
hostnames can be associated with a new set of IP addresses 
‘as often as every 3 minutes’, which increases the likelihood 
that these sites will avoid detection by detection software. 
The Honeynet Project: ‘Know Your Enemy: Fast-Flux Service 
Networks’ (August 2008) 
http://www.honeynet.org/papers/ff/ 
(Default) Gateway  ‘A default gateway is the device that passes traffic from the 
local subnet to devices on other subnets. The default gateway 
often connects local devices to the Internet …’  
Compnetworking.About.com: ‘What is a Default Gateway?’: 
http://compnetworking.about.com/od/internetaccessbestuses/f/default_
gateway.htm   
ID ‘Theft’ ‘…Identity theft is taking another person’s identity. Use of 
another person’s credit card is fraud; taking out a new credit 
card in that person’s name is identity theft.’ 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger: Page 618, ‘Security in Computing – 4th Edition’ 
(Prentice Hall) (2007) 
Internet The Internet is a public world-wide system of interconnected 
computers. 
Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC) 
‘An Internet communications protocol … (which) … offers real-
time group communications, requires very little bandwidth and 
the IRC client software is freely available across all operating 
systems.’ 
Page 5, The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy 
XII:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=2
0081124_11 
Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) 
An Internet Service Provider is ‘normally a host which is 
connected full-time to other hosts and which provides access 
and other services to its subscribers.’ 
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C Reed: ‘Internet Law – Text and Materials – 2nd Edition’ (Cambridge 
University Press) (2004) 
IP Address ‘IP’ stands for ‘Internet Protocol’, a type of network 
communication protocol which, together with TCP 
(Transmission Control Protocol), comprises TCP/IP, the 
network protocol which is used for the Internet. An IP address is 
a unique identifier allocated to computers using the Internet. 
Keyloggers Keyloggers are hardware or software devices that capture data 
typed into keypads. 
Malware ‘In addition to crimeware, malware encompasses legal but 
malicious software such as adware and spyware, and illegal 
software without a commercial purpose, such as destructive 
viruses.’  
Joint Report between the US Department of Homeland Security, SRI 
International Identity Theft Technology Council and the Anti-
Phishing Working Group, sponsored by the US Dept of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Directorate: Page 4, ‘The 
Crimeware Landscape: Malware, Phishing, Identity Theft and 
Beyond’ (October 2006) 
http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/APWG_CrimewareReport.pdf 
Metadata Metadata comprises properties which are associated with a 
piece of data, for instance the size of the data or the date it was 
created. 
Obfuscated URLs ‘Obfuscation’ is a technique which conceals ‘an attack by 
making its operation more complex and thus harder to detect.’ 
Symantec White Paper: Page 11, ‘Web-based Attacks – February 
2009’: 
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-
whitepaper_web_based_attacks_03-2009.en-us.pdf 
Obfuscating a Universal Resource Locator (URL) hides the true 
address of a webpage so that, for instance, a user is relocated 
to a different webpage than the one they thought they were 
accessing. 
PDA (Personal 
Digital Assistant) 
External storage and application portable devices which can 
connect and synchronise their information with PCs, laptops 
and other equipment. (Eg Blackberries) 
Phishing ‘Attempting to fraudulently acquire a person’s credentials, 
usually for financial gain.’ 
M Jakobsson and Z Ramzan: Page 168, ‘Crimeware – Understanding 
New Attacks and Defences’ (Addison Wesley) (2008)  
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Ransomware An attack technique whereby the data is encrypted and a 
financial demand made to restore it. 
Rootkit ‘A rootkit is a program or set of programs and files that attempts 
to conceal its existence … Usually the rootkit contains some 
malware that is being hidden as well.’ 
A S Tanenbaum: Page 686, ‘Modern Operating Systems’ (Pearson 
International Edition) (2009) 
Scareware ‘Scareware’ refers to malicious tactics which are deliberately 
intended to cause shock or concern so that, for instance, the 
victim responds by buying a fraudulent security application. The 
term is also used to describe the fraudulent security 
applications themselves. 
Software as a 
Service (SaaS) 
SaaS is ‘a software delivery method that provides access to 
software and its functions remotely as a Web-based service.’ 
Users pay a subscription fee to access the software ‘on 
demand’. 
Webopedia.com: ‘What is SAAS’? 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SaaS.html 
Spam ‘Spam’ is an Information Security term that is attributed to a 
Monty Python comedy sketch in which the participants are 
overwhelmed by repeated chanting of the word ‘spam’.  
‘Spamming’ refers to the mass mailing of unwanted e-mail 
messages which are able to inundate a user’s e-mail account. 
Spyware ‘Spyware’ is a generic term for covert surveillance software.  
Spyware includes remote viewing software applications and 
keystroke loggers (keyloggers). 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger: Page 632, ‘Security in Computing – 4th Edition’ 
(Prentice Hall) (2007) 
SQL Injection 
Attack 
A description of a SQL injection attack, within the context of the 
Heartland Payment Systems online organised crime case, is 
described below: 
BBC.co.uk: ‘US man “stole 130m card numbers” ‘ (August 2009) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8206305.stm 
Trojan A Trojan is a digital technique which downloads malicious code 
alongside a seemingly-innocuous legitimate programme. 
It is: ‘a piece of software in which unauthorised computer 
instructions have been secretly inserted; or hardware in which 
unauthorised circuitry or mechanisms have been secretly 
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inserted.’  
D P Parker: Page 72, ‘Fighting Computer Crime’ (Wiley Computer 
Publishing) (1998) 
The term ‘trojan’ was inspired by the classical Roman account 
in Virgil’s ‘Aeneid’.  
The epic poem describes a tactic used during the Trojan War 
whereby the Greek army tricked the Trojans into bringing a 
large wooden horse that had been left outside within the walls 
of Troy. The horse was not as benign as it seemed because it 
contained Greek soldiers who, once inside, emerged and 
defeated the Trojan defence. The story has come to represent 
any strategy which appears benign but which is designed to 
breach a fortified security perimeter. 
Virus  A computer virus is a type of malicious code which relies on a 
carrier to replicate. 
A ‘polymorphic virus’ is a type of computer virus which changes 
its code each time it infects a new file. 
VoIP (Voice over 
Internet Protocol) 
The technology that enables telephone calls to be transmitted 
over the Internet. 
VPN (Virtual 
Private Network) 
A VPN provides a secure channel for communication across 
the Internet, using encryption. 
Web (World Wide 
Web) 
The World Wide Web (WWW) is a sub-division of the Internet 
which links document files via ‘hypertext’. The documents are 
annotated using the HTML (HyperText Markup Language) 
protocol. 
‘Hypertext’ – ‘A computer-based text retrieval system that 
enables a user to access particular locations in webpages or 
other electronic documents by clicking on links within specific 
webpages or documents.’ 
Answers.com: 
http://www.answers.com/topic/hypertext 
Web 2.0 ‘Web 2.0’ refers to ‘the second generation of the design of the 
World Wide Web’, in particular ‘the movement away from static 
webpages to dynamic and shareable content and social 
networking.’ 
Wiktionary.org: 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Web_2.0   
Web Hosting ‘The service of hosting a site on the Internet making it viewable 
for others on the Net.’ 
Wiktionary.org: 
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http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/web_hosting   
Worm A ‘worm’ is a self-replicating type of malicious code which 
spreads via networks. 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger: Page 116, ‘Security in Computing – 4th Edition’ 
(Prentice Hall) (2007) 
3G Phones The ‘third generation’ of mobile phone technology 
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Appendix A 
 
Terrestrial/Technically-Oriented Organised Crime Group Theoretical Characteristics 
 
Table 1 – Raw data (for characteristics which have been identified as predominantly terrestrial but which may also be technology-oriented by 
inference *) extracted from a broad range of sources, with sources cited. 
Table 2 – Rationalised version of the raw data from Table 1, with sources cited 
Table 3 – Raw data (specifically for terrestrial/technology-oriented organised crime group characteristics) extracted from a typical range of 
sources, with sources cited  
Table 4 – Comparison between Table 2 data and rationalised version of the raw data from Table 3, with sources cited 
Table 5 – Summary comparison of typical terrestrial/technically-oriented and specific technology-oriented organised crime group characteristics. 
Table 6 – Maps technology-oriented organised crime group characteristics against real-life case study examples. 
 
* Perhaps the most important point to make about the sources for the first 2 tables is that they do not strictly represent terrestrial crime group 
characteristics per se. It is more accurate to say that they represent characteristics which have been identified as definitely applying to terrestrial 
organised crime groups (for instance, for the earlier sources) and which, for some of the sources (eg UNTOC), may also apply to technology-
oriented groups as well, although the inference in each case is implied not stated. 
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Table 1 summarises characteristics identified between 1990 and 2008. Table 2 further summarises the findings from Table 1, which are 
somewhat unwieldy in their raw form, and adds the items from UNTOC for comparison purposes. Table 2 then provides a workable synopsis as 
the basis for comparison with the data from Tables 3 and 4. 
 
In addition, Table 2 shows the similarities and differences of interpretation between UNTOC and some of the other sources, with the other sources 
including more granularity than UNTOC within their definitions.  
 
Table 3 comprises some of the technology-oriented organised crime group characteristics which are commonly cited by sources as significant. 
Whereas the terrestrial/technology-oriented sources are all well-established (including Albanese, whose 2008 list is an update of an earlier 2001 
version), spanning a time range between 1990 (Abadinsky) and 2008 (Albanese et al), the specific technology-oriented sources are much more 
recent, with a time range between 2001/2 (Williams) and 2009 (some of the additional sources) and are therefore drawn inevitably from fewer case 
studies. Even so, the technology-oriented sources take the approach that technologically-oriented organised crime is a genuine problem, that it 
comprises some elements which are unique to the technology-oriented environment and that it is enabled by the online environment (the ‘Web’) in 
particular. They also identify many specific elements which fall within the category of ‘Strategy/Tactics’. 
 
Table 4 is similar to Table 2 in that it rationalises the elements from Table 3 into a slightly less unwieldy format. However, whereas Table 2 
compares the UNTOC definitions with those from other sources, Table 4 compares terrestrial/technology-oriented characteristics and sources with 
those which may have a particular significance when considering technology-oriented organised crime groups. 
 
Table 5 further rationalises the technology-oriented elements and presents them alongside the terrestrial/technology-oriented characteristics 
without their sources. 
 
Finally, Table 6 maps the technology-oriented characteristics against real-life case study examples. 
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Analysis of the tables is subject to the following necessary qualifications:  
 
1. The items in the tables are by no means intended to be in any way definitive, although, between them, they do represent most of the identified 
main characteristics of the organised crime groups themselves (as opposed to their specific activities) which have been highlighted in the 
literature. Similar versions of the tables could be constructed using information from other authors, with the items mapped against different 
categories, according to purpose. Also, some of the items constitute sub-lists in themselves, for instance the UNTOC definitions and those 
aggregated from other sources by Albanese. A more granular approach could also be applied by including additional criteria to those identified 
here. 
 
2. Neither are the tables intended to indicate that the authors and organisations do not recognise each other’s characteristics as valid. This may 
not be the case at all (for instance, authors may have cited other characteristics elsewhere than the sources cited here), although a few items are 
contradictory (for instance, where sources differ from each other in Table 1 as to whether organised crime groups are ‘ideological’ or ‘non-
ideological’). 
 
3. There are also some minor differences of interpretation and nuance where sources have used the same or very similar terms and the reader is 
referred to the original sources for further, more precise explanations.   
 
Notwithstanding the above qualifications, the tables remain representative of the main identified organised crime group characteristics, with 
sufficient similarities between the items for them to enable them to be grouped together for high- level purposes.  
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Table 1 
Raw Data - Range of Typical Characteristics of Organised Crime Groups 
Category Abadinsky1 
(1990) 
 
Maltz2 (1994) EU/Europol3 
(2002) 
Gilinskiy4 (2006) Europol5 (2008) Albanese6 
(2008)* 
Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
 
  Collaboration of 
more than  two 
people (M) 
    
      Capable of either a 
centrally-focussed or 
diffuse structure 
(Fiorentini and 
Peltzman, 1995) a 
      Vertically-integrated 
structure (Garoupa, 
1997) b 
 
 
Structure Having a 
commercial or 
business-like 
structure (O) 
A complex hierarchical 
structure with functions 
assigned to specific units 
of the organisation 
Group Structures Use of legitimate 
business 
structures 
 
1. 
Organisational 
Structures 
Hierarchical Hierarchical  A complex hierarchical 
structure with functions 
assigned to specific units 
 Organised 
hierarchy 
continuing (ie a 
Hierarchy (Reuter, 
1984) c 
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Category Abadinsky1 
(1990) 
 
Maltz2 (1994) EU/Europol3 
(2002) 
Gilinskiy4 (2006) Europol5 (2008) Albanese6 
(2008)* 
Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
of the organisation continuing, 
structured 
enterprise) (MT) * 
 
  Having a 
specialised 
division of 
labour (O) 
A complex hierarchical 
structure with functions 
assigned to specific units 
of the organisation 
Specialisation Specialisation  
 
 
  Having as its 
central goal the 
pursuit of profit 
and/or power 
(M) 
The deriving of maximum 
profits as the key goal of 
the activity 
 Rational profit 
through crime 
(MT) * 
 
Non-ideological Ideology (or 
lack thereof) 
(N) 
   
Non-ideological 
 
 
2. 
Organisational 
Goals 
     Public demand for 
services (MT) * 
 
 
 
3. 
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
 
 
 
 
 
  Suspected of 
the commission 
of serious 
criminal 
offences (M) 
Involved in 
money-
laundering 
****** (O) 
The criminal nature of the 
activity and associated 
financial activities 
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Category Abadinsky1 
(1990) 
 
Maltz2 (1994) EU/Europol3 
(2002) 
Gilinskiy4 (2006) Europol5 (2008) Albanese6 
(2008)* 
Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
Governed by 
explicit rules 
and regulations 
Discipline (N) Utilising a 
system of 
discipline and 
control (O) 
    
Uses illegal 
violence and 
bribery 
Demonstrates 
illegal violence 
and bribery 
Violence (G) 
 
Using violence 
and other 
means of 
intimidation (O) 
 Use of violence Use of force or 
threat (MT) 
 
  Operating 
internationally, 
across national 
borders (O) 
 The international 
dimension 
  
 Corruption 
(G) 
Exerting 
influence over 
politics, judicial 
bodies, media, 
the economy 
(O) 
The corruption of powerful 
organisations and 
individuals, especially law-
enforcement bodies, as 
the main means of the 
criminal activity 
Influence Corruption of 
public officials  to 
maintain immunity 
(MT) * 
Authority of reputation ** 
(Finckenauer, 2005) d 
 Multiple 
enterprises 
(G) 
    Multiple enterprises 
(Reuter, 1983) e 
3. 
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
     Restricted  
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Category Abadinsky1 
(1990) 
 
Maltz2 (1994) EU/Europol3 
(2002) 
Gilinskiy4 (2006) Europol5 (2008) Albanese6 
(2008)* 
Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
membership 
      Incorporate both 
national and foreign 
members (CARPO, 
2006) f 
 
 Involvement 
in legitimate 
enterprises 
  Use of legitimate 
business 
structures 
  
 
 
       
Perpetuitous (ie 
tending towards 
longevity) 
 
Continuity (G) 
Sophistication 
(N) 
Taking place 
over a 
prolonged or 
indefinite period 
of time (M) 
A stable association of 
people, designed for long-
term activity 
Counter-
measures **** 
Organised 
hierarchy 
continuing (ie a 
continuing, 
structured 
enterprise) (MT) * 
Durability (Reuter, 
1984) g 
4. 
Organisational 
Maturity 
      Insulation (Royal 
Canadian Mounted 
Police)*****  
 
 
5. 
Organisational 
Culture 
 Bonding 
rituals (N) 
   Code of secrecy Authority of reputation ** 
(Finckenauer, 2005) h 
Self-Identification 
(Finckenauer, 2005) i 
 
 
6. 
Organisational Monopolistic**   The aspiration to 
monopoly in a certain 
 Monopoly over 
particular market 
Lends themselves to 
monopoly (Schelling, 
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Category Abadinsky1 
(1990) 
 
Maltz2 (1994) EU/Europol3 
(2002) 
Gilinskiy4 (2006) Europol5 (2008) Albanese6 
(2008)* 
Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
Environment sphere of trade on certain 
territories 
1971) j 
 
 
EU/Europol items: (M)  Mandatory  (O)  Optional;  Maltz items: (G)  Generic (N)  ‘Non-Generic’ (ie here, meaning characteristics of some 
organised crime groups which are not necessary nor typical); Albanese: (MT) Most Typical 
 
* Albanese – Using his own sample of authors, Albanese conducted a similar exercise to that used to create this table. He identified typical 10 
characteristics which he ranked according to the number of times they were cited. He then reduced these to the top 5:  
organised continuing hierarchy; rational profit through crime; use of force or threat; corruption of public officials to maintain immunity; public 
demand for services. 
** Finckenauer – ‘Authority of Reputation’ is the ability to coerce others by suggestion, through reputation, without the necessity for violence; ‘Self-
Identification’ is the act of identifying with the organisation, evidenced by (eg) initiation rites. 
*** Monopolistic – In their introduction, Fiorentini and Peltzman (Page 5) comment that they share Reuter’s view, which is opposed to Schelling’s,  
that monopolisation is becoming less of a significant  characteristic of organised crime and that this is supported by a growing body of empirical 
evidence, although it still retains a role in ‘cartel’ activities which tend to be vertically-integrated, such as money laundering and narcotics. 
Fiorentini explains the reasoning behind this view in his essay on oligopolistic competition in illegal markets (P 274, ‘The Economics of Organised 
Crime’)  
**** ‘Countermeasures’ as used here, has a different meaning to the usage of the term within Information Security, as explained in Section 2.7, 
Page 13, ‘EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment: ‘OCTA 2007’.  Within the Report, it describes a wide range of countermeasures which 
organised crime groups use against police action and detection, including ‘false identities, spoofing and encryption’. 
***** Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Criminal Intelligence Division)  – ‘Insulation’ refers to ‘protection of the organisation’s leaders by separating 
them from the soldiers, cell from cell, and function from function.’ (Page 4, ‘Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime and Money Laundering’ 
(J R Richards, CRC Press LLC) (1999)   
****** EU/Europol 2002 – Although ‘Money laundering’ is included here because it was cited by EU/Europol, will be considered in the paper as a 
type of threat (as opposed to an organised crime group characteristic). 
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The table shows organised crime characteristics which were highlighted by a sample of sources as significant between the period 1990 – 2008. 
Reading by Row – Identifies where sources concur that individual items are significant. 
Reading Vertically – Identifies that, between 1990 and 2008, there is very strong consensus between the sources that: 
 - Organised crime groups have some sort of structure (although sources may disagree as to the exact nature of that structure) 
-  Violence and corruption are significant organisational strategies 
- Organised crime groups have a tendency towards continuity. 
With regard to organisational structures and goals, there is some agreement between the sources that organised crime group structures are 
analogous with those of legitimate businesses and that profit-seeking is a significant organisational goal. 
 
Main Sources 
1  H Abadinsky, ‘ Organised Crime’ (3rd Edition) (Nelson Hall, Chicago, Illinois) (1990) 
2  M D Maltz, pp 21-37, ‘Defining Organised Crime’, ‘Handbook of Organised Crime in the United Sates’, (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT)  (1994) 
3  Joint EU/Europol Report - (Sec 2001) 433 Commission Staff Working Paper: Joint Report from Commission Services and Europol: ‘Towards a European 
Strategy to Prevent Organised Crime’ (The organised crime 2001 Report criteria were cited in T Newburn: ‘Criminology’, Page 406, Willan Publishing, 2007) 
4  Y Gilinskiy: Pages 259-292, ‘Crime in Contemporary Russia’, ‘European Journal of Criminology, 3 (3) (2006) 
5  Europol - EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment: ‘OCTA 2008’, P 13; 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCTA)/OCTA2008.pdf 
6  J S Albanese: Page 264,  ‘Risk Assessment in Organised Crime: Developing a Market and Product-Based Model to Determine Threat Levels’ (Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 2008: 24; 263. Originally published online – May 8, 2008) 
http://jayalbanese.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/AlbaneseRiskAssessmentJCCJ2008.44114959.pdf 
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Additional Items Identified from Other Sources 
a
 G Fiorentini and S Peltzman:  Page 5, ‘The Economics of Organised Crime’ (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Cambridge University Press) (1995)  
b
 N Garoupa: ABSTRACT : ‘The Economics of Organised Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement’ (Economics Working Papers, No 246, Dept of Economics and 
Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) (1997) 
c
 P Reuter:  ‘Disorganised Crime – Illegal Markets and the Mafia’, Page 175 (The MIT Press – Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England) (Aka 
‘Disorganised Crime – The Economics of the Visible Hand’) (1983) 
d
 O Finckenauer: Pages 63-83, ‘Problems of Definition: What is Organized Crime? Trends in Organized Crime’(2005) 
e
 Reuter, Ibid: Page P 175 
f
 CARPO (CARDS Regional Police Project) Report: Page 16, ‘Organised Crime and its Salient Features’ (2006) 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/projects/CARPO/Pctc_2006_20.pdf 
g
 Reuter, Ibid Page 175   
h
 O Finckenauer, Ibid 
i
 O Finckenauer, Ibid 
j
 T C Schelling: Pages 155-166, ‘What is the Business of Organised Crime?’ (‘Journal of Public Law’, 20, 71-84)  (1971) 
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Table 2 
Summary Version – Range of Typical Characteristics of Organised Crime Groups, with UNTOC and Sources 
Category Item 
No 
UN Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNTOC) 
Table 1 Source (Table 1) 
   
1 Structured Criminal Group Structure/ Group Structure Maltz/ Europol (2008) 
2 Collaboration (‘three or more persons’) Collaboration of more than 2 people (M) EU/Europol (2002) 
3 Fluid, changeable roles, membership and 
structure (‘does not need to have 
formally-defined roles for its members, 
continuity of its membership or a 
developed structure’) 
Centrally-focussed or diffuse structure  Fiorentini and Peltzman 
4   Hierarchical structure Abadinsky/ Maltz/ Gillingsky/ 
Albanese/ Reuter/ MT 
5   Vertically-integrated structure  Garoupa 
5   Commercial/ business-like structure EU/Europol (2002)/Albanese/ 
1.  
Organisational  
Structures 
7   Specialised division of labour EU/Europol (2002)/ Gilinsky/ 
Europol (2008)/ Albanese 
   
8 Formed for a planned purpose (‘not 
randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence’) 
    
9 Financial or other material goals 
(‘financial or other material benefit’) 
Pursuit of profit and/or power EU/Europol (2002)/ Gillingsky/ 
Albanese 
2. 
Organisational 
Goals 
10   Monopolistic Abadinksy/ Gillinsky/Albanese/ 
Schelling 
12   Non-Ideological Abadinsky/Albanese 2. 
Organisational 13   Ideological or Non-Ideological Maltz 
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Category Item 
No 
UN Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNTOC) 
Table 1 Source (Table 1) 
   
Goals 14   Public demand for services Albanese 
   
15 Criminal intent (‘with the aim of 
committing one or more offences’) 
Involved in serious criminal offences (eg 
money-laundering) 
EU/Europol (2002)/ Gillingsky 
16   Involved in legitimate enterprises  Maltz/ Europol (2008) 
17   Control (eg explicit rules and regulations, 
discipline) 
Abadinsky/ Maltz/ EU/Europol 
(2002) 
18 Article 1 (Statement of Purpose) – The 
purpose of this convention is to promote 
cooperation and combat transnational 
organized crime more effectively. 
Operates internationally EU/Europol (2002)/ Europol 
(2008) 
19   Multiple enterprises Maltz/ Reuter 
20   Includes both national and foreign members CARPO (2006) 
21   Restricted membership Albanese 
22   Violence Abadinsky/ Maltz/ EU/Europol 
(2002)/ Europol 
(2008)/Albanese 
23   Bribery Maltz 
24   Corruption Maltz/ EU/ Europol (2002)/ 
Gilinskiy/ Europol (2008)/ 
Albanese/ Finckenauer 
3. 
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
25 Direct or indirect methods (‘direct or 
indirect’) 
    
   
26 Continuity (‘existing for a period of time’) Tending towards continuity Abadinksy/ Maltz/ EU/Europol 
(2002)/ Gillinsky/ Europol 
(2008)/ Albanese/ Reuter 
4. 
Organisational 
Maturity 
 27  Insulation Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police 
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Category Item 
No 
UN Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNTOC) 
Table 1 Source (Table 1) 
   
28   Bonding Rituals  Maltz 
29   Code of Secrecy Albanese 
30   Authority of Reputation Finckenauer 
5. 
Organisational 
Culture 
31   Self-Identification Finckenauer 
   
6. 
Organisational 
Environment 
32   Monopolistic Abadinksy/ Gilinskiy/ Albanese/ 
Schelling 
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Table 3 
Raw Data - Range of Typical Characteristics of Technically-Oriented Organised Crime Groups 
Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
      ‘Huge number’ of 
people (MessageLabs®, 
2008)a 
Flexible 
Adaptable 
Very flexible 
structure 
Transient, lateral 
and fluid forms  
 
Decentralised, 
loose relationships 
Transitory 
relationships 
  Transient, lateral and 
fluid forms (Brenner, 
2002)b 
Decentralised (ISF, 
2008)c 
Loosely-connected (ISF, 
2008) c 
  Lateral 
Relationships 
   Lateral Relationships 
(Brenner, 2002) b 
     Hierarchical 
structure 
 
1. 
Organisational 
Structures 
Growing 
relationships 
between 
organised crime 
and intruders who 
provide the 
technical 
expertise 
Specialised 
hackers 
 
Very specialised 
division of labour 
Specialised 
components 
Specialised skills 
  Specialisation Specialised trades 
(MessageLabs®, 2009)a 
Buy in expertise 
(Winkler, 2005)d 
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Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
  Networks (ie non-
hierarchical)  
   Networks (ie non-
hierarchical) (Brenner, 
2002) b 
 
  Swarming **    Swarming (Brenner, 
2002) b 
 Growing network 
connections 
between hackers 
or small-time 
criminals and 
organised crime 
    Affiliation 
networks as 
distribution 
channels 
 
 
 Money Motive Profit-oriented    Exclusively profit-driven 
(Winkler, 2005) d 
Driven by economics 
(MessageLabs®, 2009) a 
 
 
 
   To obtain valuable data  
(ISF, 2008) c 
2. 
Organisational 
Goals 
 
 
 
   
Exploitation of the 
online market (ISF, 
2008) c 
 
3.   Depart from traditional thinking 
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Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
about organised 
crime 
    Rely on physical 
violence (Eastern 
Europe) 
  
 International 
Dimension  
International Transnational    
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
      Employ stealth (ISF, 
2008) c 
 
      Minimal hacking skills 
necessary (Winkler, 
2005) d 
3. 
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
Growing 
relationship 
between 
organised crime 
and intruders who 
provide the 
technical 
expertise 
 
Growing network 
connections 
between hackers 
or small-time 
    Resemblance to 
terrestrial 
organised crime 
organisations (eg 
Cosa Nostra) 
May have links with 
terrestrial organised 
crime groups (Winkler, 
2005) d 
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Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
criminals and 
organised crime 
      Not concerned with 
hiding existence of the 
group (Jakobsson and 
Ramzan, 2008) e 
      May not be personally 
known to one another 
and communicate only 
through the Internet 
(SOCA, 2006/7) f 
      Project-oriented (to 
commit a common act) 
(Jakobsson and 
Ramzan, 2008) e 
  Skill and knowledge 
transfers 
(collaboration of 
skill sets) 
 Rely on expertise 
from other groups 
(US) 
  
  ‘Slow drip’ tactics     
  Diverse attack 
vectors 
    
3. 
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
  Blended attack     
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Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
vectors 
  Strategic selection 
and use of 
information 
Leverage 
information and 
communication 
technologies in the 
same manner as 
legitimate 
businesses 
   
      Employ automation (UK 
Cyber Security Strategy 
2009) g 
High level of 
expertise and 
social engineering 
     Social engineering (UK 
Cyber Security Strategy, 
2009) g 
 Easily change 
tactics 
     
 
Use Internet for 
communication 
and other 
purposes 
Exploit ‘cyber’ 
opportunities 
Exploit the 
Internet as a 
working tool 
    May not be personally 
known to one another 
and communicate only 
through the Internet 
(SOCA, 2006/7) f 
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Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
    Some correlation 
between level of 
organisation and 
specific regions 
  
    Affiliation 
networks as 
distribution 
channels 
  
    Use crimeware 
toolkits 
  
   Leverage 
information and 
communication 
technologies in the 
same manner as 
legitimate 
businesses. 
Respond to the 
same driving forces. 
  Has all the attributes of 
a traditional economy 
(MessageLabs®, 2007) a 
3. 
Organisational  
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
Diversification into 
various forms of 
cyber-crime or 
Internet-related 
crime 
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Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
 
  ‘transient, lateral 
and fluid forms’ 
Ephemeral 
Transitory 
relationships 
   
      Protection of 
‘cyberkingpins’ 
(McAfee, 2009) h 
 Very well-
organised  
 
  
More organised 
(Russia and 
Eastern Europe) 
Loosely-
organised (North 
America) 
 Well-managed (ISF, 
2008) c 
Increasingly organised 
and proficient (ISF, 
2008) c 
    Wide range in 
sophistication and 
capabilities 
 Sophisticated 
(MessageLabs®, 2007) a 
Professional and 
sophisticated 
(Jakobsson and 
Ramzan, 2008) e 
4. 
Organisational 
Maturity 
  High level of 
expertise and social 
engineering 
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Category Williams2 
(2001/2002) 
Europol 
High Tech 
Crime 
Centre3 
(2007) 
Wall 1 (2008) * 
 
Etges and 
Sutcliffe4 (2008) 
Symantec 5 
(2008) 
Finjan6 (2008) Additional items 
Identified from other 
sources 
 
  New type of 
organisation 
New patterns of 
behaviour 
    
 
 Very clever at 
hiding money 
transfers 
     
 
5. 
Organisational 
Culture 
       
 
      Web-based 
marketplace (Jakobsson 
and Ramzan, 2008) e 
Jurisdictional 
Arbitrage ***   
Prosper greatly in 
non-regulated, 
lawless 
environments 
   
6. 
Organisational 
Environment 
 
  
Minimal trust 
  
Fraud and rip-offs are 
common 
(MessageLabs®, 2007) a 
 
 
* As was also the case with Albanese, the characteristics which Wall highlights are taken from various sources. In the case of Brenner, he finds 
that her predictions were accurate. 
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** Swarming – Brenner (Page 42) mentions ‘swarming’ and attributes it to Arquilla and Ronfeldt  (‘Swarming and the Future of Conflict’, 2000), who 
define it as: ‘a deliberately structured, co-ordinated strategic way to strike from all directions … Today, the key form of organisation on the rise is 
the network … The new information technologies render an ability to connect and coordinate the actions of widely-distributed ‘nodes’ in almost 
unprecedented ways. Whoever masters this form will accrue advantages of a substantial nature.’ 
*** Jurisdictional arbitrage – Williams coins the term ‘jurisdictional arbitrage’ to refer to crimes which are initiated ‘from jurisdictions that have few if 
any laws directed against cybercrime and/or little capacity to enforce laws against cybercrime.’ (Page 3) 
 
Main Sources 
1  D S Wall: Pages 39-44, ‘Cybercrime’ (‘Crime and Society Series’, Polity) (2007)badinsky, ‘ Organised Crime’ (3rd Edition) (Nelson Hall, Chicago, Illinois) 
(1990) 
2  P Williams, CERT®: ‘Organised Crime and Cybercrime: Synergies, Trends and Responses’ (2001/2002)  
3  Europol High Tech Crime Centre Report: ‘High Tech Crimes Within the EU: Old Crimes, New Tools.  New Crimes, New Tools’ (2007) 
4  Y R Etges and E Sutcliffe: Pages 87-94, ‘An Overview of Transnational Organised Cyber Crime’ (‘Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective’, 17) 
(2008) 
5  Symantec: Page 14, ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’ (November 2008): 
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
6  Finjan Q2 2008 Report: Pages 2, 8 and 9, ‘Web Security Trends Report’ (Finjan Malicious Code Research Centre): 
http://www.finjan.com/Content.aspx?id=827 
 
 
Additional Items Identified from Other Sources 
 
a
 MessageLabs®: White Paper: ‘The Online Shadow Economy: A Billion Dollar Market for Malware Authors’ (2007):  
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/lsadocs/IntComHand/2009/IHEGC012.PDF 
b
 Susan W Brenner, ‘Organised Cybercrime? How Cyberspace May Affect the Structure of Criminal Relationships’ (North Carolina Journal of Law and 
Technology, Volume 4, No. 1, 2002)  (Quoted in Wall, ‘Cybercrime’, above) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Anna Cevidalli     RHUL MSc Project, September 2009 (Appendix A) 
23/45  
 
c
 Internet Security Forum (ISF): Pages 1-3, ‘Profit-Driven Attacks’ (2008) 
d
 I Winkler: ‘Spies Among Us – How To Stop The Spies, Terrorists, Hackers And Criminals You Don’t Even Know You Encounter Every Day’ 
 (Wiley Publishing Inc) (2005) 
e
 M Jakobssson and Z Ramzan: ‘Crimeware – Understanding New Attacks and Defenses’ (Addison Wesley) (2008) 
f
  Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA): Page 14,  SOCA Annual Report 2006/7:  
http://www.soca.gov.uk/assessPublications/downloads/SOCAAnnualRep2006_7.pdf 
g
 UK Cabinet Office: Page 13, ‘Cyber Security Strategy 2009’ (June 2009): 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/cyber_security.aspx 
h
 McAfee: Pages 12-14, ‘McAfee Virtual Criminology Report – Cybercrime versus Cyberlaw’ (2009): 
http://resources.mcafee.com/content/NAMcAfeeCriminologyReport 
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Table 4 
Range of Typical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented Characteristics of Organised Crime Groups, with Sources 
Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-
Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Source (Terrestrial/ 
Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
Technically-Oriented Organised 
Crime Group Characteristics ** 
Source (Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
      
1 Structured Criminal Group Maltz/ Europol (2008)/ 
UNTOC 
Many people (MessageLabs®, 2008) 
2 Collaboration (‘three or more 
persons’) 
EU/Europol (2002)/ 
UNTOC 
Growing network connections 
between hackers or small-time 
criminals and organised crime/ 
Affiliation networks as distribution 
channels/ 
Growing relationship between 
organized crime and intruders who 
provide the technical expertise /May 
have links with terrestrial organised 
crime groups 
(Williams, 2001-2002)/ Finjan 
(2008)/ Williams (2001/2002)/ 
Winkler (2005) 
3 Fluid, changeable roles, 
membership and structure 
(‘does not need to have 
formally-defined roles for its 
members, continuity of its 
membership or a developed 
structure’) 
Fiorentini and Peltzman/ 
UNTOC Transient, lateral and fluid forms/  Flexible/ Adaptable/ Decentralised, 
loose relationships/Decentralised/ 
Loosely-connected 
 
Wall (2008)/ Williams (2001-
2002)/Europol High Tech Crime 
Centre (2007)/ Etges and 
Sutcliffe 
(2008)/Brenner/ISF/ISF 
4   Lateral Relationships Wall (2008)/Brenner 
5 Hierarchical structure Abadinsky/ Maltz/ 
Gillingsky/ Albanese/ 
Reuter/ MT 
Hierarchical Structure Finjan 
1.  
Organisational  
Structures 
6 Vertically-integrated structure  Garoupa   
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-
Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Source (Terrestrial/ 
Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
Technically-Oriented Organised 
Crime Group Characteristics ** 
Source (Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
 7 Commercial/ business-like 
structure 
EU/Europol 
(2002)/Albanese/ 
  
8 Specialised division of labour EU/Europol (2002)/ 
Gilinsky/ Europol (2008)/ 
Albanese 
Very specialised division of labour, 
Specialised components, Specialised 
skills/ 
Growing relationships between 
organized crime and intruders who 
provide the technical expertise/ 
Specialised hackers/ Specialisation/ 
Specialised Trends/Buy in expertise/  
Wall (2008)/Williams/Europol 
High Tech Crime Centre 
(2007)/ Finjan/ MessageLabs®/ 
Winkler (2005) 
9   Networks (ie non-hierarchical) Wall (2008)/ Brenner 
 
10   Swarming Wall (2008)/ Brenner 
      
11 Formed for a planned 
purpose (‘not randomly 
formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence’) 
 UNTOC   
12 Financial or other material 
goals (‘financial or other 
material benefit’) 
EU/Europol (2002)/ 
Gillingsky/ Albanese/ 
UNTOC 
Profit-oriented/ Money Motive/ 
Exclusively profit-drive/ Driven by 
economics 
Wall (2008)/Europol High Tech 
Crime Centre (2007)/ Winker 
(2005)/ MessageLabs® (2009) 
13 Monopolistic Abadinksy/ 
Gillinsky/Albanese/ 
Schelling 
  
14   To obtain valuable data ISF (2008) 
15   Exploitation of the online market ISF (2008) 
16 Non-Ideological Abadinsky/Albanese   
17 Ideological or Non-Ideological Maltz   
2. 
Organisational 
Goals 
18 Public demand for services Albanese   
      
3. 
Organisational 
19 Criminal intent (‘with the aim 
of committing one or more 
EU/Europol (2002)/ 
Gillingsky/ UNTOC 
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-
Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Source (Terrestrial/ 
Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
Technically-Oriented Organised 
Crime Group Characteristics ** 
Source (Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
offences’) 
20 Involved in legitimate 
enterprises  
Maltz/ Europol (2008)   
21 Control (eg explicit rules and 
regulations, discipline) 
Abadinsky/ Maltz/ 
EU/Europol (2002) 
  
22 Operates internationally 
 
EU/Europol (2002)/ 
Europol (2008)/ UNTOC 
International/ International Dimension/ 
Transnational 
Wall (2008)/ Europol High Tech 
Crime Centre (2007)/ Etges and 
Sutcliffe (2008) 
23 Multiple enterprises Maltz/ Reuter Diversification into various forms of 
cyber-crime and Internet-related 
crime 
Williams (2001-2002) 
24 Includes both national and 
foreign members 
CARPO (2006)   
25 Restricted membership Albanese   
26 Violence Abadinsky/ Maltz/ 
EU/Europol (2002)/ 
Europol (2008)/Albanese 
Rely on physical violence (Eastern 
Europe) 
Symantec (2008) 
27 Bribery Maltz   
28 Corruption Maltz/ EU/ Europol 
(2002)/ Gilinskiy/ Europol 
(2008)/ Albanese/ 
Finckenauer 
  
29 Direct or indirect methods 
(‘direct or indirect’) 
 UNTOC Affiliation networks as distribution 
channels 
Symantec (2008) 
30 Insulation Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police 
  
31   Depart from traditional thinking about 
organised crime 
Wall (2008) 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
32   Employ stealth ISF (2008) 
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-
Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Source (Terrestrial/ 
Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
Technically-Oriented Organised 
Crime Group Characteristics ** 
Source (Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
33   Minimal hacking necessary Winkler (2005)  
34   Not concerned with hiding existence 
of the group 
Jakobsson and Ramzan (2008) 
35   May not be personally known to one 
another and communicate only 
through the Internet 
SOCA (2006/7) 
36   Project-oriented (to commit a 
common act) 
Finjan/ Jakobsson and Ramzan 
(2008) 
 
37   Skill and knowledge transfers 
(collaboration of skill sets)/ 
Rely on expertise from other groups 
(US) 
Wall (2008)/ Symantec (2008) 
38   ‘Slow drip’ tactics Wall (2008) 
39   Diverse attack vectors Wall (2008) 
40   Blended attack vectors Wall (2008) 
41   Strategic selection and use of 
information/ Leverage information and 
communication technologies in the 
same manner as legitimate 
businesses 
Wall (2008)/ Etges and Sutcliffe 
(2008) 
42   Employ automation UK Cyber Security Strategy 
(2009) 
43   Social engineering/ High level of 
expertise and social engineering 
UK Cyber Security Strategy 
(2009)/ Wall (2008) 
44   Easily change tactics Europol High Tech Crime 
Centre (2007) 
 
45   Use Internet for communication and 
other purposes, exploit ‘cyber’ 
opportunities/ 
May not be personally known to one 
Williams (2001/2002)/ SOCA 
(2006/7) 
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-
Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Source (Terrestrial/ 
Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
Technically-Oriented Organised 
Crime Group Characteristics ** 
Source (Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
another and communicate only 
through the Internet 
 
46   Some correlation between level of 
organisation and specific regions 
Symantec (2008) 
47   Use crimeware toolkits Symantec (2008) 
48   Frauds and rip-offs are common MessageLabs® (2007) 
 
49   Leverage information and 
communication technologies in the 
same manner as legitimate 
businesses, Respond to the same 
driving forces 
Etges and Sutcliffe (2008) 
      
50 Continuity (‘existing for a 
period of time’) 
Abadinksy/ Maltz/ 
EU/Europol (2002)/ 
Gillinsky/ Europol (2008)/ 
Albanese/ Reuter/ 
UNTOC 
  
51   Transient, lateral and fluid forms; 
ephemeral/ Transitory Relationships 
Wall (2008)/ Etges and Sutcliffe 
(2008) 
52 Insulation Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police 
Protection of ‘cyberkingpins’ McAfee (2009) 
53   Very well-organised/ More organised 
(Russia and Eastern Europe), 
Loosely-organised (North America)/ 
Increasingly organised and proficient 
Wall (2008)/ Symantec (2008)/ 
ISF (2008) 
54   Wide range in sophistication and 
adaptabilities/ Sophisticated/ 
Professional and sophisticated 
Symantec (2008)/ 
MessageLabs® (2007)/ 
Jakobsson and Ramzan (2008) 
55   High level of expertise and social 
engineering 
Wall (2008) 
4. 
Organisational 
Maturity 
56   New type of organisation, New Wall (2008) 
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-
Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Source (Terrestrial/ 
Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
Technically-Oriented Organised 
Crime Group Characteristics ** 
Source (Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics) 
patterns of behaviour  
57   Very clever at hiding money transfers Europol High Tech Crime 
Centre (2007) 
      
58 Bonding Rituals  Maltz   
59 Code of Secrecy Albanese   
60 Authority of Reputation Finckenauer   
5. 
Organisational 
Culture 
61 Self-Identification Finckenauer   
      
62 Monopolistic Abadinksy/ Gilinskiy/ 
Albanese/ Schelling 
  
63   Minimal Trust/ Fraud and rip-offs are 
common 
Etges and Sutcliffe (2008)/ 
MessageLabs® (2007) 
64   Web-based marketplace Jakobsson and Ramzan (2008) 
6. 
Organisational 
Environment 
65   Jurisdictional arbitrage/ Prosper 
greatly in non-regulated, lawless 
environments 
Etges and Sutcliffe (2008) 
 
*   Many sources do not differentiate between terrestrial and technically-oriented organised crime groups, for instance in the case of 
the UNTOC criteria. Hence, the items in this column may apply to either group. 
 
**  These are characteristics which have been specifically highlighted by sources as applying to technically-oriented organised crime 
groups.   
 
Due to the heterogeneity that applies to all types of organised crime groups, this table indicates theoretical characteristic tendencies 
and is not intended to be in any way definitive. Although items in either list could potentially apply in any situation, they have been 
highlighted by sources from the Information Security industry and elsewhere as having particular significance. Situations which may 
involve organised crime groups may be high risk and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, where necessary with involvement 
from law enforcement. 
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Table 5 
Summary Comparison of Typical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented Characteristics of Organised Crime Groups 
Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Technically-Oriented Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics ** 
    
1 Structured Criminal Group Many people 
2 Collaboration (‘three or more persons’) Growing network connections between hackers or small-time 
criminals and organised crime/ 
Affiliation networks as distribution channels/ May have links 
with terrestrial organised crime groups 
3 Fluid, changeable roles, membership and structure  Transient, lateral and fluid forms/  
Flexible/ Adaptable/ Decentralised/ Loosely-connected 
4  Lateral Relationships 
5 Hierarchical structure Hierarchical Structure 
6 Vertically-integrated structure   
7 Commercial/ business-like structure  
8 Specialised division of labour Very specialised division of labour, Specialised components, 
Specialised skills/ Buy in expertise 
9  Networks (ie non-hierarchical) 
1.  
Organisational  
Structures 
10  Swarming 
    
11 Formed for a planned purpose (‘not randomly formed for 
the immediate commission of an offence’) 
 
12 Financial or other material goals (‘financial or other 
material benefit’) 
Profit-oriented 
13 Monopolistic  
2. 
Organisational 
Goals 
14  To obtain valuable data 
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Technically-Oriented Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics ** 
    
15  Exploitation of the online market 
16 Non-Ideological  
17 Ideological or Non-Ideological  
 
18 Public demand for services  
    
19 Criminal intent (‘with the aim of committing one or more 
offences’) 
 
20 Involved in legitimate enterprises   
21 Control (eg explicit rules and regulations, discipline)  
22 Operates internationally Transnational 
23 Multiple enterprises Diversification into various forms of cyber-crime and Internet-
related crime 
24 Includes both national and foreign members  
25 Restricted membership  
26 Violence Rely on physical violence (Eastern Europe) 
27 Bribery  
28 Corruption  
29 Direct or indirect methods (‘direct or indirect’) Affiliation networks as distribution channels 
30 Insulation  
31  Depart from traditional thinking about organised crime 
32  Employ stealth 
3. 
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
33  Minimal hacking necessary 
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Technically-Oriented Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics ** 
    
34  Not concerned with hiding existence of the group 
35  May not be personally known to one another and 
communicate only through the Internet 
36  Project-oriented (to commit a common act) 
37  Skill and knowledge transfers (collaboration of skill sets)/ 
Rely on expertise from other groups (US) 
38  ‘Slow drip’ tactics 
39  Diverse attack vectors 
40  Blended attack vectors 
 
41  Strategic selection and use of information/ Leverage 
information and communication technologies in the same 
manner as legitimate businesses 
42  Employ automation 
43  High level of expertise and social engineering 
44  Easily change tactics 
45  Use Internet for communication and other purposes, exploit 
‘cyber’ opportunities/ 
May not be personally known to one another and 
communicate only through the Internet 
46  Some correlation between level of organisation and specific 
regions 
47  Use crimeware toolkits 
48  Frauds and rip-offs are common 
 
49  Leverage information and communication technologies in the 
same manner as legitimate businesses, Respond to the same 
driving forces 
    
50 Continuity (‘existing for a period of time’)  4. 
Organisational 51  Transient, lateral and fluid forms; ephemeral/ Transitory 
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Category Item 
No 
Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented Organised Crime 
Group Characteristics * 
Technically-Oriented Organised Crime Group 
Characteristics ** 
    
Relationships 
52 Insulation Protection of ‘cyberkingpins’ 
53 ` More organised (Russia and Eastern Europe), Loosely-
organised (North America)/ Increasingly organised and 
proficient 
54  Sophisticated/ Professional and sophisticated 
55  High level of expertise and social engineering 
56  New type of organisation, New patterns of behaviour 
Maturity 
57  Very clever at hiding money transfers 
    
58 Bonding Rituals   
59 Code of Secrecy  
60 Authority of Reputation  
5. 
Organisational 
Culture 
61 Self-Identification  
    
62 Monopolistic  
63  Minimal Trust/ Fraud and rip-offs are common 
64  Web-based marketplace 
6. 
Organisational 
Environment 
65  Jurisdictional arbitrage/ Prosper greatly in non-regulated, 
lawless environments 
 
*   Many sources do not differentiate between terrestrial and technically-oriented organised crime groups, for instance in the case of 
the UNTOC criteria. Hence, the items in this column may apply to either group. 
 
Due to the heterogeneity that applies to all types of organised crime groups, this table indicates theoretical characteristic tendencies 
and is not intended to be in any way definitive. Although items in either list could potentially apply in any situation, they have been 
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highlighted by sources from within the Information Security industry and elsewhere as having particular significance. Situations which 
may involve organised crime groups may be high risk and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, where necessary with 
involvement from law enforcement.
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Table 6 
Summary Comparison of Real-life  v Theoretical Online Organised Crime Group Characteristics 
 
Category Item 
No 
Theoretical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group Characteristics 1 
Real Life Organised Crime Group Case Study Examples 
Which Display The Theoretical Characteristic 
    
1 Structured Criminal Group All cases 
2 Collaboration (‘three or more persons’)/ Affiliation 
networks/ May have links with terrestrial organised 
crime groups 
Collaboration - All cases 
Affiliation networks – Banco di Sicilia Incident/ ShadowCrew/ 
Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ The RBN/ CardersMarket/ Triad 
Gang (Australia)/ Heartland Payment Systems et al Group 
May have links with terrestrial organised crime groups - Banco 
di Sicilia Incident/ ShadowCrew/ Sumitomo Bank Incident 
Group/ McColo/ Triad Gang (Australia) 
3 Fluid, changeable roles, membership and structure/ 
Transient, decentralised 
Operation IceTrap/ The HangUp Team/ Sumitomo Bank Incident 
Group/ The RBN/ CardersMarket/ Heartland Payment Systems et 
al Group 
4 Lateral Relationships The HangUp Team/ T J Maxx/ Sumitomo Bank Incident 
Group/McColo/ The RBN/ Heartland Payment Systems et al 
Group 
5 Hierarchical structure Operation IceTrap/Banco di Sicilia/ShadowCrew/CardersMarket/ 
Triad Gang (Australia)/ CardersMarket  
6 Vertically-integrated structure  Operation IceTrap/ShadowCrew/ Triad Gang (Australia)/ 
CardersMarket  
1.  
Organisational  
Structures 
7 Commercial/ business-like structure The HangUp Team/ShadowCrew/ McColo/ The RBN/ Rock 
Phish/ CardersMarket 
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Category Item 
No 
Theoretical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group Characteristics 1 
Real Life Organised Crime Group Case Study Examples 
Which Display The Theoretical Characteristic 
    
8 Specialised division of labour/ Specialised skills/ Buy in 
expertise/ 
Operation IceTrap/Banco di Sicilia Incident/ ShadowCrew/ 
Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ 
CardersMarke/ Triad Gang (Australia)/ Heartland Payment 
Systems et al Group 
9 Networks (ie non-hierarchical) The HangUp Team/ T J Maxx Incident Group/The RBN/ 
Heartland Payment Systems et al Group 
 
10 Swarming The HangUp Team/ McColo/ The RBN/Rock Phish/ 
CardersMarket/ Triad Gang (Australia)/Heartland Payment 
Systems et al Group 
 
 
  
11 Formed for a planned purpose (‘not randomly formed for 
the immediate commission of an offence’) 
All cases 
12 Financial or other material goals (‘financial or other 
material benefit’) 
All cases 
13 Monopolistic Banco di Sicilia Incident/ McColo/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ 
CardersMarket 
14 To obtain valuable data All cases 
15 Exploitation of the online market The HangUp Team/ Banco di Sicilia Incident/ T J Maxx Incident/ 
ShadowCrew/Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ McColo/ The 
RBN/ Rock Phish/ CardersMarket/ Triad Gang (Australia)/ 
Heartland Payment Systems et al Group 
2. 
Organisational 
Goals 
16 Non-Ideological 2 All cases except The HangUp Team 
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Category Item 
No 
Theoretical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group Characteristics 1 
Real Life Organised Crime Group Case Study Examples 
Which Display The Theoretical Characteristic 
    
17 Ideological or Non-Ideological 3 No evidence cited  
18 Public demand for services The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ McColo/ The Russian 
Business Network/ Rock Phish/ CardersMarket 
 
 
  
19 Criminal intent (‘with the aim of committing one or more 
offences’) 
All case studies 
20 Involved in legitimate enterprises 4  Operation IceTrap/Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ McColo  
21 Control (eg explicit rules and regulations, discipline) ShadowCrew/CardsMarket 
22 Operates internationally/ Transnational All cases 
23 Multiple enterprises/ Diversification into various forms of 
cyber-crime and Internet-related crime 
All cases 
24 Includes both national and foreign members 5 Operation IceTrap/ The HangUp Team/ T J Maxx Group/ 
ShadowCrew/ Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ The RBN/ 
CardersMarket/ Triad Gang (Australia)/ Heartland Payment 
Systems et al 
25 Restricted membership 6 Operation IceTrap/ Banco di Sicilia Incident/ T J Maxx Incident 
Group/ Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ Rock Phish/ 
DarkMarket/ Heartland Payment Systems et al 
26 Violence/ Rely on physical violence (Eastern Europe) 7 No evidence cited 
3. 
Organisational 
Strategy/ 
Tactics 
27 Bribery No evidence cited 
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Category Item 
No 
Theoretical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group Characteristics 1 
Real Life Organised Crime Group Case Study Examples 
Which Display The Theoretical Characteristic 
    
28 Corruption Banco di Sicilia Incident/ Triad Gang (Australia) 
29 Direct or indirect methods (‘direct or indirect’)/ Affiliation 
networks as distribution channels 
All cases 
30 Insulation  8 Triad Gang (Australia) 
31 Depart from traditional thinking about organised crime All cases 
32 Employ stealth  9 All cases 
33 Minimal hacking necessary Banco di Sicila Incident/ McColo/The RBN/ Rock 
Phish/CardersMarket 
34 Not concerned with hiding existence of the group The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/McColo 
35 May not be personally known to one another and 
communicate only through the Internet  10 
All cases 
36 Project-oriented (to commit a common act) Operation IceTrap/ Banco di Sicilia Incident/ T J Maxx Incident 
Group/ Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ Triad Gang (Australia)/ 
Heartland Payment Systems et al Group 
37 Skill and knowledge transfers (collaboration of skill 
sets)/ Rely on expertise from other groups (US) 
All cases except T J Maxx Incident Group/ McColo and Rock 
Phish 
38 ‘Slow drip’ tactics  11 No evidence cited 
 
39 Diverse attack vectors All cases except Banco di Sicilia Incident/ T J Maxx Incident 
Group and Sumitomo Bank Incident Group and Triad Gang 
(Australia) 
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Category Item 
No 
Theoretical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group Characteristics 1 
Real Life Organised Crime Group Case Study Examples 
Which Display The Theoretical Characteristic 
    
40 Blended attack vectors All cases  
41 Strategic selection and use of information/ Leverage 
information and communication technologies in the 
same manner as legitimate businesses 
Operation IceTrap/ The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ 
Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ McColo/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ 
CardersMarket/ Triad Gang (Australia/ Heartland Payment 
Systems et al Group) 
42 Employ automation  12 All cases 
43 High level of expertise and social engineering  13 High Level of expertise - All cases except Sumitomo Bank 
Incident Group and Triad Gang (Australia) 
Social Engineering – The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ 
McColo/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ CardersMarket/ Triad Gang 
(Australia) 
44 Easily change tactics The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ 
CardersMarket 
45 Use Internet for communication and other purposes, 
exploit ‘cyber’ opportunities 
May not be personally known to one another and 
communicate only through the Internet  14 
All cases 
46 Some correlation between level of organisation and 
specific regions 
Operation IceTrap/ The HangUp Team/ Banco di Sicilia Incident/ 
McColo/ The RBN/Rock Phish/ Triad Gang (Australia) 
47 Use crimeware toolkits The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ McColo/ The RBN/ Rock 
Phish/ CardersMarket 
 
48 Frauds and rip-offs are common  15 ShadowCrew/ CardersMarket/ Triad Gang (Australia) 
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Category Item 
No 
Theoretical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group Characteristics 1 
Real Life Organised Crime Group Case Study Examples 
Which Display The Theoretical Characteristic 
    
 49 Leverage information and communication technologies 
in the same manner as legitimate businesses, Respond 
to the same driving forces 
Operation IceTrap/ The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ 
Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ McColo/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ 
CardersMarket/ Triad Gang (Australia)/ Heartland Payment 
Systems et al Group) 
 
 
  
50 Continuity (‘existing for a period of time’)  16 All cases 
51 Transient, lateral and fluid forms; ephemeral/ Transitory 
Relationships  17 
No evidence cited 
52 Insulation/ Protection of ‘cyberkingpins’ Triad Gang (Australia) 
53 More organised (Russia and Eastern Europe), Loosely-
organised (North America)/ Increasingly organised and 
proficient  18 
More organised (Russia and Eastern Europe) - No evidence 
cited 
Loosely-organised (North America) – No evidence cited 
Increasingly organised and proficient – All cases 
54 Sophisticated/ Professional and sophisticated All cases 
55 High level of expertise and social engineering  19 High Level of expertise - All cases  except Sumitomo Bank 
Incident Group and Triad Gang (Australia) 
Social Engineering – The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ 
McColo/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ CardersMarket/ Triad Gang 
(Australia) 
56 New type of organisation, New patterns of behaviour All cases  
4. 
Organisational 
Maturity 
57 Very clever at hiding money transfers Operation IceTrap/ Banco di Sicilia Incident/ T J Maxx Incident 
Group/ Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/ Triad Gang (Australia)/ 
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Category Item 
No 
Theoretical Terrestrial/ Technically-Oriented 
Organised Crime Group Characteristics 1 
Real Life Organised Crime Group Case Study Examples 
Which Display The Theoretical Characteristic 
    
 Heartland Payment Systems et al Group 
 
 
  
58 Bonding Rituals  No evidence cited 
59 Code of Secrecy No evidence cited 
60 Authority of Reputation  20 Banco di Sicilia Incident 
5. 
Organisational 
Culture 
61 Self-Identification The HangUp Team/ CardersMarket 
 
 
  
62 Monopolistic  21 Banco di Sicilia Incident/ McColo/ The RBN/ Rock Phish/ 
CardersMarket No evidence cited 
63 Minimal Trust/ Fraud and rip-offs are common  22 ShadowCrew/ CardersMarket/ Triad Gang (Australia) 
64 Web-based marketplace The HangUp Team/ ShadowCrew/ McColo/The RBN/ Rock 
Phish/ CardersMarket 
6. 
Organisational 
Environment 
65 Jurisdictional arbitrage/ Prosper greatly in non-
regulated, lawless environments 
The HangUp Team/ Banco di Sicilia Incident/ ShadowCrew/ 
Sumitomo Bank Incident Group/The RBN/ Rock Phish/ 
Heartland Payment Systems et al Group 
 
All Cases = The item applies to all 12 examples in the case studies 
 
1
   Many sources do not differentiate between terrestrial and technically-oriented organised crime groups, for instance in the case of 
the UNTOC criteria. In this column, items which may apply to either category are shown in plain text, with items identified as 
characteristic of online organised crime groups shown in italics. 
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Due to the heterogeneity that applies to all types of organised crime groups, this table indicates theoretical characteristic tendencies 
and is not intended to be definitive. Although items in either list could potentially apply in any situation, they have been highlighted by 
sources from within the Information Security industry and elsewhere as having particular significance. Situations which may involve 
organised crime groups may be high risk and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, where necessary with involvement from law 
enforcement. 
 
2
 Non-Ideological – Although several of the groups do display ideological tendencies, at least to the extent that they will often identify 
with each other as criminal entities who work outside the social norms, only The HangUp Team was cited as expressing any explicit 
ideology (the motto on their website is ‘In fraud we trust’) within the source material. As with many items in these tables, there may be  
benefit in targeting research towards this aspect of online organised crime groups. 
 
3 
 Ideological or Non-Ideological  - Once again, there was no specific evidence to indicate this characteristic in the cited sources.   
 
4
  As ‘Involved’ is a broad term, within this specific context, this item represents the utilisation of legitimate businesses for criminal 
ends, either through direct physical infiltration of a legitimate business or through incorporating a legitimate business concern within 
the criminal business model, for instance as a respectable ‘front’ to money-launder criminal takings.  However, it does not include 
indirect methods of infiltration such as exploitation of a legitimate business’s digital assets (for instance, compromising legitimate 
businesses’ websites for phishing purposes). 
 
As an example, in the case of the McColo Corporation, although the company presented itself as a legitimate concern, its activities 
suggested otherwise. Hence, the organisation was a ‘front’ for the criminal activities. 
 
5
  Although the Banco di Sicilia group intended to transfer the money abroad, the sources do not state that this was an international 
organised crime group. 
 
6
  Restricted membership – This is an interesting characteristic within an online organised crime group context, in that some 
criminal concerns, such some online forums, will be open to both legitimate and criminal individuals, whereas others will restrict 
their membership to offenders, for instance for the purpose of committing specific crimes. In this context, this item is taken to mean 
groups which specifically restrict their membership, for whatever reason. 
 
7
  Violence – Here, the term refers to physical violence. However, it could also be employed within a digital context, as 
demonstrated by D Wall in ‘The Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity’, where Table 4.1 is a matrix of cybercrimes which maps 
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terrestrial crimes against proposed online equivalents. For instance, online violence includes ‘cyber-stalking’ and ‘cyber-
harassment’, as well as targeted hate speeches and child abuse. (D Wall: Pages 77-98, ‘The Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity’, 
Information Technology and the Criminal Justice System, A Pattavina (Ed), Sage Publications, Inc, 2007) 
 
The anonymity of the Internet can also create risks for users answering Web adverts. In a recent incident which is not unique, The 
Guardian reported that a man had been physically assaulted after responding to a classified online second-hand car advert, 
demonstrating how distinctions between terrestrial and online crime can be blurred: 
 
Guardian.co.uk: ‘Man Stabbed after Answering Fake Car Advert’ (August 2009) 
 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/aug/26/man-stabbed-fake-car-advert 
  
 
8  
  Insulation – Any terrestrial criminal organisation that engages in money-laundering through a hierarchical structure of roles 
creates a distance between the group’s leader and the ‘footsoldiers’. In the case of Internet activity, the same effect can be 
achieved via various means, for instance by locating leaders in different countries to the rest of the team, separated by a network of 
‘mules’ or other intermediaries. The leaders may have no overt association with the criminal activity at all. 
 
9  
  Stealth – Although ShadowCrew, for instance, made no effort to hide its activities, the activities themselves employed stealth, for 
instance through Trojan and phishing attacks.  
 
10  
  Not personally known to one another – This is one of the key differences between some terrestrial organised crime groups and 
their online equivalents. The Internet enables individuals from across the world to communicate with each other without ever having 
to meet and services such as Web 2.0 services (eg social networking) facilitate collaboration. 
 
11 
  ‘Slow drip’ tactics – Although none of the cited examples specifically describe the groups as using ‘slow drip’ tactics, many of the 
crimeware toolkits sold on the criminal forums, for instance, do have this capability.       
 
12  
 Employ automation – The term ‘automation’ has a wide scope. Most modern information technologies employ automation to 
differing degrees. Crimeware toolkits, for instance those which include worms, and botnets require automation in order to launch 
widescale attacks.  For this reason, all the cases cited here are deemed to employ ‘automation’ because all used technologies 
which had automated aspects. 
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13 
  High level of expertise - One major advantage of the modern crimeware toolkits and their components for offenders is that they 
are designed for ease of use. Consequently, offenders can ‘mix and match’ different technical attack vectors with little technical 
knowledge, including the deployment of the high-impact botnets. However, all the case studies cited here, except Sumitomo Bank 
Incident Group and Triad Gang (Australia), did require some advanced technical skills (for their time) in order to be successful. 
 
Social engineering – As phishing requires social engineering, all the groups who incorporated phishing within their attack vectors 
were using social engineering. 
 
14 
  As has been discussed in the paper, use of the Internet is largely ubiquitous among modern businesses nowadays. All of the 
cases cited here specifically used the Internet to capture or transfer information, often in large amounts. 
 
15 
  Frauds and rip-offs are common - As used here, this item refers to activities such as double-dealing within the groups 
themselves. In the cases of ShadowCrew and CardersMarket, the forums were infiltrated by informers. In the Sumitomo Bank 
Incident Group incident, Hugh Rodley stole the identity of one of his fellow conspirators for credit and store card purchases. In the 
Triad Gang (Australia) incident, the naivety of the students who were paid to be ‘mules’ was exploited such that some were not paid 
a true reflection of the ‘going rate’ for their activities. 
 
16 
  Within the context of organised crime groups, ‘continuity’ can have more than one meaning. In this context, all the groups had 
some level of ‘continuity’ in that their activities were planned over a period of time.  
 
In the sense of longevity, the term does not apply to the Banco di Sicilia Incident or the Sumitomo Bank Incident Group as, in both 
cases, although their crimes were strategically-planned and took some time to set in place, they were apprehended before the main 
events took place. Hence, it can only be speculation to consider whether, if they had been successful, the group would have 
continued to exist and to commit further crimes. 
 
In all the other circumstances, the groups operated with a medium to long-term strategy and existed for a period of years. 
 
17 
  Due to the characteristics of the Internet, it is particularly difficult to distinguish transitory online organised crime activity as 
groups can form and disappear very quickly. It may be that the groups in the examples which were apprehended were caught, in 
part, because they were more visible than online organised crime groups with more fluid, temporary structures. 
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18 
  More organised (Russia and Eastern Europe)/ Loosely-organised (North America) - These characteristics have been identified 
elsewhere (cf sources in Table 4) but not by the sources used for the case studies.   
‘Increasingly organised and proficient’ – All the cases cited demonstrate that organised crime groups are becoming more organised and 
proficient (at using information technologies and the Internet) than before. 
 
19 
  See reference 12 (for Item 43) above. 
 
20 
   Authority of reputation – This is a difficult item to gauge with regard to online organised crime groups unless there is direct 
documentary evidence. It is quite likely, however, that where an online organised crime group has associations with established terrestrial 
organised crime groups, the ‘authority of reputation’ of the terrestrial group will transfer by association to the online group. 
 
21 
   Monopolistic – This can also be difficult to gauge at the moment with regard to online organised crime groups. Until recently, the 
Internet, and the Web in particular, was perceived by offenders as a new and unexploited marketplace where they could largely operate 
with impunity, with little fear of challenge from law enforcement or their peers, hence why organisations such as ShadowCrew traded in 
the open. However, as profits have decreased due to the current recession and serious criminal elements have become more involved, 
the situation has changed so that, although there continues to be collaboration among some groups, there is also increased competition 
among others, with more aggressive tactics involved. 
 
All the examples cited in the case studies were able to operate unchallenged in this open and lucrative environment. However, for the 
reasons above, together with an increase in offenders diversifying their skill sets and techniques to include exploitation of information 
technologies and increasing security awareness among businesses so that they introduce controls , the situation is likely to change in the 
future to a more competitive environment. 
 
22 
   See reference 15 (for Item 48) above. 
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Appendix B 
Case Studies 
Real-life examples of online organised crime group activity, arranged in chronological 
order.  
Known characteristics from each of these examples have been mapped against those 
in Tables 5 and 6 from Appendix A.  
The case studies comprise a snapshot of each incident. Given the nature and 
complexity of some of the events, it is possible that additional information may exist in 
some cases which has not yet been released into the public domain. 
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CASE STUDY 1 – Operation IceTrap 
(Pre-2000 1) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; Network infiltration 
 
In their paper about economic crime, Di Nicola and Scartezzini 2 outline Operation ‘Ice 
Trap’, an important early Italian case of international collaboration to solve online crime 
between law enforcement agencies, which also revealed a high level of organisation 
and co-operation between the members of the online organised crime group involved, 
who were dispersed across Italy, the rest of Europe and North America.  
 
As well as capitalising on the lack of international financial regulations governing the 
Internet at that time, the offenders were able to quickly establish their international 
network using the latest technologies, structuring themselves with different roles 
beneath a single leader. They used the Italian public switched telephone network 
(PSTN) network (eg ‘Itapac’) to both communicate and to infiltrate the Italian affiliate 
firms of Unilever International.  
 
Once inside the systems, the group captured credit card pin numbers and passwords 
which were used to commit fraud via virtual transactions. Di Nicola and Scartezzini 
pointed out that this was an example of how easily criminal organisations could build 
international connections using newly-available technology and equipment, quoting 
one of the former hackers, now working in the Information Security industry, as stating 
‘Information is power’. 3 
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CASE STUDY 2 – The HangUp Team 
(Pre-2000 - Present) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Fraud; Virus and Worm creation (eg the Korgo malicious code and its variations; 
the Berbew and Webber viruses; Scob Worm, all of which involve the theft of 
sensitive personal information 1);  
Spyware; Webserver infiltration; Renting out software  
for spam and phishing attacks 
 
 
The HangUp Team has been in operation since before the year 2000 and were 
originally composed of 3 members from Russia. At that time, they were arrested in 
Russia for the distribution of malware, for which they received suspended sentences. 
However, they resurfaced in 2003, launching the Webber and Berbew viruses. The 
following year, they were responsible for an attack involving Scob, a worm which 
exploited an unknown vulnerability to insert malicious content onto webservers. The 
effect was that every webpage served to users was infected with the Trojan. 2  Once 
installed on the user’s computer, the user’s activities were monitored by spyware and 
password and credit card data was covertly transferred to a server in Russia. 3  
 
By 2005, the membership of the HangUp Team was believed to have grown to 4,000 
worldwide  4. Its concerns now include renting out networks of computers for spam and 
phishing activities and information exchange among peers. 5 
 
The group is brazen about its activities. The malicious code which it releases has a 
‘tag’ in the signature, ‘Coded by HangUp Team’. The group also has a motto, ‘In fraud 
we trust’, which is posted on the public website from which it operates.  Given the 
openness of its actions, there is speculation as to why the main perpetrators, although 
known to the police since 2000, have not been intercepted, with the Russian police 
saying they are hampered by bureaucratic requirements and the difficulties of 
communicating with their US and UK equivalents. 6 
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CASE STUDY 3 – Banco di Sicilia Incident  
(2000) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online Fraud; Corruption; Money-Laundering; Attempted theft;  
Network infiltration 
 
 
This case was reported by NetworkWorld 1 and Reuters 2  in October 2000. A criminal-
led organisation with links to Cosa Nostra planned to steal 2 trillion lire ($680 million) 
from Sicily’s regional government through online bank fraud. The leader of the group 
was Antonio Orlando, a close associate of one of Palermo’s leading Mafia families, 
who had previous convictions for fraud, money laundering and receiving stolen goods. 
The Director of the Palermo police mobile squad organised crime unit said at the time: 
 
‘The operation was certainly authorised by the Mafia, because here in Sicily any  
operation of economic importance requires the Mafia’s permission…. The Mafia 
definitely has an interest in it.’ 3 
The group worked with insiders of the Banco di Sicilia and technicians from the 
national carrier, Telecom Italia SpA (sic), in order to ‘clone’ a copy of the bank’s 
computer system. This was intended to be configured to connect to the Italian 
interbank transfer network outside normal office hours using captured computer files, 
codes and passwords, for the purpose of transferring funds to bank accounts in 
Bologna, Italy, then abroad. It was planned that the banking staff involved would switch 
off the bank’s computer at a pre-arranged time to allow the ‘clone’ to take over its role.  
Police stated that telephone interceptions had revealed that the group had also sought 
accomplices from the Vatican’s Institute for the Works of Religion bank, with the 
intention of finding fellow conspirators who would help them conceal the stolen money 
where it could not be recovered by the Italian state. 
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CASE STUDY 4 – T J Maxx Incident Group  
(2002-2007) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Identity fraud; Credit card compromise; Other personal and commercial valuable 
data compromise (eg driver licence numbers); Online fraud; Network infiltration 
 
 
In 2007, the TJX case (which incorporated TJ Maxx and TK Maxx) was termed the 
‘largest online burglary ever’ by Gartner. At least 45.7 million credit and debit card 
holders across the world were exposed to potential identity fraud and other data 
compromises perpetrated by an international group, with a TJX spokeswoman 
admitting that ‘the full extent of the damage might never be known because of the 
attackers’ methods.’ 
 
In August 2008, 11 members of the group, from China, the Ukraine, Estonia and 
Belarus were charged with identity theft. They exploited vulnerabilities in an insecure 
wireless network by targeting 2 simple devices, a ‘telescope-shaped antenna’ and a 
laptop, via cars parked outside TJX commercial premises. The devices intercepted 
data transmitted from hand-held price-checking devices, cash registers and the store’s 
computers and enabled the group to access TJX’s central database.  
 
The incident generated adverse publicity for TJX and several class lawsuits were 
launched against them. In June 2008, TJX agreed to pay nearly $10m in an out-of-
court settlement to 41 US States. This was in addition to millions of dollars already paid 
to customers and banks in compensation. 
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CASE STUDY 5 – ShadowCrew  
(2002-2004) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; ID theft; Forgery; Website infiltration 
 
 
The apprehension of some of the thousands of members of the ShadowCrew 
organisation as part of the 18-month international undercover operation, Operation 
Firewall, 1 was a watershed event which ‘opened the eyes’ 2  of the Information Security 
industry in October 2004. Members of ShadowCrew were identified from across the 
world, from the United States and Canada, to Bulgaria, Poland and Sweden, with 28 
members in eight US States and 6 countries arrested in the first round. There were 
also ‘indications’ that former Eastern Bloc crime syndicates had links with the venture, 
possibly because they could employ jurisdictional arbitrage in these countries. 3 
 
ShadowCrew was a ‘web-based marketplace for stolen identities’, operating on an 
auction model similar to that of eBay, 4 where members could buy and sell their wares, 
as well as exchanging information. The site was hierarchically-organised under a clear 
leader, Andrew Mantovani, a business student, for whom it was important to be 
recognised as the ‘spiritual leader’ of the group. 5   The other main roles in the 
hierarchy were ‘Administrators’ (strategic organisers), ‘Moderators’ of online forums, 
‘Reviewers’ and ‘Vendors’. 6 
 
Unlike the activities of the RBN, which, in the main, were intended to be covert, 
ShadowCrew members, in part due to the sheer size of their operations, made little 
attempt to hide their activities. 7  The forum was open to public registration and 
viewable by anyone online, 8 with the peak hours of operation being between 10 pm to 
2 am on Sunday nights, because many of the members held daytime jobs. 9  
 
At the time of the first apprehensions, law enforcement officials identified the details of 
1.7 million stolen credit cards, login information for more than 18 million e-mail 
accounts, together with ‘identity data for thousands of people including counterfeit 
British passports and Michigan drivers’ licences’ and a suspect list of over 2,000 
names (although some of these names were likely to be aliases – see SOCA 
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comments below regarding CardersMarket). Over its two-year existence, the group 
had made more than $4.3m in illegal credit card purchases alone. 10 
 
One crucial factor which led to the arrest of some of the ShadowCrew participants and 
the shutdown of the website was the involvement of ‘CumbaJohnny’ (real name Albert 
Gonzalez), an informant for the US Secret Service, who engineered a relocation of 
some of ShadowCrew’s servers to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) in New Jersey that 
was being monitored by the Secret Service. 11  
 
Gonzalez was later apprehended in connection with other large-scale organised crime 
operations (see Heartland Payment Systems et al example below). The complexity of 
‘CumbaJohnny’s’ involvement in several different major online criminal activities 
illustrates the difficulties associated with mapping online organised crime group activity 
against a single crime type or incident. 
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CASE STUDY 6 – Sumitomo Bank Incident Group 
(2004) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; Conspiracy to defraud; Conspiracy to transfer 
criminal property 
 
 
In this incident, an international group including members from England, Belgium and 
France, conspired to obtain £229m ($423m) from the UK offices of Japan’s Sumitomo 
Masui bank. 1 The group was fronted by (‘Lord’) Hugh Rodley, a 74-year-old UK ex-
convict who, while enjoying an aristocratic lifestyle, was also liaising with members of 
the Adams crime family, whose considerable fortune had been amassed through drugs 
and extortion. Rodley’s offences included the use of a fellow conspirator’s identity for 
credit and store card purchases and he was apprehended as part of the investigation 
when one of his colleagues revealed details of the plot in a suicide letter. 2 
 
Hackers  3 were smuggled into the bank’s premises by an internal accomplice who was 
a security supervisor. They used commercial keyloggers to capture login credentials 
covertly, with the intention of transferring the funds to 10 overseas accounts set up for 
the purpose in Spain, Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore, via the banking SWIFT 
network. CCTV cameras were also tampered with in an attempt to hide their actions. 
 
As with Example 1 (Online Mafia fraud), the offenders were apprehended by the police 
before the transfers were able to take place, following a two-year investigation which 
was triggered when staff were alerted to the repeated mistakes the offenders were 
making when completing application data fields in the SWIFT system. 
 
The UK National Hi-Tech Crime Unit led the international investigation. They  
highlighted that the assistance from ‘overseas forces’ had varied enormously, 
mentioning that the Abu Dhabi accomplices had never been identified and singling out 
the co-operation of the bank and French and Belgian police as being particularly 
helpful. 
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CASE STUDY 7 – McColo 
(2004 - 2008) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; Phishing; ID theft; Child pornography distribution 
 
 
In November 2008, the website of ‘McColo Corporation’ 1, a US web-based hosting 
firm, was disconnected from the Internet by its Internet Providers. McColo was alleged 
to have been hosting command and control centres for 5 major botnets, including 
Storm,  2 and is estimated to have been responsible for more than 75% of the world’s 
spam. Alongside the RBN, with which it was said to be associated, it was known to 
have some of the most ‘disreputable’ organised crime groups in the world among its 
client list. 
 
This case was notable for the role played by Brian Krebs, the author of ‘Security Fix’, 
the established online security column in the ‘Washington Post’. He alerted ‘McColo’s’ 
service providers, one of whom was able to begin disconnecting the services within a 
couple of hours of receiving Krebs’ message, following their initial investigations. 3 This 
incident demonstrated how a collaborative approach may enable a service provider to 
take swift measures to effectively disable large-scale, distributed threats. 
 
The disconnection of ‘McColo’s’ services from the Internet resulted in an immediate 50 
to 75 per cent reduction in the volume of worldwide spam. However, the reprieve was 
shortlived, with spam now making a resurgence  4 as other criminal enterprises fill the 
vacuum created by its downfall. The US continues to generate the most spam 
worldwide  5 and Srizbi, which was one of the larger botnets linked with McColo, was 
found to have joined a different botnet network, reportedly having activated instructions 
within its code to do so.  
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CASE STUDY 8 – Russian Business Network (RBN) 
(2004 – 2008 or Present) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Mass spamming; Phishing; ID theft; Software piracy; Web hosting for illegal 
services; Spyware; Fake security applications; Child pornography; Targeted 
DOS attacks; Renting of botnets 
 
 
The RBN, known by numerous aliases including RBNet and iFrame Cash 1 and  
believed by some analysts to have strong links with the Russian government, provided 
so-called ‘bullet proof’ 2 web hosting services for rent which are said to be associated 
with 60% - 70% of the world’s online crimes 3. The services offered utilised techniques 
such as targeted DoS attacks, spamming, phishing and spyware (including fake anti-
phishing and anti-spyware sites). The RBN operated through a network of covert, 
unregistered, hard-to-find domains in Russia, with suspected bases/servers in 
Panama, the UK and the Bahamas. 4  Lately, they have also been associated with 
activity in Iran. 5 
 
Speculation that the RBN might have ceased to exist in late 2007, when its domains 
suddenly disappeared from the Internet 6 (possibly due to the withdrawal of 
government support) were believed to be premature as sites in Taiwan and China 
were found to be hosting very similar malicious ‘packing kits’ (‘development kits for 
malicious software’) to those developed by the RBN, such as the popular ‘MPack’.  
However, soon afterwards, China cut the connections that were being established, with 
conjecture that the organisation would re-establish itself via smaller, more discreet 
groupings. 7 In February 2008, The Shadowserver Foundation, a volunteer Internet 
security monitoring organisation, published a report which connected the RBN with 
servers registered in Turkey 8 and, in August 2008, the RBN was being linked with the 
information warfare attacks on Georgia. 
 
Although much of the current discussion about the RBN takes a cautious, retrospective 
stance, analysts are not ruling out the group from future high-impact activity. 
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CASE STUDY 9 – Rock Phish 
(2004 - Present) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; Phishing; Spam; Botnet distribution 
 
 
Rock Phish are an online organised crime group from the region of Romania or its 
vicinity 1 which produces ‘phishing kits’. The name of the group is derived from their 
early custom of including ‘strings such as “/rock” or “/r” ‘ in the directories of their 
phishing webpage URL (Uniform Resource Locator) addresses. 2 
 
In 2004, Rock Phish were the first group to incorporate botnets within their phishing 
infrastructure with the intent of extending the life of their attacks and to make them 
more scalable. 3 
 
In 2006, the group were believed to be responsible for over half the phishing e-mails in 
the world at that time. 4 They were estimated to have cost banks ‘more than US$100m’ 5 
and to have compromised at least 44 different businesses in 9 countries, tending to 
target financial institutions such as CitiBank, Barclays and Deutsche Bank. 6 
 
By 2007, according to figures from Cambridge University researchers, the total amount 
stolen had risen to US$178m 7 and they were responsible for introducing so-called ‘fast 
flux’ techniques into phishing, which vastly increased the number of attacks against 
financial institutions which could take place at any one time 8 and the length of time the 
domain could exist. 
 
In 2008, Rock Phish diversified their mass-phishing strategies to include the 
‘sophisticated’ Zeus Trojan as a malware download in their attacks,  9 as reported by 
RSA, 10 in order to repeatedly capture personal information during inter-website 
transactions, as well as to spread financial crimeware. 
 
By this time, RSA were reporting that the phishing attacks were now worth ‘tens of 
millions of dollars’. 11 They also highlighted a crucial distinction between Rock Phish 
and many other online organised crime gangs, in that it is ‘a closed gang operating in 
Russia’, as opposed to participating ‘in a broad economic system in which credit cards 
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are bought and sold openly.’ 12 The group’s organised self-sufficiency extends to 
writing their own code and launching its own attacks. In particular, a distinctive 
characteristic of the group was their ability to ‘scale and execute thousands of phishing 
attacks with as little infrastructure as possible’, which increased the difficulty of shutting 
down the websites. 13 Their strategies also included pooling ‘hosted resources and 
…targeting many banks simultaneously,’ co-operative attacks which were shown to be 
‘far more effective’. 14 
 
In August 2009. the Zeus Trojan, which had now evolved into a ‘botnet’, was linked 
with the servers of a company in Latvia called Real Host, which were reported to have 
captured ‘around 3.6 million PCs’ for use as ‘zombies’ in the botnet. However, analysts 
warned that it was not clear how much control the Real Host servers had because it 
was ‘extremely difficult’ to locate the centre of a botnet of that size. 15 
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CASE STUDY 10 – CardersMarket (including DarkMarket)  
(2005-2007) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; Phishing; ID theft 
 
 
‘Carding’, in criminal parlance, involves any criminal activity which arises from the 
compromise of financial smartcards such as credit or debit cards. 
CardersMarket was a web-based forum which came into existence in 2005 when 
‘Iceman’ (aka Max Vision) merged the user accounts from four rival forums he had 
hacked into his own site. 1 The forums included DarkMarket, TalkCash, 
ScandinavianCarding and TheVouched, all of which exchanged stolen information, 
with a focus on credit card data. 2 
 
As in the case of ‘CumbaJohnny’, ‘Iceman’, after becoming an informant following his 
arrest for hacking attacks on US government agencies in 1998, continued to operate 
his illegal forums using a range of aliases and separating his administrator duties from 
his illegal activities. 3 
 
In 2008, it was revealed that DarkMarket, one of the forums acquired by ‘Iceman’, had 
been an FBI undercover operation since 2006, news which received widespread media 
attention.  4  Unlike ShadowCrew and other similar sites, DarkMarket operated on an 
‘entrepreneurial, peer-reviewed’ 5 invitation-only basis and it was through such an 
invitation that the FBI had been able to infiltrate the group. Products available on the 
site included stolen personal data for ID theft (‘full infos’), credit card strip data 
(‘dumps’) to create counterfeit cards, specialised hardware and electronic banking 
logins for phishing attacks, with vendors encouraged to submit their goods for peer 
review before sale. 6 The website was shut down in 2006, following an international 
operation which included the FBI and SOCA, with over 60 arrests being made 
worldwide. 7  
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One of the arrested administrators, ‘Cha0’ (sic), from Turkey, who was alleged to have 
also been involved in kidnapping, had sold high-quality ATM-skimming hardware which 
could be attached to cash machines to obtain credit card and PIN details. 
 
The site had been well-regarded in the criminal community for identifying ‘rippers’ 
(individuals who steal from their peers) among the group, although ‘Iceman’ had issued 
warnings that the FBI were involved and that ‘Master Splynter’, the main site operator, 
was working for them. 8 Although this was the case, the message was dismissed as 
inter-forum rivalry. 9 In a farewell message to the group, ‘Master Splynter’ wrote: 
‘It is very unfortunate that we have come to this situation because … we have 
established DM as the premier English speaking forum for conducting business…’ 10 
Following the arrest of one of the UK suspects, SOCA stated that, although it was 
known that there were 2,000 registered ‘nicks’ (nicknames) on the site, they could not 
be assumed to be unique: ‘Some will be defunct. In other cases one user will have 
several different identities on the site.’ 11 
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CASE STUDY 11 – Triad Gang (Australia) 
(2006) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; ID theft; Money laundering; Phishing; Corruption 
 
 
This international fraud group, who operated out of Sydney’s Chinatown and who had 
links with Malaysia and Russia, used school-age children in Sydney as ‘mules’ to 
launder money stolen from bank accounts through phishing and hacking attacks 1 via a 
keylogging Trojan installation installed when users accessed a link to a fake e-mail 
alert. 2   In return for a  commission, reported to be between $200-$500 per day for 
moving up to $100,000 per day, 3   the money was transferred to the teenagers’ 
personal bank accounts, prior to passing the funds on to ‘bagmen’ (couriers) for the 
group, who wired them to the group leaders overseas. 4  The teenagers withdrew 
‘small amounts of less than $10,000 from different bank branches’, in order to evade 
detection. 5 
One ‘bagman’, Jonathan Carnie Mullally, from a prestigious private school, was 
described as a ‘Fagin-like character’ whose role was to be a go-between, taking money 
from the student ‘mules’ to pass on to a Malaysian gang boss. 6 Although the 
schoolchildren received sums which would have appeared substantial to them, they 
were not being paid the ‘going rate’ as the group were exploiting their naivety. 7 
Sixty victims were robbed of more than $600,000 Australian through this scam and 
some of the school children received jail terms of up to 18 months. 8 
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CASE STUDY 12 – Heartland Payment Systems et al Group 
(2006-2008) 
 
Type/s of Activity Undertaken: 
Online fraud; Online identify theft; Theft from ATM machines; 
Network infiltration; Conspiracy 
 
 
At the same time that he was assisting the Secret Service in the ShadowCrew case, 
‘CumbaJohnny’ used different online pseudonyms 1 to continue working with another 
international criminal group who were targeting US retail chain stores and financial 
institutions, including Heartland Payment Systems 2  and 7-Eleven Inc. 3  This was in 
addition to his involvement in the TJX incident outlined above. 4 
This highly-organised group, which included members from Russia, China, the 
Ukraine, the United States, Estonia and Belarus, was probably created with the 
intention to capitalise on the ‘specialised services and supplies’ which the members 
provided, 5 being skilled in the capture of credit card details and other sensitive data for 
fraud-related purposes. The group used strategic tactics such as reviewing the Fortune 
500 companies list to identify potential targets, which they then visited to monitor their 
online payment systems. 6 
The group launched SQL injection attacks, which ‘probably’ used specially-configured 
codes, which exploited vulnerabilities in firewall configurations 7, against businesses 
from their bases in poorly-regulated countries such as Latvia and the Ukraine, where 
they stored the data they had captured.  For instance, one of the members, based in 
Estonia, infiltrated the servers of a Dallas-based restaurant chain to obtain data. 8   
At the enterprise level, the group compromised poorly-configured wireless networks 
and installed ‘sniffer’ programs 9 to intercept and capture network data that was 
transferred from the Latvia and Ukrainian servers to China, where it was imprinted on 
blank ATM cards. After processing, the cards were shipped back to North America for 
use in cash machines. 10  
 
This incident was quoted as having compromised 130 million credit card numbers 11, 
which led to the case being dubbed ‘the biggest case of identity theft in American 
history. At the time of his arrest, authorities were aware that ‘CumbaJohnny’ had $1.6m 
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in his bank accounts, as well as other valuable assets. 12 He is scheduled to go on trial  
in 2010. 13 
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Case Study 3 
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     Knocked Offline’: 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/11/major_source_of_online_scams_a.ht
ml 
4
    Symantec ‘State of Spam’ Report, April 2009: 
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_04-
2009.en-us.pdf 
5
    Sophos: Page 8, ‘Security Threat Report: 2009’: 
http://www.sophos.com/sophos/docs/eng/marketing_material/sophos-security-threat-report-jan-
2009-na.pdf 
 
Case Study 8 
1
   Webhosting.devshed.com, Web Hosting News: ‘Russian Business Network: On the Fly’ 
(March 2008): 
http://webhosting.devshed.com/c/a/Web-Hosting-News/Russian-Business-Network-On-the-Fly/ 
2
   TheRegister.co.uk: ‘Infamous RBN quits China’: (November 2007) 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/13/rbn_quits_china/ 
3
   Webhosting.devshed.com, Web Hosting News: ‘Russian Business Network: On the Fly’ 
(March 2008): 
http://webhosting.devshed.com/c/a/Web-Hosting-News/Russian-Business-Network-On-the-Fly/ 
4
   Webhosting.devshed.com, Web Hosting News: ‘Russian Business Network: On the Fly’ 
(March 2008): 
http://webhosting.devshed.com/c/a/Web-Hosting-News/Russian-Business-Network-On-the-Fly/ 
5
   Securehomenetwork.blogspot.com: ‘Russian Business Network Deploys in the IP Space of 
the Islamic Republic’ (March 2009): 
http://securehomenetwork.blogspot.com/2009/03/russian-business-network-deploys-in-ip.html 
6
   Cnet.com: ‘Infamous Russian Malware Gang Vanishes’ (November 2007): 
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http://news.cnet.com/Infamous-Russian-malware-gang-vanishes/2100-7355_3-6217852.html 
7
   TheRegister.co.uk: ‘Infamous RBN quits China’: (November 2007) 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/13/rbn_quits_china/ 
8
   Shadowserver.org, Home Page of website: 
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/ 
9
   The Shadowserver Foundation: ‘RBN “Rizing” – Abdallah Internet Hizmetleri (AIH)’: 
(February 2008): 
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/uploads/Information/RBN_Rizing.pdf 
10
   TheRegister.co.uk: ‘Russian cybercrooks turn on Georgia’: (August 2008) 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/08/11/georgia_ddos_attack_reloaded/print.html 
 
Case Study 9 
 
1
    PCPro.co.uk: ‘Half of all phishes from Romanian cyber gang’: (December 2006) 
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/100351/half-of-all-phishes-from-romanian-cyber-gang 
 
2
    PCPro.co.uk: ‘Half of all phishes from Romanian cyber gang’: (December 2006) 
 
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/100351/half-of-all-phishes-from-romanian-cyber-gang 
 
3
    Blogs.ZDNet.com: ‘The Neospoilt Cybercrime Group Abandons Its Web Malware 
Exploitation Kit’ (entry dated April 21 2008) 
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1598 
4
    PCPro.co.uk: ‘Half of all phishes from Romanian cyber gang’: (December 2006) 
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/100351/half-of-all-phishes-from-romanian-cyber-gang 
 
PCPro were quoting Ken Dunham, Director of VeriSign’s security research unit. 
 
5
   InfoSecurity-magazine.com: ‘One gang corners the market in phish’ (May 2007) 
 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/1152/one-gang-corners-the-maerket-in-phish 
 
6
    PCPro.co.uk: ‘Half of all phishes from Romanian cyber gang’: (December 2006) 
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/100351/half-of-all-phishes-from-romanian-cyber-gang 
 
7
    Infosecurity-magazine.com: ‘One gang corners the market in phish’ (May 2007) 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/1152/one-gang-corners-the-market-in-
phish 
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8
 University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Technical Report No. 718: Page 92, 
‘Cooperative Attack and Defence in Distributed Networks’ (June 2008) 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-718.pdf 
 
9
    SCMagazineus.com: ‘”Rock Phish” gang adds malware download to attacks’ (April 2008) 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/Rock-Phish-gang-adds-malware-download-to-
attacks/article/109240/ 
 
10
    RSA.com: ‘RSA, the Security Division of EMC, discovers “Rock Phish” attack evolution’  
(April 2008) 
http://www.rsa.com/press_release.aspx?id=9347  
 
11
   SCMagazineus.com: ‘”Rock Phish” gang adds malware download to attacks’: (April 2008) 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/Rock-Phish-gang-adds-malware-download-to-
attacks/article/109240/ 
 
12
   SCMagazineus.com: ‘”Rock Phish” gang adds malware download to attacks’: (April 2008) 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/Rock-Phish-gang-adds-malware-download-to-
attacks/article/109240/ 
 
13
   SCMagazineus.com: ‘”Rock Phish” gang adds malware download to attacks’: (April 2008) 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/Rock-Phish-gang-adds-malware-download-to-
attacks/article/109240/ 
14
  University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Technical Report No. 718: Page 4, 
‘Cooperative Attack and Defence in Distributed Networks’ (June 2008) 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-718.pdf 
 
15
    ComputerWeekly.com: ‘Zeus Botnet Linked to Latvia’s Real Host’ (August 2009) 
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/08/03/237146/zeus-botnet-linked-to-
latvias-real-host.htm 
For an in-depth technical analysis of the Rock Phish group’s techniques, see: 
University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Technical Report No. 718: Page 4, 
‘Cooperative Attack and Defence in Distributed Networks’ (June 2008) 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-718.pdf 
 
Case Study 10 
1
    The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’, Page 12:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
2
    The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’, Page 12:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
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3
    Wired.com: ‘Notorious Crime Forum DarkMarket Goes Dark’: (September 2008) 
     http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/notorious-crime/ 
4
    Eg ZDNet.co.uk: ‘FBI agent reveals details of cybercrime sting’ (May 2009) 
     http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0,1000000189,39649176,00.htm 
5
    The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’, Page 12:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
6
    Wired.com: ‘Notorious Crime Forum DarkMarket Goes Dark’: (September 2008) 
     http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/notorious-crime/ 
7
    The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’, Page 12:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
8
    ComputerWorlduk.com: ‘Three Years Undercover with Cyber Criminals’:  
      (January 2009) 
http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/security/cybercrime/in-
depth/index.cfm?articleid=2016 
9
    Wired.com: ‘Notorious Crime Forum DarkMarket Goes Dark’: (September 2008) 
     http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/notorious-crime/ 
10
    Wired.com: ‘Notorious Crime Forum DarkMarket Goes Dark’: (September 2008) 
      http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/notorious-crime/ 
11
    Wired.com: ‘Notorious Crime Forum DarkMarket Goes Dark’: (September 2008) 
      http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/notorious-crime/ 
12
    BBC.co.uk: ‘Police stalking cyber fraudsters’ (October 2008) 
       http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7675216.stm 
 
Case Study 11 
1
    Sydney Morning Herald: ‘Gone Phishing …gangs using Aussie kids to steal millions’  
(June 2006) 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/gangs-using-aussie-kids-to-steal-
millions/2006/06/03/1148956585189.html 
 
2
  iDefense: Page 3, ‘Money Mules: Sophisticated Global Cyber Criminal Operations’ (2006) 
 
http://complianceandprivacy.com/WhitePapers/iDefense_MoneyMules_20060329.pdf 
 
3
  The Register: ‘Aussie Crooks Recruit Teen Phishing Mules’ (January 2005) 
 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/06/phisherman_fagins/print.html 
 
(The Register was quoting a report from Australia’s Daily Telegraph newspaper.) 
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4
    Sydney Morning Herald: ‘Gone Phishing …gangs using Aussie kids to steal millions’  
(June 2006) 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/gangs-using-aussie-kids-to-steal-
millions/2006/06/03/1148956585189.html 
5
  The Register: ‘Aussie Crooks Recruit Teen Phishing Mules’ (January 2005) 
 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/06/phisherman_fagins/print.html 
 
(The Register was quoting a report from Australia’s Daily Telegraph newspaper.) 
6
    Sydney Morning Herald: ‘Gone Phishing …gangs using Aussie kids to steal millions’  
(June 2006) 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/gangs-using-aussie-kids-to-steal-
millions/2006/06/03/1148956585189.html 
7
  The Register: ‘Aussie Crooks Recruit Teen Phishing Mules’ (January 2005) 
 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/06/phisherman_fagins/print.html 
 
(The Register was quoting a report from Australia’s Daily Telegraph newspaper.) 
8
    Sydney Morning Herald: ‘Gone Phishing …gangs using Aussie kids to steal millions’  
(June 2006) 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/gangs-using-aussie-kids-to-steal-
millions/2006/06/03/1148956585189.html 
 
Case Study 12 
1     NYTimes.com: ‘Global Trail of an Online Crime Ring’: (August 2008) 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/technology/12theft.html 
2
   For in-depth, updated reports on the Heartland Payment Systems aspect, see: 
BankInfoSecurity.com: ‘The Latest Updates on the Year’s First Major Information  
Security Incident’: 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/heartland_breach.php 
 
At 24 August 2009, the site was reporting that more than 650 institutions had been affected 
by this breach alone. 
3
   NYTimes.com: ‘3 Indicted in Theft of 130 Million Card Numbers’ (August 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/technology/18card.html 
4
   NYTimes.com: ‘3 Indicted in Theft of 130 Million Card Numbers’ (August 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/technology/18card.html 
5
    The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’, Page 11:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
6
   NYTimes.com: ‘3 Indicted in Theft of 130 Million Card Numbers’ (August 2009) 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/technology/18card.html 
7 
   BBC.co.uk: ‘US man “stole 130m card numbers” ‘ (August 2009) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8206305.stm 
8     NYTimes.com: ‘Global Trail of an Online Crime Ring’: (August 2008) 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/technology/12theft.html 
9
    The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’, Page 11:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
10      NYTimes.com: ‘Global Trail of an Online Crime Ring’: (August 2008) 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/technology/12theft.html 
11
   NYTimes.com: ‘3 Indicted in Theft of 130 Million Card Numbers’ (August 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/technology/18card.html 
12 
    The 2008 ‘Symantec Report on the Underground Economy XII’, Page 11:  
http://www.symantec.com/en/uk/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20081124_11 
13 
   BBC.co.uk: ‘US man “stole 130m card numbers” ‘ (August 2009) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8206305.stm 
 
Case Study References 
 
Additional Information 
 
1   For a comprehensive review of the Russian online crime environment, see: 
 
Symantec Research Report: ‘An Overview of the Russian Hacking Scene’: (July 2007) 
http://www.emea.symantec.com/onlinefraud/viewPDF.cfm?pdfname=An_Overview_of_the_R
ussian_Hacking_Scene.pdf 
 
2  Brief profiles of other online organised crime groups and their modes of operation can be 
found at: 
 
Baselinemag.com: ’10 Notorious Cyber Gangs’: 
http://www.baselinemag.com/c/a/Security/10-Notorious-Cyber-Gangs/ 
 
3    For a detailed description of one member’s involvement in an online organised crime  
group, see: 
 
Wired.com: ‘One Hacker’s Audacious Plan to Rule the Black Market in Stolen Credit  
 Cards’ (December 2008) 
http://www.wired.com/print/techbiz/people/magazine/17-01/ff_max_butler 
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Appendix C 
Morphological Analysis (MA) Methodology and Matrices 
 
Morphological Analysis (MA) ‘is a qualitative method used to holistically explore a 
range of different possible explanations for a number of issues by dividing the problem 
into different elements and displaying them in the form of a matrix that visually 
represents the 4 steps of the analytical process. 1   
 
MA is intended to be used during the early stages of exploratory analysis, for instance 
within situations where, although some data is available, the quantity may be 
insufficient to undertake meaningful quantitative analysis or, as often occurs when 
considering organised crime, there are a wide range of possible scenarios which need 
to be reduced to those which are most feasible for the given situation. 
 
Originally designed for use within the field of astrophysics,2  the method has evolved to 
be used as an analytical tool within a range of scientific and business environments, 3 
as well as being proposed as a tool to develop strategic thinking about organised crime 
in criminal intelligence. 4 Although simple to apply, the method ‘is deceptively complex 
and rich’ in its returns 5 and, because it is available as a software application, 6 there is 
the option to incorporate larger data sets which can be analysed semi-automatically to 
create inference models. 7 
 
The 4 steps of the MA process 8 are: 
 
1. Break down the problem (identify the broad elements and categorise them) 
2. Create a morphological matrix  
3. Develop possible explanations or outcomes 
4. Grade the explanations (eg from most feasible to least feasible). 
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Step 1   
 
Break down the problem 
 
The purpose of this stage is to categorise and define the different elements of the 
problem in broad terms, from a multi-disciplinary perspective.  
 
For this exercise, a scenario is devised whereby different members of a commercial 
organisation’s multi-disciplinary team (for instance, a high-level Incident Management 
team) are each required to evaluate a set of data items which refer to pre-identified 
online criminal activity, in order to meet and agree the key issues which, in their view, 
require prioritisation from the perspective of their own business. In this scenario, the 
organisation is undertaking this activity alongside the Incident Management procedures 
which have been activated involving the police. (In other circumstances, the 
methodology lends itself equally well to use by multi-disciplinary teams composed of 
different organisations or agencies.) 
 
Although this is the first time that the team have identified an incident that may involve 
significant online organised crime activity, they have all previously been briefed on the 
types of threats which such activities can pose to their type of business and have kept 
up-to-date with reading industry reports on the subject. 
 
As with all early stages of Incident Management, time is of the essence, not only in 
order to address the problem, but also because the team members need to return to 
their regular duties as soon as possible. Therefore, the team need to identify and agree 
their key items quickly, using a straightforward, simple tool, with a view to undertaking 
more in-depth, targeted analysis at a later stage, for instance by following the 
guidelines within the  ISO/IEC 27005 Risk Management standard.  
 
The team decides that the fundamental question they need to answer at this stage is: 
 
In what ways might this online organised crime group pose a threat to our 
organisation’s vulnerable assets? 
 
In order to do this, they identify that they need to evaluate the threat potential of the 
possible organisational structure and business model/s which the online criminal group 
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is utilising. The team uses the items in Table 6 to identify potential online criminal 
organisational structures which may apply in this situation, then, following initial 
analysis by the business professionals within the team, add the types of potential 
business model which are indicated by their existing evidence. The Information 
Security professionals provide data about potential attack vectors and all members of 
the team agree the assets which they deem to be most vulnerable. 
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Step 2   
 
Create a morphological matrix 
 
The outcome of the team’s Step 1 processes are depicted in Matrix Table A. 
 
The headings are located on the left-hand side, with the elements listed to the right. 
Thus, all the identified important features are listed along a row. The features in 
subsequent rows do not need to relate to the group above and it is accepted that some 
pairs of conditions may be ‘mutually inconsistent or contradictory’.  
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Morphological Analysis of a theoretical online organised crime group 
Step 2 – Create a Morphological Matrix 
Matrix Table A 
Elements of Problem 
Criminal 
Organisational 
Structures 
Collaboration Fluid, 
changeable 
roles, 
membership 
and structure 
Hierarchical 
Structure 
Network 
Structure 
Commercial/Business-
Like Structure 
Specialised Division 
of Labour 
Criminal 
Organisational 
Business 
Model 
Subscription 
Business 
Model 
Collective 
Business Model 
Online Auction 
Business 
Model 
‘Other’ Business 
Model Type 
  
Criminal 
Organisation 
Attack Vectors 
Phishing Distributed 
Denial of 
Service (eg 
botnets) 
‘Drive By 
Downloads’ 
Insider Corruption Fraud Spyware 
Potential 
Targets (Sites) 
Site Type A –  
Headquarters 
Site Type B – 
Vancouver 
Office 
Site Type C – 
Nairobi Office 
Site Type D – 
London Office 
Site Type E – 
Melbourne Office 
Site Type E - Home-
working sites 
Potential 
Targets (Data) 
Personal Data 
(all types) 
Research and 
Development 
Data 
Intellectual 
Property 
Financial Data IT-Related Data (eg 
Network Infrastructure 
Maps) 
Physical Site Maps 
and Blueprints 
Potential 
Targets 
(Stakeholders) 
Staff 
(Management) 
Staff 
(Operational) 
Third Parties Existing/ Potential 
Customers 
Shareholders Other Stakeholders 
Potential 
Targets 
(Physical/ IT) 
Network 
Infrastructure 
Physical 
Storage 
Systems (eg 
Paper files) 
Databases Websites External Storage 
Devices (eg PDAs, 
USB drives) 
Physical Assets (eg 
Keys, Safes, Staff 
Passes) 
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Step 3   
 
Develop possible explanations or outcomes 
 
This stage identifies attributes in the situation which may not have been previously 
apparent and which may require further analysis. 
 
At this point, the team use the matrix to explore the range of possible explanations or 
outcomes for the problem that is being analysed. They read the matrix by moving down 
and across the items to establish possible connections between pairs of items and to 
generate the range of possible outcomes. It is important that the team evaluates the 
items as objectively as they can, without introducing any interpretative considerations 
which might arise from their specialist fields. 
 
One important by-product of this and the subsequent stages is that the team members 
will be informing and updating each other about important aspects of the situation 
during their focussed discussions. 
 
It is not necessary (and will usually not be feasible) to develop a scenario for every 
possible combination. Because the number of possible configurations is the product of 
the number of conditions under each parameter, 9 for the example in this paper, this 
would equate to 186, 624 possible combinations: 
 
6 x 4 x 6 x 6 x 6 x 6 x 6 = 186,624 possible combinations. 
 
However,  juxtaposing the items which can produce these combinations within a 
morphological matrix allows a professional to quickly identify and extract the elements 
which they recognise to be important. 
 
Neither is it necessary for every item to have a connection. Within MA, identifying items 
which are not deemed to have relevance and which can be discarded are equally as 
important as identifying positive connections. 10 These are the pairs of items which are 
deemed to have inherent inconsistencies for one of these reasons: logical 
contradictions, empirical constraints or normative constraints (eg where a political 
situation might prevail which makes the pairing unlikely). 11 For this particular example, 
all the items (when read vertically) may have some relevance and may be mutually 
compatible. 
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As an example of the process,  Matrix Table B shows the possible links between one 
set of the attributes.  
 
In this particular example, the links might suggest a potential threat arising from the 
following associations: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Substituting any single item (for instance, replacing ‘Site Type E – Homeworking Sites’ 
with ‘Site Type A – Headquarters’ or replacing ‘Spyware’ with ‘Distributed Denial of 
Service’ attacks) creates a new and different scenario. 
 
By applying their judgment to extract the most significant possibilities within the matrix, 
the team obtains a list of scenarios which, although brief, between them capture the 
key issues that the whole team have decided need to be addressed. 
 
An online organised crime group specialist division who obtain their 
tools, in this case spyware, from a criminal online auction site, with the 
intention of targeting the personal data within databases that can be 
accessed remotely by management staff. 
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Morphological Analysis of a theoretical online organised crime group 
Step 3 – Develop Possible Explanations or Outcomes 
Matrix Table B 
Elements of Problem 
Criminal 
Organisational 
Structures 
Collaboration Fluid, 
changeable 
roles, 
membership 
and structure 
Hierarchical 
Structure 
Network 
Structure 
Commercial/Business-
Like Structure 
Specialised Division 
of Labour 
Criminal 
Organisational 
Business 
Model 
Subscription 
Business 
Model 
Collective 
Business Model 
Online Auction 
Business 
Model 
‘Other’ Business 
Model Type 
  
Criminal 
Organisation 
Attack Vectors 
Phishing Distributed 
Denial of 
Service (eg 
botnets) 
Ransomware Insider Corruption Fraud Spyware 
Potential 
Targets (Sites) 
Site Type A – 
Headquarters 
Site Type B – 
Vancouver 
Office 
Site Type C – 
Nairobi Office 
Site Type D – 
London Office 
Site Type E – 
Melbourne Office 
Site Type E - Home-
working sites 
Potential 
Targets (Data) 
Personal Data 
(all types) 
Research and 
Development 
Data 
Intellectual 
Property  
Financial Data IT-Related Data (eg 
Network Infrastructure 
Maps) 
Physical Site Maps 
and Blueprints 
Potential 
Targets 
(Stakeholders) 
Staff 
(Management) 
Staff 
(Operational) 
Third Parties Existing/ Potential 
Customers 
Shareholders Other Stakeholders 
Potential 
Targets 
(Physical/ IT) 
Network 
Infrastructure 
Physical 
Storage 
Systems (eg 
Paper files) 
Databases Websites External Storage 
Devices (eg PDAs, 
USB drives) 
Physical Assets (eg 
Keys, Safes, Staff 
Passes) 
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Step 4   
 
Grade the explanations (eg from most feasible to least feasible) 
 
The final step of the process for the team in this instance is to assess the findings of 
Stage 3 according to whether they are ‘possible, practical and feasible’ from a criminal 
perspective. (The option is also open to them to assess the scenarios against any 
other potentially-relevant criteria such as effectiveness or precedent within their own 
industry).  It is at this stage that the team members reintroduce pertinent issues arising 
from their specialist fields. 
 
For the example, each scenario can be assessed as follows: 
 
Scenario Possible? 
(Y/N) 
Practical? 
(Y/N) 
Feasible? 
(Y/N) 
An online organised crime group 
specialist division who obtain 
their tools, in this case spyware, 
from a criminal online auction 
site, with the intention of 
targeting the personal data within 
databases that can be accessed 
remotely by management staff. 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
The scenarios with the highest number of ‘Yeses’ are retained for further analysis, with 
the other scenarios being discarded for this exercise (although some of the less likely 
scenarios may still have revealed valuable information which the business captures 
and addresses externally). 
 
The remaining scenarios may highlight issues which need to be addressed. For 
instance, focusing on a scenario which involves a possible interaction between data 
that is accessed remotely and spyware might prompt an organisation to review its anti-
virus and anti-spyware strategies, as well as auditing remote working procedures to 
ensure that all data processing occurs on authorised equipment. 
 
At this point, additional methodologies can be introduced to further ascertain the 
likelihood of particular threats, for instance undertaking risk and impact analysis using 
threat and vulnerability assessment manual or software tools, with the final objective 
being to provide recommendations for further action.  
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Thus, using a systematic methodology such as MA assists in the process of reducing a 
scenario from the abstract to the concrete, which is often an issue where online 
organised crime activity is concerned, as well as increasing the likelihood that any 
subsequent analysis is undertaken on the most important set/s of data. 
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The scenario has been devised by Anna Cevidalli. 
1. C E Heldon: Page 112, ‘Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence’ (J H Ratcliffe (Ed), 
The Federation Press) (2004, 2007) 
2. Page 2, ‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-Quantified 
Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
3. T Ritchey: Page 4, ‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-
Quantified Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
4. C E Heldon: Page2 112-114, ‘Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence’ (J H Ratcliffe 
(Ed), The Federation Press) (2004, 2007) 
5. T Ritchey: Page 4, ‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-
Quantified Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
6. T Ritchey: Page 2, ‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-
Quantified Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
 
The software program is called ‘MA/Casper: Computer Aided Scenario and Problem 
Evaluation Routine’.  (Page 9, Ritchey) 
7. T Ritchey: Page 2, ‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-
Quantified Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Anna Cevidalli (Student No: 100630541)             MSc Project – September 2009 ( Appendix C) 
12/12 
8. The steps of the methodology that follow are based on Ritchey’s paper, as well as: 
C E Heldon: Page 113, ‘Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence’ (J H Ratcliffe (Ed), 
The Federation Press) (2004, 2007) 
9. T Ritchey: Page 6,‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-
Quantified Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
10. T Ritchey: Page 7,‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-
Quantified Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
11. T Ritchey: Page 8,‘General Morphological Analysis (MA) – A General Method for Non-
Quantified Modelling’ 
 
http://www.swemorph.com/ma.html 
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Appendix D 
Information and IT Attributes Exploited by Offenders 
(Supplement to Section 4.1.2 ) 
 
Key attributes of Information and Technology which are exploited by all types of 
offenders. 
 
 ‘Atomisation’ 
Information on the Internet, which is fundamentally composed of binary packets (‘1’s 
and ‘0’s), can be reduced to miniscule amounts. Equally, electronic currencies can be 
calculated to infinitesimal decimal places and information within a single web page can 
originate from many different sources around the world, any element of which can 
potentially be compromised. 
‘Atomisation’ 1 presents a security concern because most adware is compiled using 
JavaScript, whose functions can be misused so that adware residing on an innocuous 
website, when accessed, can redirect the user to a malicious destination. The 
complexity and inter-dependence of these components makes it very difficult to apply 
comprehensive security controls to them. 2  
 
Automation 
Automated techniques have major advantages over their terrestrial equivalents. Users 
can instigate complicated processes at the click of a mouse button. Automation is 
increasingly a feature within crimeware, enabling offenders to launch powerful attacks 
such as DDOS attacks using minimal technical skills. 
 
Continual Availability 
Broadband and wireless connections enables 24/7 access to the Internet. In the 2008 
UK BERR ‘Information Security Breaches Survey’, 84% of companies stated that they 
were ‘heavily dependent on their IT systems’, with 97% of the companies surveyed 
using a broadband connection and 42% using a wireless network. 3 
However, many organisations have not updated insecure legacy wireless protocols in 
their devices, providing another attack vector for offenders. 4 
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Information is available ‘on demand’ from internet search engines which provide fast 
access to vast, cheap knowledge stores and social networking sites which foster the 
creation of online information-sharing communities, for legitimate and illegal users 
alike. In their ‘2009 Midyear Security Report’, 'Cisco’ cited the example of a ‘major 
botmaster’ seeking the assistance of his criminal colleagues through an online forum 
after his own botnet had been hacked. 5 
 
Innate Properties of Digital Information  
Digital information comprises intangible yet valuable assets such as knowledge, 
human identities and network-dependent business operations, which can be traded 
using real and e-currencies. 6  It can be compromised with little obvious evidence that 
an incident has taken place. Data can either be physically viewed remotely using 
spyware or copied by malicious code without any indication to the end user that 
anything untoward has taken place because the copy of the data they are using 
appears unaltered. 
Ancillary data, including cached data and metadata, is a rich source of useful 
information in itself, for instance when creating profiles of users’ Internet shopping 
patterns. In some cases, it can also be commoditised, with access to the data being 
granted at minimal cost in return for a membership fee. It can be further exploited as 
part of the reconnaissance stage of a targeted attack or to build up a profile of a 
person’s preferences and activities (via the ‘mosaic’ effect mentioned in Section 3.2 of 
the paper) which, in the case of vulnerable users such as children, could be scrutinised 
by all types of offenders and which could lead to a risk of harm or distress. 
 
Innate Properties of Personal Information  
Although high-profile data breaches have begun to alert users to considering how the 
information they provide is processed by governments and the private sector, vast 
amounts of personal information remain publicly-accessible and unprotected on the 
Internet, placed there voluntarily by members of the public who may not appreciate the 
risks, for instance, because they are part of a generation for whom communication via 
social networking sites such as ‘YouTube’, ‘FaceBook’, ‘MySpace’ and ‘Twitter’ is an 
integral aspect of their social lives. A major security issue with social networking sites 
is that membership of the communities is granted entirely on a basis of trust, without 
employing additional means of authentication.  
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An example of the potential damage that might occur following a personal data breach 
was reported by the UK newspaper The Guardian in July 2009. 7 The paper described 
the controversial circumstances which have led to the ongoing court case of Anthony 
O’Shea who claims he was a victim of identity theft and who was jailed for 5 months as 
part of Operation Ore, a major police operation which targeted thousands of individuals 
suspected of accessing illegal child-related materials. 
Mr O’Shea’s solicitor argued that ‘hundreds’ of people might have been wrongfully 
convicted because their identities were stolen by paedophiles who used them to make 
illegal purchases on Landslide Inc, a website containing adult pornography and child 
abuse images, with huge personal consequences such as the loss of their livelihood 
and health. 
The case has divided experts, with some finding evidence of fraud and others certain 
that the convictions in question are valid. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that paedophiles, when apprehended, are particularly adept at using every facet of 
the law that they can find in their favour. At the same time, the possibility that hundreds 
of identities may have been deliberately compromised in order to commit crimes of this 
nature must be thoroughly investigated as a crime in itself. Thus, the possibility that 
online ID theft was committed (on the surface, a fairly straightforward type of crime) 
has perhaps affected the lives of hundreds of people adversely and has led to legal 
boundaries being tested. 
 
Jurisdictional Arbitrage 
 
Unfortunately, the deregulated environment of the original Internet, which was built on 
mutual trust and which encouraged free market rapid business development, has not 
proved to be sustainable. Jurisdictional arbitrage is a term to describe the exploitation 
of legal loopholes which all types of offenders, including organised crime groups, 
exploit to evade capture.  
 
Offenders can base their enterprises in ‘safe havens’ where they are unlikely to be 
prosecuted, for instance in countries where their acts may not be recognised as 
crimes. Law enforcers in many countries do not enjoy the same freedom and may be 
hampered by complicated evidence trails, legal red tape and non-co-operation. 8 
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Ubiquity  
In addition to becoming more interconnected, modern information technology is 
increasingly ubiquitous (present in many environments). Together, these two factors 
vastly increase the potential tools which offenders can employ when committing their 
crimes, for instance when technologies such as web and e-mail access are combined 
within the new generations of mobile telephony. 
For instance, in the UK in August 2009, a serving prisoner was convicted for co-
ordinating a cocaine-smuggling operation from his cell using a mobile phone and sim 
cards which had been smuggled into the jail. His contacts included a fellow prisoner 
who was serving his sentence in Panama. 9 
In a separate incident,  it was alleged by SOCA (and disputed by the UK Prison 
Service) that imprisoned organised crime group leaders were passing their orders to 
external group members using ‘code words in chat-room facilities on interactive 
games. 10 
 ‘The Times’ quoted Bill Hughes (the Director General of SOCA) as saying that 
‘organised crime bosses were operating their multimillion-pound empires from behind 
bars by using internet games to pass on their orders. Some were using code words in 
chat-room facilities on interactive games to operate from within jails…’  
 
Although the claim was denied by the Prison Service, ‘SOCA stood by its intelligence’. 
Whether or not this particular allegation is proven, the technique is simple and could be 
feasible in any environment.  
The UK Government has responded to this type of situation by publishing its 
commitment to tackle the issue in its recent Home Office report, ‘Extending Our 
Reach’. This includes extending its mobile phone-blocking pilot and updating the 
legislation which addresses mobile phone smuggling and possession within prisons. 11 
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